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Appetites And Actions In Aristotle's Moral Psychology, Tom Olshewsky
Appetites And Actions In Aristotle's Moral Psychology, Tom Olshewsky
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
The so-called practical syllogism is best understood in dispositional terms. Animate movement originates with orexis (appetite), but appetite is the result of the coming together of dual dispositions, the orektikon and the orekton. For calculative appetite, multiple objectives can be imagined, and deliberation determines which objective is best for this person in this circumstance. Deliberation is an antecedent of the actualized appetite, not its consequence. This psychology makes clear that satisfaction of appetites is a two-stage process for calculative beings: first the determination of the appetite, then movement to fulfillment in its objective. In deliberation, the determination is which …
Aristotle On Akratic Action: How Rational Is It?, Patrick Mooney
Aristotle On Akratic Action: How Rational Is It?, Patrick Mooney
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
My answer to the question asked in the paper’s title is: akratic action-acting contrary to what one believes or knows is the best course of action open to one, or “weakness of will”—is not rational at all, according to Aristotle (here restricting myself to his discussion of akrasia in the Nicomachean Ethics, VII. 1-3). In saying that it is ‘not rational at all,’ I have in mind that there is no “intellectual,” or “cognitive,” faculty at work which so much as helps to bring about the akratic act-there is, in other words, no way in which the akrates “figures out” …