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Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits Of Uncertainty And Non-Injunctive Remedies, Ian Ayres, Paul Klemperer
Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits Of Uncertainty And Non-Injunctive Remedies, Ian Ayres, Paul Klemperer
Michigan Law Review
Uncertainty and delay in patent litigation may have unforeseen virtues. The combination of these oft-criticized characteristics might induce a limited amount of infringement that enhances social welfare without reducing (or without substantially reducing) the profitability of the patentee. Patent infringement is generally viewed as socially inefficient because infringement reduces the patentee's ex ante incentive to innovate. Limited amounts of infringement combined with increased patent duration, however, can substantially reduce the distortionary ex post effects of supracompetitive pricing without reducing the patentee's ex ante incentives to innovate. Indeed, this Article derives a legal regime that preserves the incentive to innovate by …
Recent Developments In Patent Law, Arthur M. Smith
Recent Developments In Patent Law, Arthur M. Smith
Michigan Law Review
The framers of the Federal Constitution shared with Thomas Jefferson his "wish to see new inventions encouraged, and old ones brought again info useful notice." Their concern for the public welfare caused many, including Jefferson, to question the wisdom of using a limited monopoly to encourage such inventions.