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Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities
On The Signpost Principle Of Alternate Possibilities: Why Contemporary Frankfurt-Style Cases Are Irrelevant To The Free Will Debate, William Simkulet
On The Signpost Principle Of Alternate Possibilities: Why Contemporary Frankfurt-Style Cases Are Irrelevant To The Free Will Debate, William Simkulet
Philosophy and Religious Studies Department Faculty Publications
This article contends that recent attempts to construct Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs) are irrelevant to the debate over free will. The principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) states that moral responsibility requires indeterminism, or multiple possible futures. Frankfurt's original case purported to demonstrate PAP false by showing an agent can be blameworthy despite not having the ability to choose otherwise; however he admits the agent can come to that choice freely or by force, and thus has alternate possibilities. Neo-FSCs attempt to show that alternate possibilities are irrelevant to explaining an agent's moral responsibility, but a successful Neo-FSC would be consistent with …
The Curse Of Fortune; Responding To Luck Objections In An Uncooperative World, Kyle Morgan
The Curse Of Fortune; Responding To Luck Objections In An Uncooperative World, Kyle Morgan
Featured Research
The consensus scientific view holds that our world is indeterministic at the micro level, but practically deterministic at all other levels. In an indeterministic world, live alternative possibilities at the moment of decision render it impossible for agents to guarantee what they will choose; regardless of their personality and deliberative processes. Critics of indeterminist free will argue that this lack of a necessary connection between mental state and choice makes the ultimate decision fundamentally a matter of luck. As such, indeterminism opens free will up to potential problems of present luck. Additionally, large-scale determinism opens up free will to a …
A Morally Consistent Character Or Absolute Free Will: Which Should We Choose?, Sarah Woods
A Morally Consistent Character Or Absolute Free Will: Which Should We Choose?, Sarah Woods
Featured Research
“We are what we repeatedly do. Excellence, then, is not an act, but a habit.” This Aristotelian notion of how to lead a virtuous life is one that philosophers and scholars alike have respected and praised for centuries. Consistency in choosing the right path is the key to leading a fulfilling life, which is a notion many agree upon. While one person may hold Aristotelian notions of consistent excellence in character on a pedestal, this same person may also believe that in order for one to have free will and moral responsibility, one must have the ability at all times …
Rolling Back The Luck Problem For Libertarianism, Zac Cogley
Rolling Back The Luck Problem For Libertarianism, Zac Cogley
Journal Articles
I here sketch a reply to Peter van Inwagen’s Rollback Argument, which suggests that libertarian accounts of free agency are beset by problems involving luck. Van Inwagen imagines an indeterministic agent whose universe is repeatedly ‘rolled back’ by God to the time of her choice. Since the agent’s choice is indeterministic, her choices are sometimes different in the imaginary rollback scenarios. I show that although this is true, this need not impair her control over what she does. I develop an account of when and why the fact that an agent would choose differently impairs control, which provides a novel …