Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Keyword
-
- Reasons for action (4)
- Desires (3)
- Consequentialism (2)
- Moral demands (2)
- Moral intuitions (2)
-
- Naturalism (2)
- Reasons (2)
- Ruth Chang (2)
- Triviality (2)
- Affective desires (1)
- Bernard Williams (1)
- Boredom (1)
- David Sobel (1)
- Derek Parfit (1)
- Desire (1)
- Emotions (1)
- Eternity (1)
- Experimental philosophy (1)
- God (1)
- Greatness (1)
- Intentionality (1)
- Jennifer Hawkins (1)
- Jonathan Dancy (1)
- Joseph Raz (1)
- Moral reasons (1)
- Open question argument (1)
- Overdemandingness objection (1)
- Pleasure (1)
- Responsiveness to reasons (1)
Articles 1 - 8 of 8
Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities
God And Eternal Boredom, Attila Tanyi, Vuko Andric
God And Eternal Boredom, Attila Tanyi, Vuko Andric
Attila Tanyi
Overdemanding Consequentialism? An Experimental Approach, Attila Tanyi, Martin Bruder
Overdemanding Consequentialism? An Experimental Approach, Attila Tanyi, Martin Bruder
Attila Tanyi
According to act-consequentialism the right action is the one that produces the best results as judged from an impersonal perspective. Some claim that this requirement is unreasonably demanding and therefore consequentialism is unacceptable as a moral theory. The article breaks with dominant trends in discussing this so-called Overdemandingness Objection. Instead of focusing on theoretical responses, it empirically investigates whether there exists a widely shared intuition that consequentialist demands are unreasonable. This discussion takes the form of examining what people think about the normative significance of consequentialist requirements. In two experiments, the article finds that although people are sensitive to consequentialist …
Consequentialism And Its Demands: A Representative Study, Attila Tanyi, Martin Bruder
Consequentialism And Its Demands: A Representative Study, Attila Tanyi, Martin Bruder
Attila Tanyi
An influential objection to act-consequentialism holds that the theory is unduly demanding. This paper is an attempt to approach this critique of act-consequentialism – the Overdemandingness Objection – from a different, so far undiscussed, angle. First, the paper argues that the most convincing form of the Objection claims that consequentialism is overdemanding because it requires us, with decisive force, to do things that, intuitively, we do not have decisive reason to perform. Second, in order to investigate the existence of the intuition, the paper reports empirical evidence of how people see the normative significance of consequentialist requirements.. In a scenario …
Desires As Additional Reasons? The Case Of Tie-Breaking, Attila Tanyi
Desires As Additional Reasons? The Case Of Tie-Breaking, Attila Tanyi
Attila Tanyi
Sobel On Pleasure, Reason, And Desire, Attila Tanyi
Sobel On Pleasure, Reason, And Desire, Attila Tanyi
Attila Tanyi
Reason And Desire: The Case Of Affective Desires, Attila Tanyi
Reason And Desire: The Case Of Affective Desires, Attila Tanyi
Attila Tanyi
The paper begins with an objection to the Desire-Based Reasons Model. The argument from reason-based desires holds that since desires are based on reasons (first premise), which they transmit but to which they cannot add (second premise), they cannot themselves provide reasons for action. In the paper I investigate an attack that has recently been launched against the first premise of this argument by Ruth Chang. Chang invokes a counterexample: affective desires. The aim of the paper is to see if there is a way to accommodate the counterexample to the first premise. I investigate three strategies. I first deal …
Desire-Based Reasons, Naturalism, And The Possibility Of Vindication, Attila Tanyi
Desire-Based Reasons, Naturalism, And The Possibility Of Vindication, Attila Tanyi
Attila Tanyi
The aim of the paper is to critically assess the idea that reasons for action are provided by desires (the Model). I start from the claim that the most often employed meta-ethical background for the Model is ethical naturalism; I then argue against the Model through its naturalist background. For the latter purpose I make use of two objections that are both intended to refute naturalism per se. One is G. E. Moore’s Open Question Argument (OQA), the other is Derek Parfit’s Triviality Objection (TO). I show that naturalists might be able to avoid both objections in case they can …
Naturalism And Triviality, Attila Tanyi
Naturalism And Triviality, Attila Tanyi
Attila Tanyi
The paper examines Derek Parfit’s claim that naturalism trivializes the agent’s practical argument and therefore abolishes the normativity of its conclusion. In the first section, I present Parfit’s charge in detail. After this I discuss three possible responses to the objection. I show that the first two responses either fail or are inconclusive. Trying to avoid Parfit’s charge by endorsing irreductionist naturalism is not a solution because this form of naturalism is metaphysically untenable. Non- descriptive naturalism, on the other hand, does not answer the pressing concern behind Parfit’s charge. I conclude that we had better turn to the third …