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To Innovate Or Not To Innovate, That Is The Question: The Functions, Failures, And Foibles Of The Reward Function Theory Of Patent Law In Relation To Computer Software Platforms , Seth A. Cohen
Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review
The patent system has traditionally been viewed as having two primary functions: the reward function and the prospect function. Although these theories do explain some behavior which results from the practical applications of the patent system, they also overlook some behavior of the patent system which indicates a failure of these functions. In order to properly prevent such failure, this paper proposes that the patent system adopt an orientation that will lead to increased innovative rivalry and competition. In Part I, using the computer operating system software market as an example, I propose a framework for reconceptualizing patent protection as …
Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits Of Uncertainty And Non-Injunctive Remedies, Ian Ayres, Paul Klemperer
Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits Of Uncertainty And Non-Injunctive Remedies, Ian Ayres, Paul Klemperer
Michigan Law Review
Uncertainty and delay in patent litigation may have unforeseen virtues. The combination of these oft-criticized characteristics might induce a limited amount of infringement that enhances social welfare without reducing (or without substantially reducing) the profitability of the patentee. Patent infringement is generally viewed as socially inefficient because infringement reduces the patentee's ex ante incentive to innovate. Limited amounts of infringement combined with increased patent duration, however, can substantially reduce the distortionary ex post effects of supracompetitive pricing without reducing the patentee's ex ante incentives to innovate. Indeed, this Article derives a legal regime that preserves the incentive to innovate by …