Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Arts and Humanities Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 10 of 10

Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities

Love And Ethics In The Works Of J. M. E. Mctaggart, Trevor J. Bieber Dec 2014

Love And Ethics In The Works Of J. M. E. Mctaggart, Trevor J. Bieber

Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository

This dissertation attempts to make contributions to normative ethics and to the history of philosophy. First, it contributes to the defense of consequentialist ethics against objections grounded upon the value of loving relationships. Secondly, it provides the first systematic account of John M. E. McTaggart’s (1866-1925) ethical theory and its relation to his philosophy of love.

According to (maximizing) consequentialist ethics, it is always morally wrong to knowingly do what will make the world worse-off than it could have been (i.e., had one chosen one of the other courses of action available to one at the time). Many ...


On Good People: A New Defense Of Rule-Consequentialism, Ryan Jenkins Aug 2014

On Good People: A New Defense Of Rule-Consequentialism, Ryan Jenkins

Philosophy Graduate Theses & Dissertations

Rule-consequentialism is an ethical theory that does a better job than any other of justifying our moral intuitions from a single overarching principle. My dissertation defends a novel formulation of this view as an account of a good person.

First, I argue that a rule-consequentialist does “what a good person would do,” and that if everyone were like her, the world would be as good as possible.

Second, good people sometimes do more than is required of them, and so a theory of the good person must explain supererogation, i.e. “going above and beyond the call of duty.”

Third ...


On Good People: A New Defense Of Rule-Consequentialism, Ryan Jenkins Jun 2014

On Good People: A New Defense Of Rule-Consequentialism, Ryan Jenkins

Philosophy Graduate Theses & Dissertations

Rule-consequentialism is an ethical theory that does a better job than any other of justifying our moral intuitions from a single overarching principle. My dissertation defends a novel formulation of this view as an account of a good person.

First, I argue that a rule-consequentialist does "what a good person would do," and that if everyone were like her, the world would be as good as possible.

Second, good people sometimes do more than is required of them, and so a theory of the good person must explain supererogation, i.e. "going above and beyond the call of duty."

Third ...


A Defence Of Epistemic Consequentialism, Jeffrey Dunn Jun 2014

A Defence Of Epistemic Consequentialism, Jeffrey Dunn

Philosophy Faculty publications

Epistemic consequentialists maintain that the epistemically right (e.g., the justified) is to be understood in terms of conduciveness to the epistemic good (e.g., true belief). Given the wide variety of epistemological approaches that assume some form of epistemic consequentialism, and the controversies surrounding consequentialism in ethics, it is surprising that epistemic consequentialism remains largely uncontested. However, in a recent paper, Selim Berker has provided arguments that allegedly lead to a ‘rejection’ of epistemic consequentialism. In the present paper, it is shown that reliabilism—the most prominent form of epistemic consequentialism, and one of Berker's main targets—survives ...


The Deontic Cycling Problem, William Simkulet Jan 2014

The Deontic Cycling Problem, William Simkulet

Philosophy & Comparative Religion Department Faculty Publications

In his recent article "Deontic Cycling and the Structure of Commonsense Morality," Tim Willenken argues that commonsense ethics allows for rational agents having both ranked reasons (A > B, B > C, and A > C) and cyclical reasons (A < B, B < C, and A > C). His goal is to show that not all plausible views are variations of consequentialism, as consequentialism requires ranked reasons. I argue instances of apparent deontic cycling in commonsense morality are the byproducts of incomplete characterizations of the cases in question.


Trains, Trolley Cars, And Lifeboats: A Solution To Agent-Centered Restrictions And Tragic Questions Through The Application Of Middle Theory, Eric Christopher Ferrer Jan 2014

Trains, Trolley Cars, And Lifeboats: A Solution To Agent-Centered Restrictions And Tragic Questions Through The Application Of Middle Theory, Eric Christopher Ferrer

CMC Senior Theses

This Thesis will examine how the framing of ‘trolley problems’ incorrectly motivates arithmetic rankings of states of affairs by removing context. This is problematic because the context of these problems provides the tools to solve moral dilemmas by allowing one to analyze the relevant motivations, moral implications, duties, values, and personal and societal obligations that one has. I will discuss Samuel Scheffler’s charge that a paradox exists within agent-centered restrictions and how his abstract paradigmatic case leads to arithmetic rankings of choices, which are both unrealistic and lead to tragic and morally unacceptable decision making. I will argue that ...


"Freedom And Resentment" And Consequentialism: Why: 'Strawson's Point' Is Not Strawson's Point, Dale E. Miller Jan 2014

"Freedom And Resentment" And Consequentialism: Why: 'Strawson's Point' Is Not Strawson's Point, Dale E. Miller

Philosophy Faculty Publications

In The Second-Person Standpoint, Stephen Darwall offers an interpretation of P. F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” according to which the essay advances the thesis that good consequences are the “wrong kind of reason” to justify “practices of punishment and moral responsibility.” Darwall names this thesis “Strawson’s Point.” I argue for a different reading of Strawson, one according to which he holds this thesis only in a qualified way and, more generally, is not the unequivocal critic of consequentialism that Darwall makes him out to be. In fact, I contend, Strawson’s account of the reactive attitudes can potentially ...


How To Gauge Moral Intuitions? Prospects For A New Methodology, Attila Tanyi, Martin Bruder Dec 2013

How To Gauge Moral Intuitions? Prospects For A New Methodology, Attila Tanyi, Martin Bruder

Attila Tanyi

Examining folk intuitions about philosophical questions lies at the core of experimental philosophy. This requires both a good account of what intuitions are and methods allowing to assess them. We propose to combine philosophical and psychological conceptualisations of intuitions by focusing on three of their features: immediacy, lack of inferential relations, and stability. Once this account of intuition is at hand, we move on to propose a methodology that can test all three characteristics without eliminating any of them. In the final part of the paper, we propose implementations of the new methodology as applied to the experimental investigation of ...


Overdemanding Consequentialism? An Experimental Approach, Attila Tanyi, Martin Bruder Dec 2013

Overdemanding Consequentialism? An Experimental Approach, Attila Tanyi, Martin Bruder

Attila Tanyi

According to act-consequentialism the right action is the one that produces the best results as judged from an impersonal perspective. Some claim that this requirement is unreasonably demanding and therefore consequentialism is unacceptable as a moral theory. The article breaks with dominant trends in discussing this so-called Overdemandingness Objection. Instead of focusing on theoretical responses, it empirically investigates whether there exists a widely shared intuition that consequentialist demands are unreasonable. This discussion takes the form of examining what people think about the normative significance of consequentialist requirements. In two experiments, the article finds that although people are sensitive to consequentialist ...


Consequentialism And Its Demands: A Representative Study, Attila Tanyi, Martin Bruder Dec 2013

Consequentialism And Its Demands: A Representative Study, Attila Tanyi, Martin Bruder

Attila Tanyi

An influential objection to act-consequentialism holds that the theory is unduly demanding. This paper is an attempt to approach this critique of act-consequentialism – the Overdemandingness Objection – from a different, so far undiscussed, angle. First, the paper argues that the most convincing form of the Objection claims that consequentialism is overdemanding because it requires us, with decisive force, to do things that, intuitively, we do not have decisive reason to perform. Second, in order to investigate the existence of the intuition, the paper reports empirical evidence of how people see the normative significance of consequentialist requirements.. In a scenario study that ...