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Articles 1 - 30 of 276
Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities
The Surprise Exam Paradox: Disentangling Two Reductios, John N. Williams
The Surprise Exam Paradox: Disentangling Two Reductios, John N. Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
One tradition of solving the surprise exam paradox, started by Robert Binkley and continued by Doris Olin, Roy Sorensen and Jelle Gerbrandy, construes surprise epistemically and relies upon the oddity of propositions akin to G. E. Moore's paradoxical 'p and I don't believe that p.' Here I argue for an analysis that evolves from Olin's. My analysis is different from hers or indeed any of those in the tradition because it explicitly recognizes that there are two distinct reductios at work in the student's paradoxical argument against the teacher. The weak reductio is easy to fault. Its invalidity determines the …
Belief-In And Belief In God, John N. Williams
Belief-In And Belief In God, John N. Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
Of all the examples of ‘belief-in’, belief in God is both the most mysterious and the most challenging. Indeed whether and how an apologist can make a case for the intellectual respectability of theistic belief, depends upon the nature of this ‘belief-in’. I shall attempt to elucidate this matter by an analysis of the relation of ‘belief-in’ to ‘belief-that’ and by treating belief in God as a special case of ‘belief-in’.
Moorean Absurdity And The Intentional 'Structure' Of Assertion, John N. Williams
Moorean Absurdity And The Intentional 'Structure' Of Assertion, John N. Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
No abstract provided.
Justifying Circumstances And Moore-Paradoxical Beliefs: A Response To Brueckner, John N. Williams
Justifying Circumstances And Moore-Paradoxical Beliefs: A Response To Brueckner, John N. Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
In 2004, I explained the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical belief via the syllogism (Williams 2004): (1) All circumstances that justify me in believing that p are circumstances that tend to make me believe that p. (2) All circumstances that tend to make me believe that p are circumstances that justify me in believing that I believe that p. (3) All circumstances that justify me in believing that p are circumstances that justify me in believing that I believe that p.
Using The Economic Concept Of A 'Merit Good' To Justify The Teaching Of Ethics Across The University Curriculum, Mark Nowacki, Wilfried Ver Eecke
Using The Economic Concept Of A 'Merit Good' To Justify The Teaching Of Ethics Across The University Curriculum, Mark Nowacki, Wilfried Ver Eecke
John N. WILLIAMS
Philosophers often lament the limited role that philosophy plays in the intellectual formation of the average university student. Once central to university life—there was a time when the study of philosophy defined what it meant to be a student of the liberal arts—philosophy as a subject of study has become marginalized. It is a painful reality that in many universities philosophy has been reduced to the status of a fluffy elective, a course of study to be conscientiously avoided by the more "practical" and "hard nosed" students bent upon success in the pragmatic worlds of business and politics. Only classical …
Wittgensteinian Accounts Of Moorean Absurdity, John N. Williams
Wittgensteinian Accounts Of Moorean Absurdity, John N. Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
No abstract provided.
Moorean Absurdity And Conscious Belief, John N. Williams
Moorean Absurdity And Conscious Belief, John N. Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
No abstract provided.
Moorean Absurdities And Higher Order Beliefs, John N. Williams
Moorean Absurdities And Higher Order Beliefs, John N. Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
No abstract provided.
Externalism And Knowledge Of Comparative Content, Yoo Guan Tan
Externalism And Knowledge Of Comparative Content, Yoo Guan Tan
John N. WILLIAMS
Concepts are the constituents of thoughts, which in turn, are the contents of propositional attitudes. They are also what the predicates of our language express. According to a tradition going back to Plato, questions about comparative content – questions of the form Is concept F the same as concept G? – are purely about relations of ideas, and so are answerable a priori. This does not mean that no experience at all is necessary to answer such questions, for experience may be needed to grasp their content. Call a piece of information about Fs extraneous if it is not required …
Punishment: The Supposed Justifications Revisited, John N. Williams
Punishment: The Supposed Justifications Revisited, John N. Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
Review of Punishment: The Supposed Justifications Revisited by Ted Honderich, Pluto Press, 2006, ISBN: 9780745321318
Moore's Paradoxes And Iterated Belief, John N. Williams
Moore's Paradoxes And Iterated Belief, John N. Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
I give an account of the absurdity of Moorean beliefs of the omissive form (om) p and I don’t believe that p, and the commissive form (com) p and I believe that not-p, from which I extract a definition of Moorean absurdity. I then argue for an account of the absurdity of Moorean assertion. After neutralizing two objections to my whole account, I show that Roy Sorensen’s own account of the absurdity of his ‘iterated cases’ (om1) p and I don’t believe that I believe that p, and (com1) p and I believe that I believe that not-p, is unsatisfactory. …
Confucius, Mencius And The Notion Of True Succession, John N. Williams
Confucius, Mencius And The Notion Of True Succession, John N. Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
No abstract provided.
