Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Arts and Humanities Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Philosophy

2014

Cleveland State University

Moral responsibility

Articles 1 - 4 of 4

Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities

Shaky Ground, William Simkulet Jan 2014

Shaky Ground, William Simkulet

Philosophy and Religious Studies Department Faculty Publications

The debate surrounding free will and moral responsibility is one of the most intransigent debates in contemporary philosophy - but it does not have to be. At its heart, the free will debate is a metaethical debate - a debate about the meaning of certain moral terms - free will, moral responsibility, blameworthiness, praiseworthiness. Compatibilists argue that these concepts are compatible with wholly deterministic world, while incompatibilists argue that these concepts require indeterminism, or multiple possible futures. However, compatibilists and incompatibilists do not disagree on everything - both parties agree that free will and moral responsibility require control - the …


Lucky Assassins: On Luck And Moral Responsibility, William Simkulet Jan 2014

Lucky Assassins: On Luck And Moral Responsibility, William Simkulet

Philosophy and Religious Studies Department Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Moral And Professional Accountability For Clinical Ethics Consultants, William Simkulet Jan 2014

Moral And Professional Accountability For Clinical Ethics Consultants, William Simkulet

Philosophy and Religious Studies Department Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


In Control, William Simkulet Jan 2014

In Control, William Simkulet

Philosophy and Religious Studies Department Faculty Publications

In George Sher’s recent article “Out of Control”, he discusses a series of 9 cases that he believes illustrates that some agents are uncontroversially morally responsible for actions they “cannot help” but perform (2006: 285). He argues these agents exert partial control over these actions insofar as their actions are determined from their character; but this is no control at all. Here I argue that in each of these cases the agent exerts morally relevant control over her actions and that none of these are genuine instances of moral luck, nor counterexamples to the control principle.