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Perry, Wittgenstein's Builders And Metasemantics, Robert J. Stainton Dec 2008

Perry, Wittgenstein's Builders And Metasemantics, Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

The paper discusses in detail John Perry’s important article “Davidson’s Sentences and Wittgenstein’s Builders”. Perry argues, on the basis of Wittgenstein’s famous block/slab language, that words make direct metasemantic contact with the world. The present paper urges that, while Perry’s conclusions are correct and important, the arguments provided for them, in his 1994 article, ignore essential features of genuine words in natural language. A more empirically-oriented alternative tactic for supporting the same philosophical conclusions is then provided, and its advantages and disadvantages are weighed.

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Neither Fragments Nor Ellipsis, Robert J. Stainton Dec 2005

Neither Fragments Nor Ellipsis, Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

No abstract provided.

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Introduction To Ellipsis And Non-Sentential Speech, Ray Elugardo, Robert J. Stainton Dec 2004

Introduction To Ellipsis And Non-Sentential Speech, Ray Elugardo, Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

No abstract provided.

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In Defense Of Non-Sentential Assertion, Robert J. Stainton Dec 2004

In Defense Of Non-Sentential Assertion, Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

A defense of non-sentential assertion against Jason Stanley and Peter Ludlow

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Shorthand, Syntactic Ellipsis, And The Pragmatic Determinants Of What Is Said, Reinaldo Elugardo, Robert J. Stainton Aug 2004

Shorthand, Syntactic Ellipsis, And The Pragmatic Determinants Of What Is Said, Reinaldo Elugardo, Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

Our first aim in this paper is to respond to four novel objections in Jason Stanley's 'Context and Logical Form'. Taken together, those objections attempt to debunk our prior claims that one can perform a genuine speech act by using a sub‐sentential expression—where by 'sub‐sentential expression' we mean an ordinary word or phrase, not embedded in any larger syntactic structure. Our second aim is to make it plausible that, pace Stanley, there really are pragmatic determinants of the literal truth‐conditional content of speech acts. We hope to achieve this second aim precisely by defending the genuineness of sub‐sentential speech acts. …

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The Pragmatics Of Non-Sentences, Robert J. Stainton Dec 2003

The Pragmatics Of Non-Sentences, Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

No abstract provided.

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Logical Form And The Vernacular, Reinaldo Elugardo, Robert J. Stainton Aug 2001

Logical Form And The Vernacular, Reinaldo Elugardo, Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

Vernacularism is the view that logical forms are fundamentally assigned to natural language expressions, and are only derivatively assigned to anything else, e.g., propositions, mental representations, expressions of symbolic logic, etc. In this paper, we argue that Vernacularism is not as plausible as it first appears because of non-sentential speech. More specifically, there are argument-premises, meant by speakers of non-sentences, for which no natural language paraphrase is readily available in the language used by the speaker and the hearer. The speaker can intend this proposition and the hearer can recover it (and its logical form). Since they cannot, by hypothesis, …

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The Meaning Of 'Sentences', Robert J. Stainton Dec 1999

The Meaning Of 'Sentences', Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

A familiar argument for sentence primacy is shown to rest on a false empirical claim.

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Unembedded Definite Descriptions And Relevance, Robert J. Stainton Oct 1998

Unembedded Definite Descriptions And Relevance, Robert J. Stainton

Robert J. Stainton

Definite descriptions (e.g. 'The king of France in 1997', 'The teacher of Aristotle') do not stand for particulars. Or so I will assume. The semantic alternative has seemed to be that descriptions only have meaning within sentences: i.e., that their semantic contribution is given syncategorimatically. This doesn't seem right, however, because descriptions can be used and understood outside the context of any sentence. Nor is this use simply a matter of "ellipsis." Since descriptions do not denote particulars, but seem to have a meaning in isolation, I propose that they be assigned generalized quantifiers as denotations — i.e. a kind …

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Quantifier Phrases, Meaningfulness 'In Isolation', And Ellipsis, Robert J. Stainton Dec 1997