Wittgenstein, Moorean Absurdity And Its Disappearance From Speech, John N. Williams
Wittgenstein, Moorean Absurdity And Its Disappearance From Speech, John N. Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
G. E. Moore famously observed that to say, "I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don't believe that I did" would be "absurd." Why should it be absurd of me to say something about myself that might be true of me? Moore suggested an answer to this, but as I will show, one that fails. Wittgenstein was greatly impressed by Moore's discovery of a class of absurd but possibly true assertions because he saw that it illuminates "the logic of assertion". Wittgenstein suggests a promising relation of assertion to belief in terms of the idea that one "expresses …
The Absurdities Of Moore's Paradoxes, John N. Williams
The Absurdities Of Moore's Paradoxes, John N. Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
No abstract provided.
Moorean Absurdity And Expressing Belief, John N. Williams
Moorean Absurdity And Expressing Belief, John N. Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
No abstract provided.
Wittgenstein, Moorean Absurdity And Its Disappearance From Speech, John N. Williams
Wittgenstein, Moorean Absurdity And Its Disappearance From Speech, John N. Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
G. E. Moore famously observed that to say, I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don't believe that I did would be absurd. Why should it be absurd of me to say something about myself that might be true of me? Moore suggested an answer to this, but as I will show, one that fails. Wittgenstein was greatly impressed by Moore's discovery of a class of absurd but possibly true assertions because he saw that it illuminates the logic of assertion. Wittgenstein suggests a promising relation of assertion to belief in terms of the idea that one expresses …
Dialogic Cosmopolitanism And Global Justice, Eduard Christiaan Jordaan
Dialogic Cosmopolitanism And Global Justice, Eduard Christiaan Jordaan
John N. WILLIAMS
Although the term “cosmopolitan-communitarian debate” never really caught on, a national-global fault line remains prominent in debates about global justice. “Dialogic cosmopolitanism” holds the promise of bridging this alleged fault line by accepting many of the communitarian criticisms against cosmopolitanism and following what can be described as a communitarian path to cosmopolitanism. This article identifies and describes four key elements that distinguish dialogic cosmopolitanism: a respect for difference; a commitment to genuine dialogue; an open, hesitant and self-problematising attitude on the part of the moral subject; and an undertaking to expand the boundaries of moral concern to the point of …
Inconsistency And Contradiction, John N. Williams
Inconsistency And Contradiction, John N. Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
Inconsistency and contradiction are important concepts. Unfortunately, they are easily confused. A proposition or belief which is inconsistent is one which is self- contradictory and vice-versa. Moreover two propositions or beliefs which are contradictories are inconsistent with each other. Nonetheless it is a mistake to suppose that inconsistency is the same as contradiction.
Superman, Wittgenstein And The Disappearance Of Moorean Absurdity, John N. Williams
Superman, Wittgenstein And The Disappearance Of Moorean Absurdity, John N. Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
'You have known me for years, Lois' explains Superman, as I lay aside my copy of Crimmins’s example (1992). 'But there is something you have not yet discovered. You also know me under a disguise. You have not yet realized that this person is I in disguise. On that way of thinking about me, you have different opinions of me. In fact you think me an idiot.' I've just informed Superman that I accept his testimony on the strength of his intelligence. But I confess I don’t quite know how to acknowledge my acceptance of his final remark.
Moorean Absurdities And The Nature Of Assertion, John N. Williams
Moorean Absurdities And The Nature Of Assertion, John N. Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
I argue that Moore's propositions, for example, 'I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don't believe that I did' cannot be rationally believed. Their assertors either cannot be rationally believed or cannot be believed to be rational. This analysis is extended to Moorean propositions such as God knows that I am an atheist and I believe that this proposition is false. I then defend the following definition of assertion: anyone asserts that p iff that person expresses a belief that p with the intention of causing relevant epistemic change in the cognition of an actual or potential audience.
