Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Keyword
-
- Ethics (5)
- Medical Ethics (2)
- Aristotle (1)
- Bluffing (1)
- Deception (1)
-
- Disinterest (1)
- Disinterested (1)
- Disinterestedness (1)
- Essays (1)
- Ethical Cases (1)
- Ethical Theory (1)
- Faction (1)
- Game Theory (1)
- Human Enhancement (1)
- Impartiality (1)
- Intuitions (1)
- Metaphilosophy (1)
- Metaphysics (1)
- Moral Methodology (1)
- Moral Reasoning (1)
- Party (1)
- Philosophy (1)
- Procreative Ethics (1)
- Republicanism (1)
- Shelly Kagan (1)
- Virtue (1)
- Publication
- Publication Type
Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities
Logos-Sophia, Elliott Norman, Donald Wayne Viney, Keith Elliott Perkins, Addyson Kay Campbell, Hunter Hinds, Scott Squires
Logos-Sophia, Elliott Norman, Donald Wayne Viney, Keith Elliott Perkins, Addyson Kay Campbell, Hunter Hinds, Scott Squires
LOGOS-SOPHIA: The Journal of the PSU Philosophical Society
Logos-Sophia, Volume 17, Spring 2024. The Journal of the Pittsburg State University Philosophical Society has largely been a student publication with occasional faculty contribution
A Conflict Of Disinterest: The Problem Of Party In The Early American Republic, Darren Morgan
A Conflict Of Disinterest: The Problem Of Party In The Early American Republic, Darren Morgan
Electronic Theses & Dissertations
This study examines the lost classical republican virtue of disinterestedness—its early role in the nation’s founding, its eventual subordination to partisanship, and its enduring legacy in the realm of politics. Two seminal documents shaped Americans’ early ideas regarding disinterestedness, namely James Madison’s Federalist, No. 10 and George Washington’s “Farewell Address;” however, these cornerstones of impartial politics built upon a long history of classical republican thought from both ancient Rome and mother England. The eventual impracticality of such a virtue quickly gave way to a more enticing and interested form of politics in the early republic—one where lines were rapidly …
Review Of "Truly Human Enhancement: A Philosophical Defense Of Limits ", James Mcbain
Review Of "Truly Human Enhancement: A Philosophical Defense Of Limits ", James Mcbain
Faculty Submissions
Review of "Truly Human Enhancement: A Philosophical Defense of Limits" by Nicholas Agar.
On Skepticism About Case-Specific Intuitions, James Mcbain
On Skepticism About Case-Specific Intuitions, James Mcbain
Faculty Submissions
Moral theorizing is often characterized as beginning from our intuitions about ethical cases. Yet, while many applaud, and even demand, this methodology, there are those who reject such a methodology on the grounds that we cannot treat people’s intuitions about ethical cases as evidence for or against moral theories. Recently, Shelly Kagan has argued that the reliance upon case-specific intuitions in moral theorizing is problematic. Specifically, he maintains that the practice of using intuitions about cases lacks justification and, hence, we ought to be skeptical about the evidential weight of moral intuitions. This leads Kagan to conclude that we ought …
Moral Callings And The Duty To Have Children: A Response To Jeff Mitchell, James Mcbain
Moral Callings And The Duty To Have Children: A Response To Jeff Mitchell, James Mcbain
Faculty Submissions
Jeff Mitchell argues that the good reason for having children is that parenthood is a “moral calling” and that one should heed the call out of a sense of duty and responsibility for the good of society. I argue such a “moral calling” account is mistaken, first, in that Mitchell problematically assumes the “basic intuition” is mistaken and, second, it fails to provide the epistemic conditions for the warranted belief that one would probably make a good parent (a central consideration of Mitchell’s). Thus, such a “moral calling” rationale for the having of children is not superior to rationales that …
The Moral Poker Face: Games, Deception, And The Morality Of Bluffing, James Mcbain
The Moral Poker Face: Games, Deception, And The Morality Of Bluffing, James Mcbain
Faculty Submissions
Bluffing is essentially nothing more than a type of deception. But, despite its morally questionable foundation, it is not only permissible in certain contexts, but sometimes encouraged and/or required (e.g., playing poker). Yet, the question remains as to whether it is permissible to bluff in other contexts – particularly everyday situations. In this paper, I will look at László Mérő’s argument – one based in game theory and Kantian ethics – to the end that bluffing is morally permissible in everyday contexts. I will argue that Mérő’s argument is mistaken on two grounds. First, it includes an epistemic feature (i.e., …