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OSSA Conference Archive

Argument

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Commentary On Mckeon On Argument, Inference, And Persuasion, Daniel H. Cohen Jun 2020

Commentary On Mckeon On Argument, Inference, And Persuasion, Daniel H. Cohen

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


Argument, Inference, And Persuasion, Matthew W. Mckeon Jun 2020

Argument, Inference, And Persuasion, Matthew W. Mckeon

OSSA Conference Archive

I move beyond Pinto’s (2001) discussion of arguments as invitations to inference by highlighting how arguments can guide the performance of inferences that they do not express. This motivates a distinction between two types of persuasive force arguments can have in terms of two different connections between arguments and inferences. I use this distinction to explain how an epistemically bad argument can rationally persuade addressees of its conclusion.


Commentary On: Tony Blair’S “The Persuasive Ineffectiveness Of Arguing And Arguments”, Michel Dufour Jun 2020

Commentary On: Tony Blair’S “The Persuasive Ineffectiveness Of Arguing And Arguments”, Michel Dufour

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


The Persuasive Ineffectiveness Of Arguing And Arguments, J. Anthony Blair Jun 2020

The Persuasive Ineffectiveness Of Arguing And Arguments, J. Anthony Blair

OSSA Conference Archive

Arguments intended to persuade have a chequered success record. Quite aside from failing to resolve deep disagreements, they are an inefficient means of persuasion in commerce and politics. The persistence of competing schools of thought in numerous fields of scientific and scholarly theorizing, despite argued advocacy, also raises questions about arguing’s persuasive effectiveness. Yet humans are irredeemably reason-expecting and reason-giving creatures. This paper offers some possible explanations of this paradoxical situation.


Commentary On: Jianfeng Wang’S “Deep Disagreement, Deep Rhetoric, And Cultural Diversity", Jean Goodwin Jun 2020

Commentary On: Jianfeng Wang’S “Deep Disagreement, Deep Rhetoric, And Cultural Diversity", Jean Goodwin

OSSA Conference Archive

In this cogent paper, Wang urges argumentation theorists to pay attention to the myriad things that are happening whenever someone makes an argument. To do this he updates and extends the classical rhetorical cannon of style. He documents the importance of argumentative style through a case study of deep disagreement, showing how one arguer’s choices served to reconstruct an otherwise abusive situation. I urge him to continue the project by providing an equally cogent account of explaining why an arguer’s stylistic choices lead to the desired audience’s response.


Diversity, Conflict Resolution, And (Dis)Agreement, Linda Carozza Jun 2020

Diversity, Conflict Resolution, And (Dis)Agreement, Linda Carozza

OSSA Conference Archive

Is reaching an agreement a product of strong arguing-making and argument-having? Mediators are trained to be neutral facilitators with a range of diverse strategies for resolving disagreements. In spite of this, parties in conflict can derail a mediator’s trajectory in helping all involved by i) understand different positions and especially ii) develop resolutions. Borrowing from the literature of conflict resolution this paper questions the efficacy of critical-logical normative argumentation models.


Commentary On Michael Yong-Set's Ludological Approach To Argumentation, Daniel H. Cohen May 2016

Commentary On Michael Yong-Set's Ludological Approach To Argumentation, Daniel H. Cohen

OSSA Conference Archive

Although Michael Yong-Set's proposal to approach argumentation theory from a ludological perspective is not yet sufficiently developed to warrant adopting it, there is enough to warrant exploring it further – which is all the reception it needs at this point.


On The Very Concept Of An Enthymeme, G.C. Goddu May 2016

On The Very Concept Of An Enthymeme, G.C. Goddu

OSSA Conference Archive

An enthymeme is often defined as an argument with a missing component or an argument with an unexpressed component. Roy Sorensen, in “Are Enthymemes Arguments?”, argues against the possibility of enthymemes being arguments at all, but he assumes that arguments are abstract objects. I shall present and explore some more metaphysically neutral arguments against enthymemes as arguments and ultimately conclude that while not conclusive, the most viable option is Sorensen’s—enthymemes are not arguments.


Definition: A Three-Dimensional Analysis With Bearing On Key Concepts, Robert H. Ennis Phd May 2016

Definition: A Three-Dimensional Analysis With Bearing On Key Concepts, Robert H. Ennis Phd

OSSA Conference Archive

This essay presents a three-dimensional analysis of definition (form, stance, and content) with application to making and evaluating definitions; teaching how to define; avoiding equivocation with "argument" and "bias"; and, using the concept-conception distinction, avoiding being deterred by the many definitions of "critical thinking", and seeing the usefulness of objectivity in everyday arguments in spite of existing conflict and confusion about aspects of objectivity.


