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Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities
The Principle Of Fairness And States’ Duty To Obey International Law, David Lefkowitz
The Principle Of Fairness And States’ Duty To Obey International Law, David Lefkowitz
Philosophy Faculty Publications
Philosophers and political theorists have developed a number of different justifications for the duty to obey domestic law. The possibility of using one (or more) of these justifications to demonstrate that states have a duty to obey international law seems a natural starting point for an analysis of international political obligation. Amongst the accounts of the duty to obey domestic law, one that appears to have a great deal of intuitive appeal, and that has attracted a significant number of philosophical defenders, is the principle of fairness (or fair play). In this paper, I examine the possibility of using the …
Jean Hampton’S Theory Of Punishment: A Critical Appreciation, Richard Dagger
Jean Hampton’S Theory Of Punishment: A Critical Appreciation, Richard Dagger
Political Science Faculty Publications
Jean Hampton’s work first came to my attention in 1984, when the summer issue of Philosophy & Public Affairs appeared in my mailbox. Hampton’s essay in that issue, “The Moral Education Theory of Punishment,” did not persuade me—or many others, I suspect—that “punishment should not be justified as a deserved evil, but rather as an attempt, by someone who cares, to improve a wayward person” (Hampton 1984, 237). The essay did persuade me, though, that moral education is a plausible aim of punishment, even if it is not the “full and complete justification” Hampton claimed it to be (Hampton 1984, …
Social Contracts, Fair Play, And The Justification Of Punishment, Richard Dagger
Social Contracts, Fair Play, And The Justification Of Punishment, Richard Dagger
Political Science Faculty Publications
In recent years, the counterintuitive claim that criminals consent to their own punishment has been revived by philosophers who attempt to ground the justification of punishment in some version of the social contract. In this paper, I examine three such attempts—“contractarian” essays by Christopher Morris and Claire Finkelstein and an essay by Corey Brettschneider from the rival “contractualist” camp—and I find all three unconvincing. Each attempt is plausible, I argue, but its plausibility derives not from the appeal to a social contract but from considerations of fair play. Rather than look to the social contract for a justification of punishment, …