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Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities
The Racial Offense Objection To Confederate Monuments: A Reply To Timmerman, Dan Demetriou
The Racial Offense Objection To Confederate Monuments: A Reply To Timmerman, Dan Demetriou
Philosophy Publications
The reply essay (1000 words) to Travis Timmerman's "A Case for Removing Confederate Monuments" in Bob Fisher's Ethics, Left and Right: The Moral Issues That Divide Us volume. In it, Demetriou explains why he thinks the mere harm from the racial offense a monument may cause does not justify removing it.
Ashes Of Our Fathers: Racist Monuments And The Tribal Right, Dan Demetriou
Ashes Of Our Fathers: Racist Monuments And The Tribal Right, Dan Demetriou
Philosophy Publications
In this chapter Demetriou sketches a rightist approach to monumentary policy in a diverse polity beleaguered by old ethnic grievances. He begins by noting the importance of tribalism, memorialization, and social trust. He then suggests a policy which 1) gradually narrows the gap between peoples in the heritage landscape, 2) conserves all but the most offensive of the least beloved racist monuments, 3) avoids recrimination (i.e., “keeps it positive”) and eschews ideological commentary in new monuments or revisions to old ones, 4) as much as politically feasible, recognizes only the offense of willing tribemates, and 5) responds to aesthetic and …
The Ethics Of Racist Monuments, Dan Demetriou, Ajume Wingo
The Ethics Of Racist Monuments, Dan Demetriou, Ajume Wingo
Philosophy Publications
We focus on the debate over racist monuments as it manifests in the mid-2010s Anglosphere, primarily in the US (chiefly regarding the over 700 monuments devoted to the Confederacy),2 but to some degree also in Britain and commonwealth countries, especially South Africa (chiefly regarding monuments devoted to figures and events associated with colonialism and apartheid). Even with this limited scope, we will not recommend any sweeping policy for many lands, histories, peoples, and monuments in this immensely difficult and emotionally fraught controversy. Our aim rather is to categorize arguments, voice some un-asked questions, and offer a few guidelines for policymakers …
Psychological Continuity: A Discussion Of Marc Slors' Account, Traumatic Experience, And The Significance Of Our Relations To Others, Pieranna Garavaso
Psychological Continuity: A Discussion Of Marc Slors' Account, Traumatic Experience, And The Significance Of Our Relations To Others, Pieranna Garavaso
Philosophy Publications
This paper addresses a question concerning psychological continuity, i.e., which features preserve the same psychological subject over time; this is not the same question as the one concerning the necessary and sufficient conditions for personal identity. Marc Slors (1998, 2001, 2001a) defends an account of psychological continuity that adds two features to Derek Parfit’s Relation R, namely narrativity and embodiment. Slors’ account is a significant improvement on Parfit’s, but still lacks an explicit acknowledgment of a third feature that I call relationality. Because they are usually regarded as cases of radical discontinuity, I start my discussion from the experiences of …
Hilary Putnam's Consistency Objection Against Wittgenstein's Conventionalism In Mathematics, Pieranna Garavaso
Hilary Putnam's Consistency Objection Against Wittgenstein's Conventionalism In Mathematics, Pieranna Garavaso
Philosophy Publications
Hilary Putnam first published the consistency objection against Ludwig Wittgenstein’s account of mathematics in 1979. In 1983, Putnam and Benacerraf raised this objection against all conventionalist accounts of mathematics. I discuss the 1979 version and the scenario argument, which supports the key premise of the objection. The wide applicability of this objection is not apparent; I thus raise it against an imaginary axiomatic theory T similar to Peano arithmetic in all relevant aspects. I argue that a conventionalist can explain the consistency of T and suggest that an analogous explanation can be provided for the consistency of Peano arithmetic.
On Frege’S Alleged Indispensability Argument, Pieranna Garavaso
On Frege’S Alleged Indispensability Argument, Pieranna Garavaso
Philosophy Publications
The expression ‘indispensability argument’ denotes a family of arguments for mathematical realism supported among others by Quine and Putnam. More and more often, Gottlob Frege is credited with being the first to state this argument in section 91 of the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. Frege's alleged indispensability argument is the subject of this essay. On the basis of three significant differences between Mark Colyvan's indispensability arguments and Frege's applicability argument, I deny that Frege presents an indispensability argument in that very often quoted section of the Grundegesetze.