The Normative Significance Of Deep Disagreement, Tim Dare May 2016

The Normative Significance Of Deep Disagreement, Tim Dare

OSSA Conference Archive

Some normative problems are difficult because of the number and complexity of the issues they involve. Rational resolution might be hard but it seems at least possible. Other problems are not merely complex and multi-faceted but ‘deep’. They have a logical structure that precludes rational resolution. Treatments of deep disagreement often hint at sinister implications. If doubt is cast on our 'final vocabulary', writes Richard Rorty, we are left with "no noncircular argumentative recourse .... [B]eyond them there is only helpless passivity or a resort to force.” I will argue that some normative problems are deep, but that we need …


Demonstrating Objectivity In Controversial Science Communication: A Case Study Of Gmo Scientist Kevin Folta, Jean Goodwin May 2016

Demonstrating Objectivity In Controversial Science Communication: A Case Study Of Gmo Scientist Kevin Folta, Jean Goodwin

OSSA Conference Archive

Scientists can find it difficult to be seen as objective within the chaos of a civic controversy. This paper gives a normative pragmatic account of the strategy one GMO scientist used to demonstrate his trustworthiness. Kevin Folta made his talk expensive by undertaking to answer all questions, and carried out this responsibility by acting as if every comment addressed to him—even the most hostile—was in fact a question in good faith. This presumption of audience good faith gave in turn his audience good reason to presume his good faith, and a situation of reciprocal distrust was transformed into one with …


Argument Objectivity And Ontological/Logical Pluralism: Must Arguments Be Domain Sensitive?, Philip Rose May 2016

Argument Objectivity And Ontological/Logical Pluralism: Must Arguments Be Domain Sensitive?, Philip Rose

OSSA Conference Archive

The idea of ontological/logical pluralism raises an interesting question about the objectivity of arguments and argument forms: Are all arguments and argument forms domain dependent? In his recent work Bruno Latour outlines a radical form of ontological pluralism in which each domain or “mode of existence” has its own set of “felicity conditions” that serve as “veridiction” conditions unique to that mode. To “speak well” requires that one speak in the “interpretive key” proper to each mode. Since there is no “meta-language” that crosses all modes, then all modes must be assessed using the felicity or veridiction conditions peculiar to …


Commentary On Ami Mamolo On Argumentation And Infinity, Daniel H. Cohen May 2016

Commentary On Ami Mamolo On Argumentation And Infinity, Daniel H. Cohen

OSSA Conference Archive

There is more to mathematics than proofs; there are also arguments, which means that mathematicians are human arguers complete with their biases. Among those biases is a preference for beauty, It is a bias insofar as it is a deaprture from objectivity, but it is benign, accounting for the popularity of Cantor's "Paradise" of non-denumerable infinities as a travel destination for mathematicians and the relatively little interest in Robinson's infinitesimals.


Are Conductive Arguments Really Not Possible?, J. Anthony Blair May 2013

Are Conductive Arguments Really Not Possible?, J. Anthony Blair

OSSA Conference Archive

In “Are conductive arguments possible?” Jonathan Adler argued that conductive argu-ments (those balancing considerations for a claim, C, against counter-considerations against C) are not possible because they are committed to two incompatible propositions: (I) C is reached without nullifying the counter-considerations; (II) C is accepted is true, which issues in belief, so C is detached from these premises. This paper offers an analysis and an assessment of Adler’s case for his thesis.


The Practice Of Arguing And The Arguments: Examples From Mathematics, Begoῆa Carrascal May 2013

The Practice Of Arguing And The Arguments: Examples From Mathematics, Begoῆa Carrascal

OSSA Conference Archive

In argumentation studies, almost all theoretical proposals are applied, in general, to the analysis and evaluation of written argumentative texts. I will consider mathematics to illustrate some differences between argumentative practice and the products of it, to emphasize the need to address the different types of argumentative discourse and argumentative situation. Argumentative practice should be encouraged when teaching technical subjects to convey a better understanding and to improve thought and creativity.


