Arts and Humanities Commons^™

The Value Of Judgmental Subjectivity, Paula Olmos

OSSA Conference Archive

Kuhn (1977) considered that criteria for scientific theory choice function as values and not as rules what implies: i) the debatable character of their attribution, ii) the gradual nature of their compliance and iii) the necessity to weigh them up in a multidimensional values-based judgment. Kuhn also emphasized: 1) the agent-related nature of processes involving the “recognition of values as reasons” and 2) the non-algorithmic and open character of the “justificatory dynamics of science”.

The Emotional Life Of Reason: Exploring Conceptions Of Objectivity, Robert C. Pinto, Laura E. Pinto

OSSA Conference Archive

This paper extends Pinto’s (2011) “Emotions and Reasons” (in which he argued that emotions provide reasons for action in so far as the beliefs and desires which make up reasons are constitutive elements of emotions) by exploring relationships between emotions-as-reasons and in (re)conceptualizing objectivity as naturalized to address the evaluative dimension. The paper addresses the emotional character of reason with respect to subjective and normative validity by shifting analysis to socially situated practices.

Mapping Objectivity And Bias In Relation To Argument, J. Anthony Blair

OSSA Conference Archive

The conference theme invites contrasts between objectivity and bias, since the two are commonly considered contraries. But there are a variety of meanings of the two and a corresponding variety of contraries. Thus there is a problem for any attempt to discuss bias and objectivity in relation to argument as a contrasting pair. Still, several senses of both terms relate to argumentation. I offer an inventory of them.

Ethical Argumentation, Objectivity, And Bias, Derek Allen

OSSA Conference Archive

On one account, the moral point of view is impartial, hence in this sense objective. On a different account, morality sometimes seems to recommend partiality, hence, in one sense of 'partiality,' bias. Still another view says that in some cases morality is neutral between impartiality and partiality in choosing between alternative actions. My main concern will be with impartiality and partiality (hence with objectivity and bias in corresponding senses of these words) in relation to arguments of the kind presented in first-order ethical argumentation (hence in relation to first-order ethical arguments). Part of my discussion will focus on one type …

Commentary On 'Pursuing Objectivity: How Virtuous Can You Get?', William R. Minto

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.

Revising Toulmin’S Model: Argumentative Cell And The Bias Of Objectivity, Thierry Herman

OSSA Conference Archive

This paper presents what we call with Plantin (1900, 2005) an argumentative cell as an unit which is inspired by Toulmin’s layout of arguments (and refined with linguistic insights), in order to analyse two major effects of pseudo-objectivity in argumentation. Four problems of Toulmin's layout will be tackled: (1) Data are only described as facts, (2) the definition of Backing is blurred, but it may be linked with sources of information (linguistic evidentiality) and extended to Data, (3) the dialectical component of the Rebuttal needs to be extended to concessions, and (4) dealing with complex argumentation (linked and convergent argument) …

Virtuous Vices: On Objectivity, Bias, And Virtue In Argumentation, Daniel H. Cohen, Katharina Stevens

OSSA Conference Archive

How is it possible that biases are cognitive vices, objectivity is an exemplary intellectual virtue, and yet objectivity is itself a bias? In this paper, we argue that objectivity is indeed a kind of bias but is still an argumentative virtue. In common with many biases – and many virtues – its effects are neither uniformly negative nor uniformly positive. Consequences alone are not enough to determine which character traits are argumentative virtues. Context matters.

The opening section addresses the problem of identifying argumentative virtues and provides a preliminary response to recent questions from Goddu and Godden regarding the foundations …

Emotional Legal Arguments And A Broken Leg, Rubens Damasceno-Morais

OSSA Conference Archive

We intend to examine ways that emotions may be intertwined within argumentative legal discourses. From the transcript of a brief trial in a Court of Appeal in Brazil we have the opportunity to observe how the emotional and rational reasoning live together in a deliberation among magistrates. “The leg broken case” allow us to examine how judges define the value of compensation to be paid in cases of moral damage. We show that not only technical arguments are the compounds of one decision; subjectivity is also important in that legal context. We would yet confirm what jurists and …

Exploring Argumentation, Objectivity, And Bias: The Case Of Mathematical Infinity, Ami Mamolo

OSSA Conference Archive

This paper presents an overview of several years of my research into individuals’ reasoning, argumentation, and bias when addressing problems, scenarios, and symbols related to mathematical infinity. There is a long history of debate around what constitutes “objective truth” in the realm of mathematical infinity, dating back to ancient Greece (e.g., Dubinsky et al., 2005). Modes of argumentation, hindrances, and intuitions have been largely consistent over the years and across levels of expertise (e.g., Brown et al., 2010; Fischbein et al., 1979, Tsamir, 1999). This presentation examines the interrelated complexities of notions of objectivity, bias, and argumentation as manifested in …

Another Dimension To Deep Disagreements: Trust In Argumentation, Moira L. Kloster

OSSA Conference Archive

I will connect the literature on deep disagreements with the literature on trust to construct a two-dimensional picture of the limits of argument. Argumentation and trust are important to the functioning of society, but each sets different expectations for when arguments can and should be used to resolve disagreements. When trust is factored in, we see a more nuanced picture of which disagreements will remain too deep for objective argument. Affective and social aspects of argument are not independent of procedure and content.

