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Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities
Righting Health Policy: Bioethics, Political Philosophy, And The Normative Justification Of Health Law And Policy, D. Robert Macdougall
Righting Health Policy: Bioethics, Political Philosophy, And The Normative Justification Of Health Law And Policy, D. Robert Macdougall
Publications and Research
In Righting Health Policy, D. Robert MacDougall argues that bioethics needs but does not have adequate tools for justifying law and policy. Bioethics’ tools are mostly theories about what we owe each other. But justifying laws and policies requires more; at a minimum, it requires tools for explaining the legitimacy of actions intended to control or influence others. It consequently requires political, rather than moral, philosophy. After showing how bioethicists have consistently failed to use tools suitable for achieving their political aims, MacDougall develops an interpretation of Kant’s political philosophy. On this account the legitimacy of health laws does …
Introduction To Philosophy, Ryan Mcelhaney
Introduction To Philosophy, Ryan Mcelhaney
Open Educational Resources
No abstract provided.
Intervention Principles In Pediatric Health Care: The Difference Between Physicians And The State., D. Robert Macdougall
Intervention Principles In Pediatric Health Care: The Difference Between Physicians And The State., D. Robert Macdougall
Publications and Research
According to various accounts, intervention in pediatric decisions is justified either by the best interests standard or by the harm principle. While these principles have various nuances that distinguish them from each other, they are similar in the sense that both focus primarily on the features of parental decisions that justify intervention, rather than on the competency or authority of the parties that intervene. Accounts of these principles effectively suggest that intervention in pediatric decision making is warranted for both physicians and the state under precisely the same circumstances. This essay argues that there are substantial differences in the competencies …
The Prospects For Change: The Question Of Justice In A Law & Society Framework, Michael W. Raphael
The Prospects For Change: The Question Of Justice In A Law & Society Framework, Michael W. Raphael
Graduate Student Publications and Research
What is the law and society framework and where has it gotten us? A student in a classroom might raise their hand and offer "understanding legal pluralism" as a possible answer. However, the conceptual problem with legal pluralism is the coexistence of potentially conflicting bases of justification. Given this, desiring to understand how the law shapes the structural underpinnings of whichever "legal" phenomena and its "ongoing transformation", is nevertheless an immense achievement that stops short of its underlying goal – the achievement of human dignity through human rights. For example, to talk about 'multi-stakeholder consultations' and other pithy phrases that …
Justice In Context: Assessing Contextualism As An Approach To Justice, Michael Buckley
Justice In Context: Assessing Contextualism As An Approach To Justice, Michael Buckley
Publications and Research
Moral and political philosophers are increasingly using empirical data to inform their normative theories. This has sparked renewed interest into questions concerning the relationship between facts and principles. A recent attempt to frame these questions within a broader approach to normative theory comes from David Miller, who has on several occasions defended ‘contextualism’ as the best approach to justice. Miller argues that the context of distribution itself brings one or another political principle into play. This paper examines this claim. It considers several plausible strategies for carrying out Miller’s general project and argues that each strategy fails. Nevertheless, the author …
The Truth About Kant On Lies, James E. Mahon
The Truth About Kant On Lies, James E. Mahon
Publications and Research
In this chapter I argue that there are three different senses of 'lie' in Kant's moral philosophy: the lie in the ethical sense (the broadest sense, which includes lies to oneself), the lie in the 'juristic' sense (the narrowest sense, which only includes lies that specifically harm particular others), and the lie in the sense of right (or justice), which is narrower than the ethical sense, but broader than the juristic sense, since it includes all lies told to others, including those who are bent on harming innocent others.