Argument And Explanation In Mathematics, Michel Dufour May 2013

Argument And Explanation In Mathematics, Michel Dufour

OSSA Conference Archive

Are there arguments in mathematics? Are there explanations in mathematics? Are there any connections between argument, proof and explanation? Highly controversial answers and arguments are reviewed. The main point is that in the case of a mathematical proof, the pragmatic criterion used to make a distinction between argument and explanation is likely to be insufficient for you may grant the conclusion of a proof but keep on thinking that the proof is not explanatory.


Why I Still Do Not Know What A "Real" Argument Is, G C. Goddu May 2013

Why I Still Do Not Know What A "Real" Argument Is, G C. Goddu

OSSA Conference Archive

In his recent paper, “What a Real Argument is” Ben Hamby attempts to provide an adequate theoretical account of what a “real” argument is. I argue that if the definition picks out a stable class of arguments, such a class is either not theoretically relevant or is not capturing the class of arguments that Hamby intends.


The Virtue Of Restraint: Rebalancing Power In Arguments, Moira Kloster May 2013

The Virtue Of Restraint: Rebalancing Power In Arguments, Moira Kloster

OSSA Conference Archive

Is argument a game everyone should be able to play? If it is, current argument practices do not yet level the playing field enough for a fair game. We may build in subtle imbalances that work against people who cannot easily adapt to the most common patterns of argumentative interaction. We need better ways to build trust, to create safety, and adapt goals in order to bring everyone into the game.


The Language And Diagramming Of Rejection And Objection, Cathal Woods May 2013

The Language And Diagramming Of Rejection And Objection, Cathal Woods

OSSA Conference Archive

Understanding the language of rejections and objections is an important part of the analysis and practice of argument. In order to strengthen this understanding, we might turn to diagramming, as it has been shown to have the virtue of improving critical thinking skills. This paper discusses what reliable meaning can be taken from words and phrases related to rejections and objections, and then how to diagram them.


Exploring The Meaning Of Agurment In China, Yun Xie, Dale Hample, Shuying Shi, Sarah Evans May 2013

Exploring The Meaning Of Agurment In China, Yun Xie, Dale Hample, Shuying Shi, Sarah Evans

OSSA Conference Archive

This paper aims to explore the meaning of the English word argument in Chinese culture and language. It first reviews the various definitions and concepts of argument in western literature and Chinese culture. Next, it argues that there is no one single all-encompassing word in Chinese that can fully represent all the meanings of the English word argument. Finally, it conducts a survey research to get the possible Chinese translations of the English word argument.


Norms Of Advocacy, Jean Goodwin May 2013

Norms Of Advocacy, Jean Goodwin

OSSA Conference Archive

This essay advances an account of the ordinary speech activity of advocating. The ethical principles developed within advocacy professions such as law and public relations show that advocates are not just out to persuade. Instead, they undertake obligations to make the best case for their positions while also maintaining the integrity of the communication systems within which they operate. While not offering full justifications, advocates nevertheless help auditors by making conspicuous the outer bounds of the arguable.


Arguments As Abstract Objects, Paul Simard Smith, Andrei Moldovan, G C. Goddu May 2011

Arguments As Abstract Objects, Paul Simard Smith, Andrei Moldovan, G C. Goddu

OSSA Conference Archive

In recent discussions concerning the definition of argument, it has been maintained that the word ‘argument’ exhibits the process-product ambiguity, or (as in Goddu forthcoming) an act/object ambi-guity. Drawing on literature on lexical ambiguity we argue that ‘argument’ is not ambiguous. The term ‘argument’ refers to an object, not to a speech act. We also examine some of the important implications of our argument by considering the question: what sort of abstract objects are arguments?


Critical Thinking And Informal Logic: Neuropsychological Perspectives, Paul Thagard May 2011

Critical Thinking And Informal Logic: Neuropsychological Perspectives, Paul Thagard

OSSA Conference Archive

This article challenges the common view that improvements in critical thinking are best pursued by investigations in informal logic. From the perspective of research in psychology and neuroscience, human inference is a process that is multimodal, parallel, and often emotional, which makes it unlike the linguistic, serial, and narrowly cognitive structure of arguments. Attempts to improve inferential practice need to consider psychological error tendencies, which are patterns of thinking that are natural for people but frequently lead to mistakes in judgment. This article discusses two important but neglected error tendencies: motivated inference and fear-driven inference.


