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The Narrative Practice Hypothesis: Origins And Applications Of Folk Psychology, Daniel Hutto
The Narrative Practice Hypothesis: Origins And Applications Of Folk Psychology, Daniel Hutto
Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts - Papers (Archive)
Psychologically normal adult humans make sense of intentional actions by trying to decide for which reason they were performed. This is a datum that requires our understanding. Although there have been interesting recent debates about how we should understand ‘reasons’, I will follow a long tradition and assume that, at a bare minimum, to act for a reason involves having appropriately interrelated beliefs and desires.
Review: Rethinking Commonsense Psychology: A Critique Of Folk Psychology, Theory Of Mind And Simulation, Daniel Hutto
Review: Rethinking Commonsense Psychology: A Critique Of Folk Psychology, Theory Of Mind And Simulation, Daniel Hutto
Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts - Papers (Archive)
Ask nearly any analytic philosopher of mind how we understand intentional actions performed for reasons and you are bound to be told that we do so by deploying mental concepts, such as beliefs and desires, in systematic ways. This way of making sense of actions is known as commonsense or folk psychology (or CSP or FP for short). There have been many interesting debates about CSP over the years. These have focused on questions including: How fundamental and universal is this practice? Which species engage in it? What mechanisms underwrite the competence? How is the ability acquired? And, what exactly …