Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities
A Very Different Kind Of Rule: Credal Rules, Argumentation And Community, James Bradley, Peter Loptson
A Very Different Kind Of Rule: Credal Rules, Argumentation And Community, James Bradley, Peter Loptson
OSSA Conference Archive
In mainstream Anglo-American philosophy, the relation between cognition and community has been defined primarily in terms of the generalization of the mathematical function (Frege, Russell), especially as a model for the nature of rules (Wittgenstein and followers), which thus come to be under-stood as algorithms. This leads to the elimination of both the reflexive, synthesizing subject (for it is unnec-essary to the algorithmic decision-making procedure installed in the rule), and the intrinsic communal-historical nature of argumentation and belief-formation. Against this approach, I follow R.G. Collingwood’s hitherto unrecognized strategy in his Essay on Metaphysics (1940) and argue that the relation of …
Propositional Quantification, Ryan Christensen
Propositional Quantification, Ryan Christensen
Philosophy Faculty Publications
Ramsey deWned truth in the following way: xz is true if and only if 'pzz(xz = [zpz] & pz). This deWnition is ill-formed in standard Wrst-order logic, so it is normally interpreted using substitutional or some kind of higher-order quanti-Wer. I argue that these quantiWers fail to provide an adequate reading of the deWnition, but that, given certain adjustments, standard objectual quantiWcation does provide an adequate reading.
Credit Theories And The Value Of Knowledge, Jason Baehr
Credit Theories And The Value Of Knowledge, Jason Baehr
Philosophy Faculty Works
One alleged advantage of credit theories of knowledge is that they are capable of explaining why knowledge is essentially more valuable than mere true belief. I argue that credit theories in fact provide grounds for denying this claim and therefore are incapable of overcoming the 'value problem' in epistemology. Much of the discussion revolves around the question of whether true belief is always epistemically valuable. I also consider to what extent, if any, my main argument should worry credit theorists.