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Conflicting Reasons, Unconflicting ‘Ought’S, Gopal Shyam Nair
Conflicting Reasons, Unconflicting ‘Ought’S, Gopal Shyam Nair
Prof. NAIR Gopal Shyam
One of the popular albeit controversial ideas in the last century of moral philosophy is that what we ought to do is explained by our reasons. And one of the central features of reasons that accounts for their popularity among normative theorists is that they can conflict. But I argue that the fact that reasons conflict actually also poses two closely related problems for this popular idea in moral philosophy. The first problem is a generalization of a problem in deontic logic concerning the existence of conflicting obligations. The second problem arises from a tension between the fact that reasons …
Conflicting Reasons, Unconflicting ‘Ought’S, Gopal Shyam Nair
Conflicting Reasons, Unconflicting ‘Ought’S, Gopal Shyam Nair
Prof. NAIR Gopal Shyam
One of the popular albeit controversial ideas in the last century of moral philosophy is that what we ought to do is explained by our reasons. And one of the central features of reasons that accounts for their popularity among normative theorists is that they can conflict. But I argue that the fact that reasons conflict actually also poses two closely related problems for this popular idea in moral philosophy. The first problem is a generalization of a problem in deontic logic concerning the existence of conflicting obligations. The second problem arises from a tension between the fact that reasons …
Moral Dilemmas, Gopal Shyam Nair
Moral Dilemmas, Gopal Shyam Nair
Prof. NAIR Gopal Shyam
A moral dilemma is a situation where an agent’s obligations conflict. Debate in this area focuses on the question of whether genuine moral dilemmas exist. This question involves considering not only the nature and significance of dilemmas, but also the connections between dilemmas, the logic of obligation, and moral emotions.
The Logic Of Reasons, Gopal Shyam Nair, John Horty
The Logic Of Reasons, Gopal Shyam Nair, John Horty
Prof. NAIR Gopal Shyam
Reasons figure large in our ordinary talk of deliberating about or justifying actions or conclusions. Suppose, for example, you want to convince a friend to dine with you at Obelisk tonight. Typically, you will offer reasons—there is a new chef, the reviews have been excellent. Or suppose you want to explain why you believe raccoons have been in the backyard. You will offer your evidence, again, typically, in the form of reasons—the garbage was broken into, those tracks look like raccoon prints.
How Do Reasons Accrue?, Gopal Shyam Nair
How Do Reasons Accrue?, Gopal Shyam Nair
Prof. NAIR Gopal Shyam
Reasons can interact in a variety of ways to determine what we ought to do. For example, I might face a choice of whether to work on this paper or socialize with friends. And it might be that the only relevant reason to work on this paper is that I have a deadline coming up soon and that the only relevant reason to socialize is that it is relaxing. In this case, whether I ought to work on the paper or ought to stay at home is determined by which of these reasons is stronger
A Fault Line In Ethical Theory, Gopal Shyam Nair
A Fault Line In Ethical Theory, Gopal Shyam Nair
Prof. NAIR Gopal Shyam
A venerable idea in the history of moral philosophy is that central among the normative notions is the notion of goodness or value. This idea, which can be found at least as early as 1903 in G.E. Moore’s Principia Ethica, claims that goodness is central in that all other normative notions can be explained in terms of it. Moore’s approach and the dominant approach to the project of explaining the normative notions of rightness and what we have reason to do is the consequentialist program. While the most famous element of this program is the consequentialist moral theory that says …
Philosophy's New Challenge: Experiments And Intentional Action, N. Angel Pinillos, Nick Smith, Gopal Shyam Nair, Peter Marchetto, Cecilea Mun
Philosophy's New Challenge: Experiments And Intentional Action, N. Angel Pinillos, Nick Smith, Gopal Shyam Nair, Peter Marchetto, Cecilea Mun
Prof. NAIR Gopal Shyam
Experimental philosophers have gathered impressive evidence for the surprising conclusion that philosophers' intuitions are out of step with those of the folk. As a result, many argue that philosophers' intuitions are unreliable. Focusing on the Knobe Effect, a leading finding of experimental philosophy, we defend traditional philosophy against this conclusion. Our key premise relies on experiments we conducted which indicate that judgments of the folk elicited under higher quality cognitive or epistemic conditions are more likely to resemble those of the philosopher. We end by showing how our experimental findings can help us better understand the Knobe Effect.