Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities
Diversity In Argumentation Theory, Claudio Duran, Eva Hamamé
Diversity In Argumentation Theory, Claudio Duran, Eva Hamamé
OSSA Conference Archive
There is still a high degree of expectation that argumentation should be understood from the perspective of the logical mode of reasoning with little attention to intuitions, emotions and physicality. Our proposal intends to develop a comprehensive understanding of argumentation from the perspective of Michael Gilbert’s Theory of Multi-Modal Argumentation. This approach allows the introduction of diversity in Argumentation Theory, investigating in depth the relations between logic, intuitions, emotions and physicality in cases of argumentation.
In Search For A Balance Between Experimental Research And The Theory Of Reasoning: Commentary On José Ángel Gascón’S “Why Did You Really Do It? Examining The Distinction Between Kinds Of Reasons”, Marcin Koszowy
OSSA Conference Archive
No abstract provided.
A Ludological Perspective On Argument, Michael A. Yong-Set
A Ludological Perspective On Argument, Michael A. Yong-Set
OSSA Conference Archive
This introductory paper explores a new perspective on argumentation that draws upon the resources of ludology – the critical and academic of study of games qua games. In the Philosophical Investigations, one of the later Wittgenstein’s more mysterious suggestions is that if one understands how games work, then one would be able to understand how natural language works. Similarly, it will be argued that if we look to how games function as games, we will be able to understand how the ‘argument-game’ functions. The epistemic importance of rhetorical argumentation rather than analytic demonstration becomes apparent if we consider ‘argument’ …
Normative Argumentation Theory Without Fundamental Principles, Eugen Octav Popa
Normative Argumentation Theory Without Fundamental Principles, Eugen Octav Popa
OSSA Conference Archive
In this paper I develop and defend a form of argumentative normativity that is not based on fundamental principles. I first argue that research agendas that aim to discover (or claimed to have discovered) fundamental principles of ‘good’ argumentative discourse share one crucial weak spot, viz. circularity. I then argue that this weak spot can be avoided in a pancritical (Bartley, 1984) view of normativity.
Rhetoric, Dialectic And Logic: The Triad De-Compartmentalized, Charlotte Jørgensen
Rhetoric, Dialectic And Logic: The Triad De-Compartmentalized, Charlotte Jørgensen
OSSA Conference Archive
Taking Blair’s recent contribution to the debate about the triad as its starting point, the paper discusses and challenges the effort to reduce the intricate relationship between rhetoric, dialectic, and logic to a single criterion or watertight trichotomy. I argue that such efforts obscure the complexities within the fields, their differences being partly due to disciplinary traditions. They neglect the intermingling properties of the fields as well as the possibilities for theoretical bridging between them.
Argumentation As An Ethical And Political Choice, Menashe Schwed
Argumentation As An Ethical And Political Choice, Menashe Schwed
OSSA Conference Archive
The paper's two theses are: First, that the historical and philosophical roots of argumentation are in ethics and politics, and not in any formal ideal, be it mathematical, scientific or other. Furthermore, argumentation is a human invention, deeply tied up with the emergence of democracy in ancient Greece. Second, that argumentation presupposes and advances concurrently humanistic values, especially the autonomy of the individual to think and decide in a free and uncoerced manner.
Rationality, Reasonableness And Informal Logic: A Case Study Of Chaim Perelman, Rongdong Jin, Christopher W. Tindale
Rationality, Reasonableness And Informal Logic: A Case Study Of Chaim Perelman, Rongdong Jin, Christopher W. Tindale
OSSA Conference Archive
Perelman’s discussion about the distinction and relation between the rational and the reason-able could be seen as an attempt to bring forward a new understanding of rationality. In light of the concep-tion of situated reason, this paper argues that Perelman’s explication of the dialectic of the rational and the reasonable highlights the balance of universality and contexuality, and could contribute a fuller conception of rationality to establishing a solid philosophical foundation for Johnson’s informal logic.