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Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities
False Negatives, Steven Luper
False Negatives, Steven Luper
Philosophy Faculty Research
In Philosophical Explanations, Robert Nozick suggested that knowing that some proposition, p, is true is a matter of being “sensitive” to p’s truth-value. It requires that one’s belief state concerning p vary appropriately with the truth-value of p as the latter shifts in relevant possible worlds. Nozick fleshed out this sketchy view with a specific analysis of what sensitivity entails. Famously, he drew upon this analysis in order to explain how common-sense knowledge claims, such as my claim to know I have hands, are true, even though we do not know that skeptical hypotheses are false. His …
Naturalized Epistemology, Curtis Brown, Steven Luper
Naturalized Epistemology, Curtis Brown, Steven Luper
Philosophy Faculty Research
An explanation of the theory of naturalized epistemology, the theory of knowledge, what it is, how we can or should achieve it, and how much, if anything, we can know.
Restorative Rigging And The Safe Indication Account, Steven Luper
Restorative Rigging And The Safe Indication Account, Steven Luper
Philosophy Faculty Research
Typical Gettieresque scenarios involve a subject, S, using a method, M, of believing something, p, where, normally, M is a reliable indicator of the truth of p, yet, in S’s circumstances, M is not reliable: M is deleteriously rigged. A different sort of scenario involves rigging that restores the reliability of a method M that is deleteriously rigged: M is restoratively rigged. Some theorists criticize (among others) the safe indication account of knowledge defended by Luper, Sosa, and Williamson on the grounds that it treats such cases as knowledge. But other theorists also criticize the safe indication account because it …
Belief And Rationality, Curtis Brown, Steven Luper-Foy
Belief And Rationality, Curtis Brown, Steven Luper-Foy
Philosophy Faculty Research
We have gathered here a collection of papers at a point of intersection between epistemology and the philosophy of mind. The essays in this collection illuminate the bearing of issues about rationality on a variety of themes about belief, including the relation of belief to other propositional attitudes, the nature of the subjects who have beliefs, the nature of the objects of belief, and the ways in which we attribute content to beliefs.