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Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities
Classical Philosophical Approaches To Lying And Deception, James E. Mahon
Classical Philosophical Approaches To Lying And Deception, James E. Mahon
Publications and Research
This chapter examines the views of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle on lying. It it outlines the differences between different kinds of falsehoods in Plato (real falsehoods and falsehoods in words), the difference between myths and lies, the 'noble' (i.e., pedigree) lie in The Republic, and how Plato defended rulers lying to non-rulers about, for example, eugenics. It considers whether Socrates's opposition to lying is consistent with Socratic irony, and especially with his praise of his interlocutors as wise. Finally, it looks at Aristotle's condemnation of lies, and asks whether lies to enemies, and self-deprecating lies by the magnanimous person, are …
Contemporary Approaches To The Philosophy Of Lying, James E. Mahon
Contemporary Approaches To The Philosophy Of Lying, James E. Mahon
Publications and Research
The chapter examines fifty years of philosophers working on lying - from the 1970s to the current day – focusing on how lying is defined (descriptively and normatively), whether lying involves an intention to deceive (Deceptionists) or not (Non-Deceptionists), why lying is wrong, and whether lying is worse than other forms of deception, including misleading with the truth. Philosophers discussed include Roderick Chisholm and Thomas Feehan, Alan Donagan, Sissela Boy, Charles Fried, David Simpson, David Simpson, Bernard Williams, Paul Faulkner, Thomas Carson, Roy Sorensen, Don Fallis, Jennifer Saul, Andreas Stoke, Jonathan Webber and Clea Rees
Secrets Vs. Lies: Is There A Moral Asymmetry?, James E. Mahon
Secrets Vs. Lies: Is There A Moral Asymmetry?, James E. Mahon
Publications and Research
In this chapter I argue that the traditional interpretation of the commonly accepted moral asymmetry between secrets and lies is incorrect. On the standard interpretation of the commonly accepted view, lies are prima facie or pro tango morally wrong, whereas secrets are morally permissible. I argue that, when secrets are distinguished from mere acts of reticence and non-acknowledgement, as well as from acts of deception, so that they are defined as acts of not sharing believed-information while believing that the believed-information is relevant, the correct interpretation of the commonly accepted moral asymmetry between secrets and lies is that secrets are …
The Noble Art Of Lying, James E. Mahon
The Noble Art Of Lying, James E. Mahon
Publications and Research
In this chapter I examine the writings of Mark Twain on lying, especially his essays "On the decay of the Art of Lying" and "My First Lie, and How I Got Out of It." I show that Twain held that there were two kinds of lies: the spoken lie and the silent lie. The silent lie is the lie of not saying what one is thinking, and is far more common than the spoken lie. The greatest silent lies, according to Twain, were the national silent lies that there was nothing wrong with slavery (the U.S.), that there was nothing …
Lying For The Sake Of The Truth: The Ethics Of Deceptive Journalism, James E. Mahon
Lying For The Sake Of The Truth: The Ethics Of Deceptive Journalism, James E. Mahon
Publications and Research
Should journalists go undercover and misrepresent who they are in order to write exposé stories? This chapter examines the case of Ken Silverstein, the Washington editor of Harper's Magazine. Silverstein lied to lobbying firms about being a prospective client so he could expose firms' strategies to help tyrannical regimes and dictators. Although a utilitarian ethical approach would dictate that Silverstein should have gone undercover and lied to obtain the truth, an approach based on virtue ethics would discourage such actions.
The Truth About Kant On Lies, James E. Mahon
The Truth About Kant On Lies, James E. Mahon
Publications and Research
In this chapter I argue that there are three different senses of 'lie' in Kant's moral philosophy: the lie in the ethical sense (the broadest sense, which includes lies to oneself), the lie in the 'juristic' sense (the narrowest sense, which only includes lies that specifically harm particular others), and the lie in the sense of right (or justice), which is narrower than the ethical sense, but broader than the juristic sense, since it includes all lies told to others, including those who are bent on harming innocent others.