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Competitive Experimentation With Private Information, Giuseppe Moscarini, Francesco Squintani
Competitive Experimentation With Private Information, Giuseppe Moscarini, Francesco Squintani
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We study a winner-take-all R&D race where firms are privately informed about the uncertain arrival rate of the invention. Due to the interdependent-value nature of the problem, the equilibrium displays a strong herding effect that distinguishes our framework from war-of-attrition models. Nonetheless, equilibrium expenditure in R&D is sub-optimal when the planner is sufficiently impatient. Pessimistic firms prematurely exit the race, so that the expected discounted amount of R&D activity is inefficiently low. This result stands in contrast to the overinvestment in research that is typical of winner-take-all R&D races without private information. We conclude that secrecy in R&D inefficiently slows …
Schumpeterian Profits In The American Economy: Theory And Measurement, William D. Nordhaus
Schumpeterian Profits In The American Economy: Theory And Measurement, William D. Nordhaus
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
The present study examines the importance of Schumpeterian profits in the United States economy. Schumpeterian profits are defined as those profits that arise when firms are able to appropriate the returns from innovative activity. We first show the underlying equations for Schumpeterian profits. We then estimate the value of these profits for the non-farm business economy. We conclude that only a miniscule fraction of the social returns from technological advances over the 1948-2001 period was captured by producers, indicating that most of the benefits of technological change are passed on to consumers rather than captured by producers.