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Philosophy

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City University of New York (CUNY)

Autonomy

Publication Year

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities

Neutrality, Autonomy, And Power, Eldar Sarajlic Nov 2016

Neutrality, Autonomy, And Power, Eldar Sarajlic

Publications and Research

This paper critically examines Alan Patten’s theory of neutrality of treatment. It argues that the theory assumes an inadequate conception of personal autonomy, which undermines its plausibility. However, I suggest that the theory can resolve the problem by developing and reinterpreting its conception of autonomy and introducing an additional strategy for addressing the power imbalances that result from the market-based interactions between individuals and their conceptions of the good.


Do Predictive Brain Implants Threaten Patient Autonomy Or Authenticity?, Eldar Sarajlic Nov 2015

Do Predictive Brain Implants Threaten Patient Autonomy Or Authenticity?, Eldar Sarajlic

Publications and Research

In this commentary, I discuss this Frederic Gilbert's claim that predictive brain implants (PBIs) threaten persons’ autonomy by diminishing their postoperative experience of self-control. Contrary to Gilbert, I suggest that PBIs do not pose a significant threat to patient’s autonomy, as self-control, but rather to his or her sense of authenticity. My claim is that the language of authenticity, already introduced in the recent bioethical literature, may offer a better way to voice some of the concerns with PBIs that Gilbert recognized.


Are Liberal Perfectionism And Neutrality Mutually Exclusive?, Eldar Sarajlic Oct 2015

Are Liberal Perfectionism And Neutrality Mutually Exclusive?, Eldar Sarajlic

Publications and Research

In this paper, I question the view that liberal perfectionism and neutrality are mutually exclusive doctrines. I do so by criticizing two claims made by Jonathan Quong. First, I object to his claim that comprehensive anti-perfectionism is incoherent. Second, I criticize his claim that liberal perfectionism cannot avoid a paternalist stance. I argue that Quong’s substantive assumptions about personal autonomy undermine both of his arguments. I use the discussion of Quong to argue that the standard assumption in liberal theory about mutual exclusivity of liberal perfectionism and neutrality needs to be reconsidered, and I show why the argument about the …