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Ontological Independence In Aristotle's Categories, Phil Corkum

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Aristotle holds that substances (such as you and me) are ontologically independent from nonsubstances (such as our qualities and quantities) but nonsubstances are ontologically dependent on substances. There is then an asymmetry between substances and nonsubstances with respect to ontological dependence. Such asymmetry is widely and rightly thought to be a lynchpin of Aristotelian metaphysics. What is really real for Aristotle are such ordinary objects as you and me. Our properties - my paleness, your generosity - inhabit Aristotle's ontology only in so far as they are ours. This much we can all agree on; and I'll only briefly rehearse …

Metaphysics H 6 And The Problem Of Unity, Hye-Kyung Kim

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

I argue that H 6 should be taken as Aristotle's clarification on the causelessness in the unity of the parts of definition. In H 6 Aristotle is concerned with a general metaphysical problem affecting - threatening - his theory of substance at two major points. The unity of genus and differentia in the definition of form has to be accounted for without appealing to a unifying cause. If it were not accounted for, form would not be the primary cause of being and thus not primary substance. The unity of the parts of the definition of composite substance also has …

Sagp Newsletter 2003 2004 1 December, Anthony Preus

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Program of the 50th Anniversary Year of the Society, with the three divisions of the American Philosophical Association.

Saying, Meaning And Signifying: Aristotle's Λέγεται Πολλαχῶς, Jurgis (George) Brakas

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

The purpose of this essay is to identify the precise meaning of λέγεται as it appears in constructions such as those considered, as well as the meaning of those constructions themselves. My thesis is that λέγεται means “is uttered signifying something.” If we take this to be correct for the moment, then a construction as τἀγαθόν ἰσαχώς λέγεται τῶ ὄντι, γάρ εν πάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις λέγεται means “ ‘the good’ is uttered signifying as many things as ‘being’ is, for it is uttered signifying something in all the categories”-- for example: god in the category of substance, the virtues in …

Plato's Geometrical Logic, Mark Faller

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

Socrates’ brief mention of a complex problem in geometrical analysis at Meno (86d-87c) remains today a persistent mystery. The ostensible reason for the reference is to provide an analogy for the method of hypothesis from the use of hypotheses in analytic geometry. Both methods begin by assuming what is to be demonstrated and then show that the assumption leads to a well-founded truth father than something known to be false.

But why did Plato pick this particular problem in analysis and why at this particular place in the inquiry? For those of us who view the dialogues as pedagogical puzzles …

Form And Flux In The Theaetetus And Timaeus, David P. Hunt

The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter

The subject of this essay is the "Heraclitean" flux in the Theaetetus and its role in the discussion of the first definition of knowledge, particularly in light of the flux doctrine that Plato propounds in the Timaeus. There are two principal interpretive approaches to the argument in this part of the Theaetetus, and the question whether its theory of flux is, to any appreciable degree, Plato's own view is perhaps the central issue dividing the two camps. Though the Timaeus has been cursorily cited by the one camp, and as cursorily dismissed by the other, I believe that a closer …