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2011

Selected Works

Ivan Perkins

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Weak Loyalties: How The Rule Of Law Prevents Coups D'Etat And Generates Long-Term Political Stability, Ivan Perkins Feb 2011

Weak Loyalties: How The Rule Of Law Prevents Coups D'Etat And Generates Long-Term Political Stability, Ivan Perkins

Ivan Perkins

The “rule of law” is lauded for producing a variety of positive governance characteristics, including minimal corruption, human rights, and economic prosperity. What has been overlooked, however, is that rule-of-law institutions are also responsible for another phenomenon: the fact that certain states experience long-term political stability, without any coups or coup attempts (defined as internal efforts to seize central state authority through force). The prevailing theory of stability holds that “professional” military officers refrain from coups because they have internalized norms of civilian authority and constitutional procedure. However, this theory requires a system of socialization capable of counteracting self-interest, throughout …