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Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities
Animals Aren’T Persons, But Is It Time For A Neologism?, Helen Steward
Animals Aren’T Persons, But Is It Time For A Neologism?, Helen Steward
Animal Sentience
Mark Rowlands argues that at least some animals are persons, based on the idea that (i) many animals have a property he calls “pre-reflective awareness,” (ii) the capacity for pre-reflective awareness is sufficient to satisfy the traditional Lockean definition of personhood, and (iii) satisfaction of the traditional Lockean definition of personhood is sufficient for being a person. I agree with (i) and can see that there is a persuasive case for (ii), but I think the case against (iii) blocks the conclusion that animals are persons. I suggest that we may need instead to coin a neologism in order to …
Unconscious Higher-Order Thoughts (Hots) As Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness?, Rocco J. Gennaro
Unconscious Higher-Order Thoughts (Hots) As Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness?, Rocco J. Gennaro
Animal Sentience
Rowlands argues that many nonhuman animals are “persons,” contrary to the prevailing orthodoxy which rests on a mistaken conception of the kind of self-awareness relevant to personhood. He argues that self-awareness bifurcates into two importantly different forms — reflective self-awareness and pre-reflective self-awareness — and that many animals can have the latter, which is sufficient for personhood. I agree that there is good reason to think that many animals can have pre-reflective self-awareness, but I think Rowlands is mistaken about its nature. His account runs the risk of leading to an infinite regress objection, and his notion of pre-reflective self-awareness …
Are Animals Persons?, Mark Rowlands
Are Animals Persons?, Mark Rowlands
Animal Sentience
It is orthodox to suppose that very few, if any, nonhuman animals are persons. The category “person” is restricted to self-aware creatures: humans (above a certain age) and possibly some of the great apes and cetaceans. I argue that this orthodoxy should be rejected, because it rests on a mistaken conception of the kind of self-awareness relevant to personhood. Replacing this with a sense of self-awareness that is relevant requires us to accept that personhood is much more widely distributed through the animal kingdom.
The Intersectional Influences Of Prince: A Human-Animal Tribute, Annie K. Potts
The Intersectional Influences Of Prince: A Human-Animal Tribute, Annie K. Potts
Animal Studies Journal
Prince Rogers Nelson (1958-2016) was best known for his joyful funk music and electrifying stage performances that transgressed normative representations of gender, sexuality, race, spirituality, identity and taste. He was also a compassionate person who held deep convictions about freedom and the right of all species to enjoy lives without fear and suffering. This essay discusses Prince’s intersectional influences – the various ways his virtuosity over the past 38 years disrupted binaries, challenged assumptions and stereotypes, advocated for social justice, and combatted speciesism in its many forms. Embedded within the essay are seven personal tributes written by fans of Prince …
Animals And African Ethics, Luis Cordeiro-Rodrigues
Animals And African Ethics, Luis Cordeiro-Rodrigues
Between the Species
This article is a book review of the book Animals and African Ethics by Kai Horsthemke. I argue this is a brilliant book that gives a clear overview of how Africans see animals. However, I also contend that Horsthemke could have had a more charitable approach to African ideas and explore how an African theory of animal rights can be built upon this.
Killing And Feeling Bad: Animal Experimentation And Moral Stress, Mike R. King
Killing And Feeling Bad: Animal Experimentation And Moral Stress, Mike R. King
Animal Studies Journal
This paper is prompted by the introspective account of animal experimentation provided by Marks in his paper ‘Killing Schrödinger’s Feral Cat’ in this journal. I offer an ethical interpretation of Marks' paper, and add personal reflections based on my own experiences of being involved in animal experimentation. Identifying the emotional and cognitive experiences of Marks and myself with Rollin’s concept of ‘moral stress’ I explore this effect that conducting animal experimentation can have on the people involved. I argue, based partly on personal anecdotal experience, that this stress varies depending on the organisational structure of animal experimentation, and one’s position …