Cognition And Literary Ethical Criticism, Gilbert Plumer, Louis Groarke May 2011

Cognition And Literary Ethical Criticism, Gilbert Plumer, Louis Groarke

OSSA Conference Archive

“Ethical criticism” is an approach to literary studies that holds that reading certain carefully selected novels can make us ethically better people, e.g., by stimulating our sympathetic imagination (Nussbaum). I will try to show that this nonargumentative approach cheapens the persuasive force of novels and that its inherent bias and censorship undercuts what is perhaps the principal value and defense of the novel—that reading novels can be critical to one’s learning how to think.


How Many Premises Can An Argument Have?, G C. Goddu, David Hitchcock May 2011

How Many Premises Can An Argument Have?, G C. Goddu, David Hitchcock

OSSA Conference Archive

Is it possible for an argument to have either zero premises or an infinite number of premises? I shall argue that regardless of how you conceive of arguments you should accept that an argument could have an infinite number of premises. The zero case is more complicated since the matter seems to depend not only on the metaphysics of arguments, but also the nature and function of arguing. I shall argue that at least a plausible case can be made for the possibility of zero premise arguments.


Monologue, Dilogue Or Polylogue: Which Model For Public Deliberation?, Marcin Lewinski, J Anthony Blair May 2011

Monologue, Dilogue Or Polylogue: Which Model For Public Deliberation?, Marcin Lewinski, J Anthony Blair

OSSA Conference Archive

“Reasonable hostility” is a norm of communicative conduct initially developed by studying public exchanges in education governance meetings in local U.S. communities. In this paper I consider the norm’s usefulness for and applicability to a U.S. state-level public hearing about a bill to legalize civil unions. Following an explication of reasonable hostility and grounded practical theory, the approach to inquiry that guides my work, I describe Hawaii’s 2009, 18-hour public hearing and analyze selected seg-ments of it. I show that this particular public hearing raised demands for testifiers on the anti-civil union side of the argument that reasonable hostility does …


Issues In Conductive Argument Weight, Thomas Fischer, Rongdong Jin May 2011

Issues In Conductive Argument Weight, Thomas Fischer, Rongdong Jin

OSSA Conference Archive

The concept of conductive argument weight was developed by Carl Wellman and later by Trudy Govier. This concept has received renewed attention recently from another informal logician, Robert C. Pinto. Argument weight has also been addressed in recent years by theorists in AI & Law. I argue from a non-technical perspective that some aspects of AI & Law’s approach to argument weight can be usefully applied to the issues addressed by Pinto. I also relate some of these issues to the work of argument theorist Harald Wohlrapp.


The Dialectical Tier Of Mathematical Proof, Andrew Aberdein, Anton Colijn May 2011

The Dialectical Tier Of Mathematical Proof, Andrew Aberdein, Anton Colijn

OSSA Conference Archive

Ralph Johnson argues that mathematical proofs lack a dialectical tier, and thereby do not qualify as arguments. This paper argues that, despite this disavowal, Johnson's account provides a compel-ling model of mathematical proof. The illative core of mathematical arguments is held to strict standards of rigour. However, compliance with these standards is itself a matter of argument, and susceptible to chal-lenge. Hence much actual mathematical practice takes place in the dialectical tier.


“Reasonable Hostility”: Its Usefulness And Limitation As A Norm For Public Hearings, Karen Tracy May 2011

“Reasonable Hostility”: Its Usefulness And Limitation As A Norm For Public Hearings, Karen Tracy

OSSA Conference Archive

“Reasonable hostility” is a norm of communicative conduct initially developed by studying public exchanges in education governance meetings in local U.S. communities. In this paper I consider the norm’s usefulness for and applicability to a U.S. state-level public hearing about a bill to legalize civil unions. Following an explication of reasonable hostility and grounded practical theory, the approach to inquiry that guides my work, I describe Hawaii’s 2009, 18-hour public hearing and analyze selected seg-ments of it. I show that this particular public hearing raised demands for testifiers on the anti-civil union side of the argument that reasonable hostility does …


Academic Arguments, Daniel Cohen, George Thomas Goodnight May 2011

Academic Arguments, Daniel Cohen, George Thomas Goodnight

OSSA Conference Archive

Calling an argument “merely academic” impugns its seriousness, belittles its substance, dis-misses its importance, and deflates hope of resolution, while ruling out negotiation and compromise. How-ever, “purely academic” argumentation, as an idealized limit case, is a valuable analytical tool for argumen-tation theorists because while the telos of academic argumentation may be cognitive, it is cognitive in the service of a community, which, in turn, is a community in the service of the cognitive.