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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities
From Fleck’S Denkstil To Kuhn’S Paradigm: Conceptual Schemes And Incommensurability, Babette Babich
From Fleck’S Denkstil To Kuhn’S Paradigm: Conceptual Schemes And Incommensurability, Babette Babich
Articles and Chapters in Academic Book Collections
This article argues that the limited influence of Ludwik Fleck’s ideas on philosophy of science is due not only to their indirect dissemination by way of Thomas Kuhn, but also to an incommensurability between the standard conceptual framework of history and philosophy of science and Fleck’s own more integratedly historico-social and praxis-oriented approach to understanding the evolution of scientific discovery. What Kuhn named “paradigm” offers a periphrastic rendering or oblique translation of Fleck’s Denkstil/Denkkollektiv, a derivation that may also account for the lability of the term “paradigm”. This was due not to Kuhn’s unwillingness to credit Fleck but rather to …
Continental Philosophy Of Science: Mach, Duhem, And Bachelard, Babette Babich
Continental Philosophy Of Science: Mach, Duhem, And Bachelard, Babette Babich
Articles and Chapters in Academic Book Collections
As representatives of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century empiricism and positivism, the particular names Ernst Mach (1838–1916), Pierre Duhem (1861–1916) and Gaston Bachelard (1884–1962) have of course and as already noted much more than a merely historical significance. In analytic philosophy of science, an ongoing tradition of reinterpretations of their work continues to influence the current linguistic or theoretical crisis in analytic philosophy and semiotics - semantics of scientific theory (Duhem not only as represented by W.V.O.Quine but also Stanley Jaki) as well as, on the other hand, the current emphasis on experiment representing the counter-absolutist turn to the history (and …
On The Analytic-Continental Divide In Philosophy: Nietzsche's Lying Truth, Heidegger's Speaking Language, And Philosophy, Babette Babich
On The Analytic-Continental Divide In Philosophy: Nietzsche's Lying Truth, Heidegger's Speaking Language, And Philosophy, Babette Babich
Articles and Chapters in Academic Book Collections
This article explores the question of the nature of the differences between analytic and continental styles of philosophizing, raising the political stakes of the professional differentiation between, and especially: the denial of the difference between analytic philosophy and continental philosophy. Discusses the question of the annexation of the philosophical themes of continental philosophy on the part of analytic philosophy, annexation because it is not dialogical or hermeneutical, appropriation or cooption simply by refusing the distinction between styles altogether.
Heidegger: Through Phenomenology To Thought, William J. Richardson
Heidegger: Through Phenomenology To Thought, William J. Richardson
Research Resources
No abstract provided.
Kuhn's Paradigm As A Parable For The Cold War: Incommensurability And Its Discontents From Fuller's Tale Of Harvard To Fleck's Unsung Lvov, Babette Babich
Kuhn's Paradigm As A Parable For The Cold War: Incommensurability And Its Discontents From Fuller's Tale Of Harvard To Fleck's Unsung Lvov, Babette Babich
Articles and Chapters in Academic Book Collections
In a journal issue dedicated to a discussion of Steve Fuller's Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History for Our Times, I argue that Kuhn’s limited acknowledgment of Fleck’s influence on his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was due to a foundational incommensurability between the standard conceptual framework for philosophical studies of science and Fleck’s historico-social and praxis-oriented approach to scientific progress. The incommensurability in question constituted an insurmountable tension between the kind of language and thinking manifest in Fleck’s study and the conceptual language evident in Kuhn and characteristic of one might still call the received view’ in philosophy of science. …