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Are Ends Subject To Deliberation In Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics? A Reply To David Wiggins, Anthony Crifasi
Are Ends Subject To Deliberation In Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics? A Reply To David Wiggins, Anthony Crifasi
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
We focus upon the difficulties involved in Wiggin's interpretation of deliberation, since these form the basis for his later analyses. Wiggins grounds his thesis that ends are subject to deliberation upon the view that the various virtues are constituents of happiness. As constituents of the ultimate end itself, they would not be ordered to any higher end. Consequently, the virtues would be incommensurable with one another, since conflicts between virtues would not be resolvable in terms of any common end. It is perfectly understandable that under this view the sole arbiter of such conflicts would be “situational appreciation,” as Wiggins …
Are Ends Subject To Deliberation In Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics? A Reply To David Wiggins, Anthony Crifasi
Are Ends Subject To Deliberation In Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics? A Reply To David Wiggins, Anthony Crifasi
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
Conflicts between virtues would not result in the radical incommensurability described by Wiggins (having no common end at all). Such a highest end would by no means be a “universal rule” in the sense criticized by Wiggins in his reply to Allan, since particular circumstances could, as always, affect or prevent altogether the manner and means by which the end would be actualized. The “situational appreciation” of practical wisdom would therefore still play a vital role in the practical actualization of any virtue. Since the benefits of this interpretation include the elimination of radical incommensurability without appeal to universal Kantian …