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Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities
Coding Empathy, Fabrizio Macagno, Chrysi Rapanta
Coding Empathy, Fabrizio Macagno, Chrysi Rapanta
OSSA Conference Archive
In rhetoric, empathy – the ability to put oneself inside the interlocutor’s position in an argument – has been considered as the bridge between the orator and the interlocutors. Despite its crucial importance, no studies have addressed the challenge of operationalizing this concept, translating it into proxies that can be used for determining how empathic a dialogue is. This paper intends to propose a coding scheme for capturing two dimensions of empathy in dialogue – otherness and relevance.
Does Taste Counts As Evidence In Argumentation?, Daniel Mejía
Does Taste Counts As Evidence In Argumentation?, Daniel Mejía
OSSA Conference Archive
This paper is intended to answer the question of whether taste represents some kind of evidence in argumentation. To do this, the text is divided into four parts: first, the relationship between the technique of reconstruction and the definitions of argumentation is exposed. Second, different borderline cases that limit the use of this technique are discussed. Third, a dialogue where the argument appeals to taste is presented as another borderline case. Fourth, the role of taste as evidence (ground) for the analyzed argument is explored.
What Makes A Fallacy Serious?, Michel Dufour
What Makes A Fallacy Serious?, Michel Dufour
OSSA Conference Archive
Among the defining criteria of a fallacy, Douglas Walton requires that its flaw must be serious. This allows his distinction between “serious” fallacies, minor ones, or mere blunders. But what makes a fallacy serious? Isn’t being fallacious serious enough? Walton leaves these questions unanswered but often calls to his distinction between sophism and paralogism. Several ways to apply the adjective “serious” to fallacies are discussed. Some depend on the type, others on structural aspects, and others on a dialectical background.
Confidence In Arguments In Dialogues For Practical Reasoning, Waleed Mebane
Confidence In Arguments In Dialogues For Practical Reasoning, Waleed Mebane
OSSA Conference Archive
For the context of practical reasoning, this paper suggests a method of assessing the level of confidence we should rationally have in arguments. It draws from dialectic which induces the elaboration of reasons for a position and on auditors’ prior knowledge. Accurate assessment depends on evidential standards, on selecting dialogue moves according to their practical and epistemic importance, and on selecting auditors according to their competence and diversity of relevant knowledge.
Deliberation And Collective Identity Formation, Hubert Marraud
Deliberation And Collective Identity Formation, Hubert Marraud
OSSA Conference Archive
Deliberation is an argumentative practice in which several parties reason in order to decide the best available course of action. I argue that deliberation, unlike negotiation, requires a collective agency, defined by shared commitments, and not merely a plural agency defined by aggregation of individual commitments. Since the “we” presupposed by this argumentative genre is built up in the course of the deliberation exchange itself, shaping collective identity is a basic function of public deliberation.
Emotional Arguments: What Would Neuroscientists And Psychologists Say?, Linda Carozza
Emotional Arguments: What Would Neuroscientists And Psychologists Say?, Linda Carozza
OSSA Conference Archive
Why is there resistance in acknowledging emotional arguments? I explore the ambiguity entrenched in the emotional mode of argument, which may contribute to the lack of widespread agreement about its existence. In particular, belief systems and personality styles are addressed, as they are integral to the emotional mode of argumentation. This multidisciplinary approach neither advocates or dismisses the emotional mode; it adds another layer of understanding to the literature that is important to consider.
Dialogue Types: A Scale Development Study, Ioana A. Cionea, Dale Hample, Edward L. Fink
Dialogue Types: A Scale Development Study, Ioana A. Cionea, Dale Hample, Edward L. Fink
OSSA Conference Archive
This paper presents the results of a quantitative study in which self-report scales were developed to measure four of the six dialogue types proposed by Walton (1998): persuasion, negotiation, information-seeking, and eristic dialogues. The paper details the research design, presents the measurement instruments developed, and describes the analyses conducted to assess the dimensionality and reliability of the proposed scales.
Arguing Or Reasoning? Argumentation In Rhetorical Context, Manfred Kraus
Arguing Or Reasoning? Argumentation In Rhetorical Context, Manfred Kraus
OSSA Conference Archive
If dialogue is a necessary condition for argument, argumentation in oratory becomes questionable, since rhetoric is not a dialogically structured activity. If special norms apply to the ‘solo’ performances of rhetoric, the orator’s activity may be more appropriately described as reasoning than as arguing. By analyzing in what respect rhetorical texts can be interpreted as dialogue-based and subject to criteria of Informal Logic, the virtues of rhetorical argumentation in contrast to logic and dialectic emerge.
Fallacy Identification In A Dialectical Approach To Teaching Critical Thinking, Mark Battersby, Sharon Bailin, Jan Albert Van Laar
Fallacy Identification In A Dialectical Approach To Teaching Critical Thinking, Mark Battersby, Sharon Bailin, Jan Albert Van Laar
OSSA Conference Archive
The dialectical approach to teaching critical thinking is centred on a comparative evaluation of contending arguments, so that generally the strength of an argument for a position can only be assessed in the context of this dialectic. The identification of fallacies, though important, plays only a preliminary role in the evaluation to individual arguments. Our approach to fallacy identification and analysis sees fal-lacies as argument patterns whose persuasive power is disproportionate to their probative value.