Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 10 of 10
Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities
Metalinguistic Disagreements, Underdetermination And The Straw Man Fallacy: Toward Meaning Argumentativism, Marcin Lewinski
Metalinguistic Disagreements, Underdetermination And The Straw Man Fallacy: Toward Meaning Argumentativism, Marcin Lewinski
OSSA Conference Archive
The goal of this paper is to critically analyze some of the dubious assumptions about language and meaning hidden in the dominant accounts of the straw man fallacy. I will argue that against the background of the resurgent conception of language as an underdetermined and in-principle negotiable entity (Dorr & Hawthorne 2014; Ludlow 2014; Plunkett & Sundell 2013, 2019), some alleged straw man attacks are better seen as reasonable moves in the metalinguistic disagreements permeating our ordinary argumentative practice.
Listen Carefully! Fallacious Auditory Arguments, Gabrijela Kišiček
Listen Carefully! Fallacious Auditory Arguments, Gabrijela Kišiček
OSSA Conference Archive
In some cases, prosodic features (or other forms of sound) which accompany verbal message might be an essential part of an argument. The same as verbal, auditory arguments can also be fallacious. Prosodic features (e.g., word emphasis, pause) may contribute to making an auditory straw man fallacy or by manipulating voice quality, pitch or intonation one can make an auditory ad hominem. Also there are many potentially fallacious appeals to emotion.
Institutionalized Argumentative Reasonableness - Commentary On Reijven, Jean H.M. Wagemans
Institutionalized Argumentative Reasonableness - Commentary On Reijven, Jean H.M. Wagemans
OSSA Conference Archive
No abstract provided.
Halting Retreats To Metadialogues, Beth Innocenti
Halting Retreats To Metadialogues, Beth Innocenti
OSSA Conference Archive
How can social actors halt retreats to metadialogues that involve nit-picking or unwarranted charges, and why can they expect the strategies to work? Krabbe (2003) has proposed a dialectical regulation designed to forestall or halt retreats from ground-level discussions to metadialogues: paying the costs of the metadialogue. I argue that this dialectical regulation deserves to be taken seriously because it is realistic and encompasses a range of strategies that ordinary social actors take as reasonable.
Institutional And Institutionalized Fallacies: Diversifying Pragma-Dialectical Fallacy Judgments, Menno H. Reijven
Institutional And Institutionalized Fallacies: Diversifying Pragma-Dialectical Fallacy Judgments, Menno H. Reijven
OSSA Conference Archive
To improve argumentative discourse, it is necessary to make fallacy judgments which take into consideration the social practice in which argumentation occurs. In this paper, I propose four meta-categories for fallacies to study the connection of fallacies to their institutionalized discourse. Using the first 2016 U.S. Presidential Debate as a case study, I show how this framework can be used to propose improvements to argumentative contexts.
Employing And Exploiting The Presumptions Of Communication In Argumentation: An Application Of Normative Pragmatics, Scott Jacobs
Employing And Exploiting The Presumptions Of Communication In Argumentation: An Application Of Normative Pragmatics, Scott Jacobs
OSSA Conference Archive
Argumentation occurs through and as communicative activity. Communication (and therefore argumentation) is organized by pragmatic principles of expression and interpretation. Grice’s (1975) theory of conversational implicature provides a model for how people use rational principles to manage the ways in which they reason to representations of arguments, and not just reason from those representations. These principles are systematic biases that make possible reasonable decision-making and intersubjective understandings in the first place; but they also make possible all manner of errors and abuses. Much of what is problematic in argumentation involves the ways in which the pragmatic principles of communication are …
Commentary On: “Ad Stuprum: The Fallacy Of Appeal To Sex”, Maureen Linker
Commentary On: “Ad Stuprum: The Fallacy Of Appeal To Sex”, Maureen Linker
OSSA Conference Archive
No abstract provided.
Polylogical Fallacies: Are There Any?, Marcin Lewiński
Polylogical Fallacies: Are There Any?, Marcin Lewiński
OSSA Conference Archive
Dialectical fallacies are typically defined as breaches of the rules of a regulated discussion between two participants (di-logue). What if discussions become more complex and involve multiple parties with distinct positions to argue for (poly-logues)? Are there distinct argumentation norms of polylogues? If so, can their violations be conceptualized as polylogical fallacies? I will argue for such an approach and analyze two candidates for argumentative breaches of multi-party rationality: false dilemma and collateral straw man.
Trust Based On Bias: Cognitive Constraints On Source-Related Fallacies, Steve Oswald, Christopher Hart
Trust Based On Bias: Cognitive Constraints On Source-Related Fallacies, Steve Oswald, Christopher Hart
OSSA Conference Archive
This paper advances a cognitive account of the rhetorical effectiveness of fallacious arguments and takes the example of source-related fallacies. Drawing on cognitive psychology and evolutionary linguistics, we claim that a fallacy enforces accessibility and epistemic cognitive constraints on argument processing targeted at preventing the addressee from spotting its fallaciousness, by managing to prevent or circumvent critical reactions. We address the evolutionary bases of biases and the way that these are exploited in fallacious argumentation.
Fallacies: Do We “Use” Them Or “Commit” Them? Or: Is All Our Life Just A Collection Of Fallacies?, Igor Zagar, Dima Mohammed
Fallacies: Do We “Use” Them Or “Commit” Them? Or: Is All Our Life Just A Collection Of Fallacies?, Igor Zagar, Dima Mohammed
OSSA Conference Archive
After C. L. Hamblin's groundbreaking work Fallacies (1970), re-interpreting what used to be known as "mistakes in reasoning" or "bad arguments" since Aristotle (On Sophistical Refutations), the study of fallacies started to bloom, coming up with ever new perspectives and conceptualizations of what should count as a mistake in reasoning and argumentation, and why a certain kind of reasoning should at all be considered a mistake (Woods & Walton 1989, van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992, etc.). This paper will be concerned with two questions. First, an epistemological one: do we (unintentionally) commit fallacies, or do we (intentionally) use them? Secondly, …