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Philosophy

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OSSA Conference Archive

Walton

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Articles 1 - 10 of 10

Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities

Commentary On Michel Dufour’S “What Makes A Fallacy Serious?”, Hans Vilhelm Hansen Jun 2020

Commentary On Michel Dufour’S “What Makes A Fallacy Serious?”, Hans Vilhelm Hansen

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


What Makes A Fallacy Serious?, Michel Dufour Jun 2020

What Makes A Fallacy Serious?, Michel Dufour

OSSA Conference Archive

Among the defining criteria of a fallacy, Douglas Walton requires that its flaw must be serious. This allows his distinction between “serious” fallacies, minor ones, or mere blunders. But what makes a fallacy serious? Isn’t being fallacious serious enough? Walton leaves these questions unanswered but often calls to his distinction between sophism and paralogism. Several ways to apply the adjective “serious” to fallacies are discussed. Some depend on the type, others on structural aspects, and others on a dialectical background.


Institutionalized Argumentative Reasonableness - Commentary On Reijven, Jean H.M. Wagemans Jun 2020

Institutionalized Argumentative Reasonableness - Commentary On Reijven, Jean H.M. Wagemans

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


Commentary On Cionea And Hample, Michael Hoppmann May 2016

Commentary On Cionea And Hample, Michael Hoppmann

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


Walton’S Argumentation Schemes, Christoph Lumer May 2016

Walton’S Argumentation Schemes, Christoph Lumer

OSSA Conference Archive

The contribution critically discusses Walton's (and Reed’s and Macagno’s) argumentation scheme approach. On the one hand, its enormous richness and closeness to the empirical argumentation material is appreciated, but, on the other, fundamental conceptual weaknesses are revealed. Although the approach more recently has been declared to strive for “true beliefs and correct choices” it has not systematically developed the proposed schemes in a way that these goals are reached. Accordingly, many proposed schemes are fallacious from an epistemological standpoint.


Couples’ Dialogue Orientations, Dale Hample, Ioana A. Cionea May 2016

Couples’ Dialogue Orientations, Dale Hample, Ioana A. Cionea

OSSA Conference Archive

Walton has distinguished among several sorts of argumentative dialogues (persuasion, negotiation, information seeking, deliberation, inquiry, and eristic). This paper continues the project of measuring individuals’ self-reported preferences for each dialogue type. In this study, long-term romantic couples were surveyed to examine if their dialogue preferences matched, and whether their preferences were, in turn, related to their relational satisfaction.


Dialogue Types: A Scale Development Study, Ioana A. Cionea, Dale Hample, Edward L. Fink May 2013

Dialogue Types: A Scale Development Study, Ioana A. Cionea, Dale Hample, Edward L. Fink

OSSA Conference Archive

This paper presents the results of a quantitative study in which self-report scales were developed to measure four of the six dialogue types proposed by Walton (1998): persuasion, negotiation, information-seeking, and eristic dialogues. The paper details the research design, presents the measurement instruments developed, and describes the analyses conducted to assess the dimensionality and reliability of the proposed scales.


The Epistemic Relevance Of Social Considerations In Ordinary Day-To-Day Presumptions, Fred J. Kauffeld May 2013

The Epistemic Relevance Of Social Considerations In Ordinary Day-To-Day Presumptions, Fred J. Kauffeld

OSSA Conference Archive

The involvement of social considerations in our ordinary conception of presumption and corresponding plain practice of presuming things raises doubts as to whether they afford epistemically satisfying bases for rational argumentation. To some (e.g., Nicholas Rescher) this involvement illuminates important modes of discursive inquiry; to others (e.g., Douglas Walton and David Godden) it points to the need for theoretically based reform or regulation of our ordinary practices. This paper attempts to clarify and defend the epistemic value of ordinary presumptions.


A Gendered Analysis Of The Role Of Authority In Argumentation, Khameiel Al Tamimi, John E. Fields May 2011

A Gendered Analysis Of The Role Of Authority In Argumentation, Khameiel Al Tamimi, John E. Fields

OSSA Conference Archive

The first part of this paper will look at how essential features of power and authority affect the credibility of arguments. Empirical evidence from communication studies and feminist writings, such Sue Campbell, and Robin Lakoff, shows that there is inherent disparity in the reception of arguments when presented by men and women. The second part will aim to elucidate how this problem of lack of authority is not addressed by the ad verecundiam fallacy.


Androcentrism As A Fallacy Of Argumentation, Catherine Hundleby, Claudio Duran May 2011

Androcentrism As A Fallacy Of Argumentation, Catherine Hundleby, Claudio Duran

OSSA Conference Archive

The deep operation of androcentrism in scientific argumentation demands recognition as a form of fallacy. On Walton’s (1995) account, fallacies are serious mistakes in argumentation that employ presumptions acceptable in other circumstances. There are only isolated cases in which androcentric pre-sumptions are acceptable, and I argue that androcentrism affects an overarching theme of generalization in science rather than an isolated scheme. Androcentrism is related to other ways of treating privileged people as exemplary humans, whose negative impact on processes of argumentation can be described as the fallacy of “appeal to the standard.”