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Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities
Pure Cognitivism And Beyond, Attila Tanyi
Pure Cognitivism And Beyond, Attila Tanyi
Attila Tanyi
The article begins with Jonathan Dancy’s attempt to refute the Humean Theory of Motivation. It first spells out Dancy’s argument for his alternative position, the view he labels ‘Pure Cognitivism’, according to which what motivate are always beliefs, never desires. The article next argues that Dancy’s argument for his position is flawed. On the one hand, it is not true that desire always comes with motivation in the agent; on the other, even if this was the case, it would still not follow that desire is identical with the state of being motivated. When this negative work is done, the …
Immortal Curiosity, Attila Tanyi, Karl Karlander
Immortal Curiosity, Attila Tanyi, Karl Karlander
Attila Tanyi
The paper discusses Bernard Williams’ argument that immortality is rationally undesirable because it leads to insufferable boredom. We first spell out Williams’ argument in the form of a dilemma. We then show that the first horn of this dilemma, namely Williams’ requirement of the constancy of character of the immortal, is defensible. We next argue against a recent attempt that accepts the dilemma, but rejects the conclusion Williams draws from it. From these we conclude that blocking the second horn of the dilemma is the best way to respond to Williams. Our objection contends that Williams overlooks a basic feature …
Sobel On Pleasure, Reason, And Desire, Attila Tanyi
Sobel On Pleasure, Reason, And Desire, Attila Tanyi
Attila Tanyi
An Essay On The Desire-Based Reasons Model, Attila Tanyi
An Essay On The Desire-Based Reasons Model, Attila Tanyi
Attila Tanyi
The dissertation argues against the view that normative reasons for action are grounded in desires. It first works out the different versions of the Model. After this, in the next three chapters, it presents and discusses three arguments against the Model, on the basis of which, it concludes that the Model gives us the wrong account of normative practical reasons.