Definition: A Three-Dimensional Analysis With Bearing On Key Concepts, Robert H. Ennis Phd

OSSA Conference Archive

This essay presents a three-dimensional analysis of definition (form, stance, and content) with application to making and evaluating definitions; teaching how to define; avoiding equivocation with "argument" and "bias"; and, using the concept-conception distinction, avoiding being deterred by the many definitions of "critical thinking", and seeing the usefulness of objectivity in everyday arguments in spite of existing conflict and confusion about aspects of objectivity.

The Method Of Relevant Variables, Objectivity, And Boas, James B. Freeman

OSSA Conference Archive

L. J. Cohen has presented an understanding of appraising argument strength which applies to a variety of types of defeasible reasoning. This method can be used to explicate how a body of information may back a warrant and to rank different bodies of evidence on strength of backing. We shall argue that this method allows backing warrants objectively, whether they are inductive warrants backed by observation or moral warrants backed in part a priori. The method also suggests where arguments employing these warrants may be vulnerable to bias bias but need not be infected by it.

Objectivity In Newsmaking: An Argumentative Perspective, Marta Zampa

OSSA Conference Archive

Objectivity is a key concept in journalism studies, yet a controversial one. Scholars (e.g., Clayman and Heritage 2002; Hallin and Mancini 2004; Schudson 1978; 2001) disagree on what it precisely implies (distinguishing facts from opinions? Reporting only true facts? Being balanced in presenting positions?) and on how strictly journalists should stick to it. I claim that adopting an argumentative perspective enables to see how journalists deal with objectivity in everyday work. In fact, the objectivity requirement plays the role of endoxical premise in argumentative reasoning that takes place during newsroom decision-making. In the present paper, this is shown by analyzing …

Pursuing Objectivity: How Virtuous Can You Get?, José Ángel Gascón

OSSA Conference Archive

While, in common usage, objectivity is usually regarded as a virtue, and failures to be objective as vices, this concept tends to be absent in argumentation theory. This paper will explore the possibility of taking objectivity as an argumentative virtue. Several problems immediately arise: could objectivity be understood in positive terms— not only as mere absence of bias? Is it an attainable ideal? Or perhaps objectivity could be explained as a combination of other virtues?

Objectivity, Autonomy, And The Use Of Arguments From Authority, John Fields

OSSA Conference Archive

Objectivity, Autonomy, and the use of

Arguments from Authority

(PAPER)

Starting in the early modern era, the use of arguments from authority to support important factual claims began to be heavily criticized. Recent investigations into the nature of testimony, however, suggest that such criticisms are factually and normatively problematic. In this paper, the author argues for a model of testimonial authority that corrects this earlier, unrealistically individualistic picture of how person bear their burdens in the search for a common reality.

On Being Objective: Hard Data, Soft Data And Baseball., Michael A. Gilbert

OSSA Conference Archive

“Objective” is a term that has a long and sometimes tumultuous history and a wide range of meanings. The sense in which I am interested here is the one that refers to ways of thinking, and especially the explicit criticism of an argument or judgment as not being “objective,” as exemplified in the following.

• You’re not being objective.
• You have to look at it objectively.
• Objectively, the best choice is…
• Being objective, I’d have to say…

Implicit in these statements is an ideology that denigrates emotion and other communicative aspects in favour of an idealized sense of fact, data and …

Argument Objectivity And Ontological/Logical Pluralism: Must Arguments Be Domain Sensitive?, Philip Rose

OSSA Conference Archive

The idea of ontological/logical pluralism raises an interesting question about the objectivity of arguments and argument forms: Are all arguments and argument forms domain dependent? In his recent work Bruno Latour outlines a radical form of ontological pluralism in which each domain or “mode of existence” has its own set of “felicity conditions” that serve as “veridiction” conditions unique to that mode. To “speak well” requires that one speak in the “interpretive key” proper to each mode. Since there is no “meta-language” that crosses all modes, then all modes must be assessed using the felicity or veridiction conditions peculiar to …

Commentary On The Emotional Life Of Reason: Exploring Conceptions Of Objectivity, Moira Howes

OSSA Conference Archive

Robert Pinto and Laura Pinto advance a non-binary account of reason and emotion in the reasoning process and argue for a naturalistic understanding of objectivity that will allow for the evaluation of emotions as reasonable. Pinto and Pinto’s promising argument generates important and productive lines of inquiry. I suggest a few such lines of inquiry, including the idea that it may be important to support reflexivity and interpretive community with equanimity; that we should further examine the potential of new ideals of objectivity that explicitly incorporate emotion and virtue; and finally, that we should craft methodologies to deepen our understanding …

On The Objectivity Of Norms Of Argumentation, Michael Hoppmann

OSSA Conference Archive

This paper addresses the relationship between norms of reasoning and norms of politeness: To what extend can one be polite and reasonable at the same time? For this purpose, a normative system of reasoning (i.e. the model of the pragma-dialectical critical discussion) is contrasted with a normative system of politeness (Leech’s Politeness Maxims). If and when they are in conflict: How can the communicator solve this tension?

Does Happiness Increase The Objectivity Of Arguers?, Moira Howes

OSSA Conference Archive

At first glance, happiness and objectivity seem to have little in common. I claim, however, that subjective and eudaimonic happiness promotes arguer objectivity. To support my claim, I focus on connections between happiness, social intelligence, and intellectual virtue. After addressing objections concerning unhappy objective and happy unobjective arguers, I conclude that communities should value happiness in argumentative contexts and use happiness as an indicator of their capacity for objective argumentation.