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Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities
A Commentary On Tracy Bowell’S “Whataboutisms, Arguments And Argumentative Harm”, Mark Battersby
A Commentary On Tracy Bowell’S “Whataboutisms, Arguments And Argumentative Harm”, Mark Battersby
OSSA Conference Archive
A commentary on Tracy Bowell's Whataboutisms, Arguments and Argumentative Harm summarizing her arguments and suggesting that the use of "argumentative harm" is not a helpful way to identify fallacious uses of "whatabout" questions.
Commentary On: Michael Gilbert’S “Understanding The Embrace Of Fallacy: A Multi-Modal Analysis”, Jean Goodwin
Commentary On: Michael Gilbert’S “Understanding The Embrace Of Fallacy: A Multi-Modal Analysis”, Jean Goodwin
OSSA Conference Archive
If the goal to inquire into, understand, and respond to what it for someone to be “anti-vax,” the concept of fallacy seems the wrong tool to pick up.
Understanding The Embrace Of Fallacy: A Multi-Modal Analysis, Michael A. Gilbert
Understanding The Embrace Of Fallacy: A Multi-Modal Analysis, Michael A. Gilbert
OSSA Conference Archive
I want to suggest that we can attain a deeper understanding of fallacies if we 1) examine them in situ, and 2) apply a multi-modal analysis to them. That is to say that there is a need to examine the logical, emotional, visceral and kisceral aspects of fallacies in order to understand why an arguer uses a fallacy (Gilbert 1997). Toward this end I will examine the embrace of fallacies and the circumstances in which they are used. The first is the use of the ad vericundiam and post hoc ergo propter hoc in the context of vaccine hesitancy. The …
What Makes A Fallacy Serious?, Michel Dufour
What Makes A Fallacy Serious?, Michel Dufour
OSSA Conference Archive
Among the defining criteria of a fallacy, Douglas Walton requires that its flaw must be serious. This allows his distinction between “serious” fallacies, minor ones, or mere blunders. But what makes a fallacy serious? Isn’t being fallacious serious enough? Walton leaves these questions unanswered but often calls to his distinction between sophism and paralogism. Several ways to apply the adjective “serious” to fallacies are discussed. Some depend on the type, others on structural aspects, and others on a dialectical background.
The Polysemy Of ‘Fallacy’—Or ‘Bias’, For That Matter, Frank Zenker
The Polysemy Of ‘Fallacy’—Or ‘Bias’, For That Matter, Frank Zenker
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Starting with a brief overview of current usages (Sect. 2), this paper offers some constituents of a use-based analysis of ‘fallacy’, listing 16 conditions that have, for the most part implicitly, been discussed in the literature (Sect. 3). Our thesis is that at least three related conceptions of ‘fallacy’ can be identified. The 16 conditions thus serve to “carve out” a semantic core and to distinguish three core-specifications. As our discussion suggests, these specifications can be related to three normative positions in the philosophy of human reasoning: the meliorist, the apologist, and the panglossian (Sect. 4). Seeking to make these …
Commentary On Enthymemes And Fallacy Gaps: Commentary On Paglieri, Scott F. Aikin
Commentary On Enthymemes And Fallacy Gaps: Commentary On Paglieri, Scott F. Aikin
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No abstract provided.
On The Difference Between Fallacy And Sophism, Michel Dufour
On The Difference Between Fallacy And Sophism, Michel Dufour
OSSA Conference Archive
The translation into French of the English word “fallacy” opens a discussion on the difference between fallacy and sophism in English. The two words are sometimes synonyms, but a difference is sometimes made on the ground that a sophism is deliberate and a fallacy is non-deliberate. In a second part of the paper this distinctive criterion is taken seriously to discuss the relative frequency of sophisms and of fallacies for a typical kind of fallacious argument. I claim that this aspect should be taken into account by a theory of fallacious argument.
Commentary On: Frank Zenkers’S “The Polysemy Of ‘Fallacy’– Or ‘Bias’, For That Matter”, Michel Dufour
Commentary On: Frank Zenkers’S “The Polysemy Of ‘Fallacy’– Or ‘Bias’, For That Matter”, Michel Dufour
OSSA Conference Archive
No abstract provided.
Fallacy And Argumentational Vice, Andrew Aberdein
Fallacy And Argumentational Vice, Andrew Aberdein
OSSA Conference Archive
If good argument is virtuous, then fallacies are vicious. Yet fallacies cannot just be identified with vices, since vices are dispositional properties of agents whereas fallacies are types of argument. Rather, if the normativity of good argumentation is explicable in terms of virtues, we should expect the wrongness of fallacies to be explicable in terms of vices. This approach is defended through case studies of several fallacies, with particular emphasis on the ad hominem.
Denying The Antecedent And Conditional Perfection Again, Andrei Moldovan
Denying The Antecedent And Conditional Perfection Again, Andrei Moldovan
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It has been argued that a fragment of discourse that constitutes a fallacy of denying the antecedent at the level of what is literally said may not be a fallacy at the level of speaker meaning. The pragmatic phenomenon involved here is known as conditional perfection. I argue that the account of conditional perfection in van der Auwera (1997) and Horn (2000) has several problems, and I discuss several possible alternatives.
The Abuses Of Argument: Understanding Fallacies On Toulmin's Layout Of Argument, Andrew Pineau
The Abuses Of Argument: Understanding Fallacies On Toulmin's Layout Of Argument, Andrew Pineau
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This paper provides a preliminary account of fallacies on Toulmin’s model of argument, one that improves upon previous attempts to understand fallacies on this argument scheme. To do this I examine Johnson and Blair’s (1983) taxonomy of three basic fallacies (irrelevant reason, hasty conclusion and problematic premise) on Toulmin’s layout.
The Use Of Hyperbole In The Argumentation Stage, A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans
The Use Of Hyperbole In The Argumentation Stage, A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans
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In this paper I investigate what role the stylistic device of hyperbole can play in arguers’ strategic maneuvers in the argumentation stage of a discussion. First, I give an analysis of the general effects the use of hyperbole may have in argumentative discourse. Next, I specify how hyperbole may contribute to arguers’ dialectical and rhetorical aims in the argumentation stage of a discussion.
Androcentrism As A Fallacy Of Argumentation, Catherine Hundleby, Claudio Duran
Androcentrism As A Fallacy Of Argumentation, Catherine Hundleby, Claudio Duran
OSSA Conference Archive
The deep operation of androcentrism in scientific argumentation demands recognition as a form of fallacy. On Walton’s (1995) account, fallacies are serious mistakes in argumentation that employ presumptions acceptable in other circumstances. There are only isolated cases in which androcentric pre-sumptions are acceptable, and I argue that androcentrism affects an overarching theme of generalization in science rather than an isolated scheme. Androcentrism is related to other ways of treating privileged people as exemplary humans, whose negative impact on processes of argumentation can be described as the fallacy of “appeal to the standard.”