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Philosophy

University at Albany, State University of New York

Philosophy Faculty Scholarship

2015

Philosophy

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities

Preserving The Autographic/Allographic Distinction, P.D. Magnus, Jason R. D'Cruz Oct 2015

Preserving The Autographic/Allographic Distinction, P.D. Magnus, Jason R. D'Cruz

Philosophy Faculty Scholarship

In his study of forms of representation, Nel- son Goodman sought to explain why some representations, like words or musical scores, are considered replicable while others, such as paintings, are not. He named the replicable rep- resentations allographic and the ones we consider nonreplicable autographic (Goodman 1976, 113). His explanation of what grounds this distinction is in his theory of notations (chaps. IV–V). That theory essentially seeks to secure the possibility of identity for representations, as well as the possibility of knowing such identity, by setting out a number of requirements. Unless a repre- sentational practice satisfies the requirements (is …


Promising To Try, Jason R. D'Cruz, Justin Kalef Jul 2015

Promising To Try, Jason R. D'Cruz, Justin Kalef

Philosophy Faculty Scholarship

We maintain that in many contexts promising to try is expressive of responsibility as a promiser. This morally significant application of promising to try speaks in favor of the view that responsible promisers favor evidentialism about promises. Contra Berislav Marusˇic´, we contend that responsible promisers typically withdraw from promising to act and instead promise to try, in circumstances in which they recognize that there is a significant chance that they will not succeed.


Trust, Trustworthiness, And The Moral Consequence Of Consistency, Jason R. D'Cruz Jan 2015

Trust, Trustworthiness, And The Moral Consequence Of Consistency, Jason R. D'Cruz

Philosophy Faculty Scholarship

Situationists such as John Doris, Gilbert Harman, and Maria Merritt suppose that appeal to reliable behavioral dispositions can be dispensed with without radical revision to morality as we know it. This paper challenges this supposition, arguing that abandoning hope in reliable dispositions rules out genuine trust and forces us to suspend core reactive attitudes of gratitude and resentment, esteem and indignation. By examining situationism through the lens of trust we learn something about situationism (in particular, the radically revisionary moral implications of its adoption) as well as something about trust (in particular, that the conditions necessary for genuine trust include …