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Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities
Defending The Multiple Realization Argument Against The Identity Theory, David Barrett
Defending The Multiple Realization Argument Against The Identity Theory, David Barrett
Graduate Theses and Dissertations
A classic argument in the philosophy of mind is that the identity theory is false because mental state types are multiply realized in brain state types. In this dissertation I provide a detailed elaboration of the argument and a defense of it against a few of its prominent contemporary critics. Finally I offer empirical evidence from inter-species differences in humans and monkeys, and also from a case of extensive neural plasticity, which shows that mental state types are multiply realized in brain state types.
Divine Hiddenness And The Challenge Of Inculpable Nonbelief, Matthew R. Sokoloski
Divine Hiddenness And The Challenge Of Inculpable Nonbelief, Matthew R. Sokoloski
Graduate Theses and Dissertations
Divine hiddenness is the idea that God is in some sense hidden or obscure. This dissertation responds to J.L. Schellenberg's argument, based on divine hiddenness and human reason, against the existence of God. Schellenberg argues that if a perfectly loving God exists, we would not expect to find such widespread nonbelief in God's existence. Given the amount of reasonable nonbelief in the world, Schellenberg argues that an agnostic ought to conclude that God does not exist rather than conclude that God is hidden. Schellenberg's argument has three major premises: (1) If there is a God, he is perfectly loving; (2) …
Steadfastness And The Epistemology Of Disagreement, Chad Andrew Bogosian
Steadfastness And The Epistemology Of Disagreement, Chad Andrew Bogosian
Graduate Theses and Dissertations
Suppose that you and an intellectual peer disagree about some proposition P in a field like philosophy, ethics, science, religion, politics, etc. As intellectual peers, they are roughly of equal intelligence and equally virtuous with respect to evaluating the evidence E in support of P. What is the epistemic significance of you and an intellectual `peer' disagreeing about whether some body of evidence E supports a given proposition P? Can two epistemic peers reasonably disagree? In Chapter 1, I consider the Equal Weight View according to which rationality requires you to give equal weight to you peer's response to the …