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Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities
Is The Self Really That Kind Of Illusion?, Anand J. Vaidya
Is The Self Really That Kind Of Illusion?, Anand J. Vaidya
Comparative Philosophy
Karsten Struhl has offered an intriguing account of what kind of illusion the self is. His account is based on Buddhist philosophy, neuropsychology, and neuroscience. This critical notice examines his arguments, and aims to question whether or not the self is the kind of illusion Struhl argues it to be.
The Self: Kierkegaard And Buddhism In Dialogue, David Wisdo
The Self: Kierkegaard And Buddhism In Dialogue, David Wisdo
Comparative Philosophy
Is it possible for there to be a fruitful dialogue between Søren Kierkegaard and Buddhists regarding the understanding of the self? In this paper, I explore the possibilities for such a dialogue by first discussing the rejection of substantialism shared by Kierkegaard and Buddhists. Next, although many Buddhists accept a reductionist account of the kind found in the Abhidharma tradition, Madhyamaka thinkers such as Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti are well-known for offering an account of the self, based on the notion of emptiness (śūnyatā), which resembles in some ways the account of the self that is proposed by Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Anti-Climacus …
Searle And Buddhism On The Non-Self, Soraj Hongladarom
Searle And Buddhism On The Non-Self, Soraj Hongladarom
Comparative Philosophy
In this brief note I continue the discussion that I had with John Searle on the topic of the self and the possibility of continuity of consciousness after death of the body. The gist of Searle's reply to my original paper (Hongladarom 2008) is that it is logical possible, though extremely unlikely, that consciousness survives destruction of the body. This is a rather startling claim given that Searle famously holds that consciousness is the work of the body. Nonetheless, he claims that such issue is an empirical matter which could perhaps be discovered by future science. Another point concerns identity …
Neither Ātman Nor Anattā: Tapering Our Conception Of Selfhood, Roman Briggs
Neither Ātman Nor Anattā: Tapering Our Conception Of Selfhood, Roman Briggs
Comparative Philosophy
I provide critical discussion of conception of and talk of psychic integration which I take to be both excessive and deficient; these viciously extreme positions are championed by the Apostle Paul and St. Augustine (and both their religious and their secular cultural descendants in the West), and by Jacques Lacan and María Lugones (and their contemporaries), respectively. I suggest that we must negotiate a Buddhist-inspired understanding located between these extremes in endorsing any acceptable conception of the self, generally speaking—a conception which, contra the strong antirealist about selves, allows for the continued use of selfhood in everyday discourse, but which, …