The Ethics Of Placebo-Controlled Trials In Developing Countries To Prevent Mother-To-Child Transmission Of Hiv, John N. Williams
The Ethics Of Placebo-Controlled Trials In Developing Countries To Prevent Mother-To-Child Transmission Of Hiv, John N. Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
Placebo-trials on HIV-infected pregnant women in developing countries like Thailand and Uganda have provoked recent controversy. Such experiments aim to find a treatment that will cut the rate of vertical transmission more efficiently than existing treatments like zidovudine. This scenario is first stated as generally as possible, before three ethical principles found in the Belmont Report, itself a sharpening of the Helsinki Declaration, are stated. These three principles are the Principle of Utility, the Principle of Autonomy and the Principle of Justice. These are taken as voices of moral imperative. But although each has intuitive appeal, it can be shown …
Orwell And Huxley: Making Dissent Unthinkable, John N. Williams
Orwell And Huxley: Making Dissent Unthinkable, John N. Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
In this paper I compare the fictional world depicted by Orwell’s 1984 with that of Huxley’s Brave New World from the point of view of an analytic philosopher. Neither novel should be read as predictions, the accuracy of which can be used to judge them. Rather, both attempt to portray what humanity could conceivably become. The authenticity of this conceivability is a necessary condition of the power of both works to raise central philosophical questions about the human condition. What is ethically wrong with control? How far can Man go in recreating himself? In what sense are these worlds anti-utopian? …
Ontological Disproof Of God's Existence, John N. Williams
Ontological Disproof Of God's Existence, John N. Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
An initial reading of Hume's Principle is that no necessary truth can be denied without contradiction, whereas all existential propositions can. Therefore it is self-contradictory to say,that any existential claim is necessarily true, since it follows that this claim both can and cannot be denied without self-contradiction. Thus any claim of the form 'X necessarily exists' is a self-contradiction, even if X is God.
Moore's Paradox: One Or Two?, John N. Williams
Moore's Paradox: One Or Two?, John N. Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
Discussions of what is sometimes called 'Moore's paradox' are often vitiated by a failure to notice that there are two paradoxes; not merely one in two sets of linguistic clothing. The two paradoxes are absurd, but in different ways, and accordingly require different explanations.
Moore’S Paradox, Defective Interpretation, Justified Belief And Conscious Belief: A Reply To Vahid, John N. Williams
Moore’S Paradox, Defective Interpretation, Justified Belief And Conscious Belief: A Reply To Vahid, John N. Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
No abstract provided.
The Preface Paradox Dissolved, John N. Williams
The Preface Paradox Dissolved, John N. Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
The preface paradox strikes us as puzzling because we feel that if a person holds a set of inconsistent beliefs, i.e. beliefs such that at least one of them must be correct, then he should give at least one of them up. Equally, if a person's belief is rational, then he has a right to hold it. Yet the preface example is prima facie a case in which a person holds an inconsistent set of beliefs each of which is rational, and thus a case in which that person has a duty to relinquish what he has a right to …
Moorean Absurdity, Knowledge And Iterated Belief, John N. Williams
Moorean Absurdity, Knowledge And Iterated Belief, John N. Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
No abstract provided.
The Completeness Of The Pragmatic Solution To Moore’ Paradox: A Reply To Chan, John N. Williams
The Completeness Of The Pragmatic Solution To Moore’ Paradox: A Reply To Chan, John N. Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
No abstract provided.
Justified Belief And The Infinite Regress Argument, John N. Williams
Justified Belief And The Infinite Regress Argument, John N. Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
The background to this paper is the question of how rational belief is possible in the light of the commonly presented infinite regress in reasons. The paper investigates the neglected question of whether this regress is vicious. I argue that given the genuine requirements of rational belief, the regress would require the rational believer to hold an infinity of beliefs, which is impossible. The regress would not entail the rational believer holding an infinitely complex belief, which, admittedly, would be logically impossible.
Believing The Self-Contradictory, John N. Williams
Believing The Self-Contradictory, John N. Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
Clearly, if a man holds a self-contradictory belief, then his belief cannot be rational, for there can be no set of evidence sufficient to justify it. This is most apparent when the self contradictory belief is a belief in a conjunction, (e.g., a belief that p & ~p), rather than when it is a non-conjunctive self-contradictory belief, e.g. a belief that red is not a color.