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Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities
A Critique Of The U.S. Genetic Privacy Act, Thomas A. Cavanaugh
A Critique Of The U.S. Genetic Privacy Act, Thomas A. Cavanaugh
Philosophy
No abstract provided.
“Playing God” And Bioethics, Thomas A. Cavanaugh
The Compatibility Of Divine Determinism And Human Freedom: A Modest Proposal, David P. Hunt
The Compatibility Of Divine Determinism And Human Freedom: A Modest Proposal, David P. Hunt
Philosophy
I begin by developing an argument for the conclusion that God's causally determining everything we do is compatible with human freedom. Libertarian theists (and not just libertarians) will suspect that something must be wrong with the argument. They are right, and T explain why. I then point out that certain influential arguments for the conclusion that God's foreknowing everything we do is compatible with human freedom are in the same logical boat as this fallacious argument. I look closely at tvvo of these, showing how they go astray. I conclude with some morals suggested by this cautionary tale.
Hegel, Antigone, And Women, Philip J. Kain
Hegel, Antigone, And Women, Philip J. Kain
Philosophy
When Hegel turns to a treatment of culture in Chapter VI of the Phenomenology—as anyone who has read his early writings would expect1—he begins with the ancient Greek polis. There the human spirit first fully emancipated itself from nature as it had not, in Hegel’s opinion, in Egypt; yet it was still in perfect harmony and balance with the natural. In Hegel’s view, this was an age of beaut y that produced a social community and an ethical life where citizens were free and at home. What is a bit surprising, though, is that in the Phenomenology Hegel does not …
On A Theological Counterexample To The Principle Of Alternate Possibilities, David P. Hunt
On A Theological Counterexample To The Principle Of Alternate Possibilities, David P. Hunt
Philosophy
In an earlier paper in this journal I suggested that the standard argument for theological fatalism provides a counterexample to one of its own premises, the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. David Widerker has recently urged in these pages three objections to my suggestion. I here argue that only the third of these objections raises a serious difficulty for my position, though even this difficulty is far from decisive.