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Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities

Meta-Heuristic Strategies In Scientific Judgment, Spencer P. Hey Oct 2011

Meta-Heuristic Strategies In Scientific Judgment, Spencer P. Hey

Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository

In the first half of this dissertation, I develop a heuristic methodology for analyzing scientific solutions to the problem of underdetermination. Heuristics are rough-and-ready procedures used by scientists to construct models, design experiments, interpret evidence, etc. But as powerful as they are, heuristics are also error-prone. Therefore, I argue that they key to prudently using a heuristic is the articulation of meta-heuristics---guidelines to the kinds of problems for which a heuristic is well- or ill-suited.

Given that heuristics will introduce certain errors into our scientific investigations, I emphasize the importance of a particular category of meta-heuristics involving the search for …


Epistemic Contextualism: A Defense And Analysis, Sruthi R. Rothenfluch May 2011

Epistemic Contextualism: A Defense And Analysis, Sruthi R. Rothenfluch

Department of Philosophy: Dissertations, Theses, and Student Research

Epistemic contextualists maintain that the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions and denials change according to the context of utterance. In this dissertation, I defend this view against one of its main rivals, classic invariantism, which holds that the contents of such statements remain fixed across contexts. While epistemic contextualists provide a straightforward semantic account of the variability in our knowledge-ascribing behavior, classic invariantists cannot, and therefore must offer some explanation as to why it seems as though the standards for ‘knowing that p’ shift from one context to the next. To this end, classic invariantists draw a distinction between what …


The Mind In Motion, Shayan A. Gates May 2011

The Mind In Motion, Shayan A. Gates

Senior Honors Projects

The Mind in Motion

Shayan Gates

Faculty Sponsor: Galen Johnson, Philosophy

The origin of most scientific disciplines can be traced back to a few philosophical insights posed by a few curious thinkers throughout time, and cognitive science is no exception.While intrigue has nearly always surrounded the human mind and its relation to the brain, validation of this relationship has not been so easy to come by, and there are still areas of contention during this time of advancement in neurological sciences and related technologies.

This topic is very broad (to say the least) so I decided to confine this paper …


Empiricism And Wesleyan Ethics, Kevin Twain Lowery Apr 2011

Empiricism And Wesleyan Ethics, Kevin Twain Lowery

Faculty Scholarship – Theology

In this article, the open-endedness of Wesleyan ethics is affirmed; attempts to articulate a system of Wesleyan ethics have been few, and it would be virtually impossible for any single expression of Wesleyan ethics to be regarded as definitive for the tradition as a whole. The fact that Wesleyan ethics is a relatively open field allows it to be developed in a number of ways that can still be regarded as Wesleyan or are at least consistent with basic Wesleyan commitments. Wesley’s allegiance to empiricism is then recalled, and the importance of addressing epistemological questions is stressed. An outline of …


The Bee-Haviour Of Scientists: An Analogy Of Science From The World Of Bees, Ben Trubody Mar 2011

The Bee-Haviour Of Scientists: An Analogy Of Science From The World Of Bees, Ben Trubody

Between the Species

I am going to compare the strategies and communication bees use in order to locate and retrieve nectar to the world of science and the scientist. The analogy is intentionally anthropomorphic but I wish to argue that if successful bees made assumptions they would be similar to those of the scientist: flowers can be regarded as facts, nectar as knowledge, honey as technology and their ‘waggle-dance’ as communication of ideas. I would like to say that this is to be used as an analogy and should not be taken to be a statement of the scientific method as an emergent …


Just-If-Ication, Raam P. Gokhale Feb 2011

Just-If-Ication, Raam P. Gokhale

Raam P Gokhale

A Discussion of Scientific Reasoning


Feminist Empiricism, Catherine Hundleby Jan 2011

Feminist Empiricism, Catherine Hundleby

Philosophy Publications

No abstract provided.


Credit Theories And The Value Of Knowledge, Jason Baehr Jan 2011

Credit Theories And The Value Of Knowledge, Jason Baehr

Philosophy Faculty Works

One alleged advantage of credit theories of knowledge is that they are capable of explaining why knowledge is essentially more valuable than mere true belief. I argue that credit theories in fact provide grounds for denying this claim and therefore are incapable of overcoming the 'value problem' in epistemology. Much of the discussion revolves around the question of whether true belief is always epistemically valuable. I also consider to what extent, if any, my main argument should worry credit theorists.


Co-Creation Of Experiential Qualities, Vuk Uskoković Jan 2011

Co-Creation Of Experiential Qualities, Vuk Uskoković

Pharmacy Faculty Articles and Research

Cognitive sciences have been interminably in search for a consistent philosophical framework for the description of perceptual phenomena. Most of the frameworks in usage today fall in-between the extremes of constructivism and objective realism. However, whereas constructivist cognitive theories face difficulties when attempting to explain the experiential commonality of different cognitive entities, objectivistic theories fail in explaining the active role of the subject in the formation of experiences. This paper undertakes to compare and eventually combine these two major approaches to describing cognitive phenomena. It is argued that constructivist explanations inevitably refer to a ‘hidden’ ontological source of experience, and …


Combating Anti Anti-Luck Epistemology, Brent J C Madison Jan 2011

Combating Anti Anti-Luck Epistemology, Brent J C Madison

Philosophy Papers and Journal Articles

One thing that nearly all epistemologists agree upon is that Gettier cases are decisive counterexamples to the tripartite analysis of knowledge; whatever else is true of knowledge, it is not merely belief that is both justified and true. They now agree that knowledge is not justified true belief because this is consistent with there being too much luck present in the cases, and that knowledge excludes such luck. This is to endorse what has become known as the ‘anti-luck platitude’.

But what if generations of philosophers have been mistaken about this, blinded at least partially by a deeply entrenched professional …