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Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities
Under The Veil, William Simkulet
The Deontic Cycling Problem, William Simkulet
The Deontic Cycling Problem, William Simkulet
William Simkulet
In his recent article "Deontic Cycling and the Structure of Commonsense Morality," Tim Willenken argues that commonsense ethics allows for rational agents having both ranked reasons (A > B, B > C, and A > C) and cyclical reasons (A < B, B < C, and A > C). His goal is to show that not all plausible views are variations of consequentialism, as consequentialism requires ranked reasons. I argue instances of apparent deontic cycling in commonsense morality are the byproducts of incomplete characterizations of the cases in question.
Trolley Cases And Autonomy Violation, William Simkulet
Trolley Cases And Autonomy Violation, William Simkulet
William Simkulet
No abstract provided.
Shaky Ground, William Simkulet
Shaky Ground, William Simkulet
William Simkulet
The debate surrounding free will and moral responsibility is one of the most intransigent debates in contemporary philosophy - but it does not have to be. At its heart, the free will debate is a metaethical debate - a debate about the meaning of certain moral terms - free will, moral responsibility, blameworthiness, praiseworthiness. Compatibilists argue that these concepts are compatible with wholly deterministic world, while incompatibilists argue that these concepts require indeterminism, or multiple possible futures. However, compatibilists and incompatibilists do not disagree on everything - both parties agree that free will and moral responsibility require control - the …
Moral And Professional Accountability For Clinical Ethics Consultants, William Simkulet
Moral And Professional Accountability For Clinical Ethics Consultants, William Simkulet
William Simkulet
No abstract provided.
Frowe's Machine Cases, William Simkulet
Frowe's Machine Cases, William Simkulet
William Simkulet
Helen Frowe (2006/2010) contends that there is a substantial moral difference between killing and letting die, arguing that in Michael Tooley's infamous machine case it is morally wrong to flip a coin to determine who lives or dies. Here I argue that Frowe fails to show that killing and letting die are morally inequivalent. However, I believe that she has succeeded in showing that it is wrong to press the button in Tooley's case, where pressing the button will change who lives and dies. I argue that because killing and letting die are morally equivalent we have no reason to …