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Innovation

University of Michigan Law School

Antitrust and Trade Regulation

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Tesla, Dealer Franchise Laws, And The Politics Of Crony Capitalism, Daniel A. Crane Jan 2016

Tesla, Dealer Franchise Laws, And The Politics Of Crony Capitalism, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Public choice theory has long proclaimed that business interests can capture regulatory processes to generate economic rents at the expense of consumers. Such political exploitation may go unnoticed and unchallenged for long time periods because, though the rents are captured by a relatively small number of individuals or firms, the costs are widely diffused over a large number of consumers. The triggering event to expose and mobilize opposition to the regulatory capture may not arise until a new technology seeks to challenge the incumbent technology, thus creating a motivated champion to expose and oppose the regulatory capture and advocate for …


Tesla And The Car Dealers' Lobby, Daniel A. Crane Jun 2014

Tesla And The Car Dealers' Lobby, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Tesla Motors, the offspring of entrepreneur Elon Musk (who brought us Pay-Pal and SpaceX), is the most exciting automotive development in many decades and a marquee story of American technological dynamism and innovation. The company’s luxury electric cars have caused a sensation in the auto industry, including a review by Consumer Reports calling Tesla’s Model S the best car it ever tested. Despite the acclaim, Tesla faces enormous challenges Despite the acclaim, Tesla faces enormous challenges in penetrating an automotive market that has been dominated for a century by internal combustion engines. Not only must it build cars that customers …


Section 5 And The Innovation Curve, Daniel A. Crane Jan 2013

Section 5 And The Innovation Curve, Daniel A. Crane

Book Chapters

the ftc’s authority to use Section 5 of the FTC Act to reach anticompetitive conduct that would not be illegal under the Sherman or Clayton Acts has been much discussed in recent years, particularly in conjunction with the FTC’s enforcement action against Intel. As of this writing, a Section 5 action against Google seems imminent.


Innovative Copyright, Greg Lastowka Apr 2011

Innovative Copyright, Greg Lastowka

Michigan Law Review

For over a decade, Michael Carrier has been exploring the intersection of antitrust and intellectual property ("IP") law, contributing many articles that offer new solutions and approaches to the vexing problems confronting the law of innovation. Carrier's academic writing is situated in a voluminous scholarly discourse about the appropriate rules and goals of the laws of copyright, patent, and antitrust. While Carrier easily could have written an "insider" tome for specialists in this area, his new book, Innovation for the 21st Century, is targeted at a broader audience. Carrier's book is directed at legislators, jurists, and opinion makers-as well as …


Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits Of Uncertainty And Non-Injunctive Remedies, Ian Ayres, Paul Klemperer Jan 1999

Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits Of Uncertainty And Non-Injunctive Remedies, Ian Ayres, Paul Klemperer

Michigan Law Review

Uncertainty and delay in patent litigation may have unforeseen virtues. The combination of these oft-criticized characteristics might induce a limited amount of infringement that enhances social welfare without reducing (or without substantially reducing) the profitability of the patentee. Patent infringement is generally viewed as socially inefficient because infringement reduces the patentee's ex ante incentive to innovate. Limited amounts of infringement combined with increased patent duration, however, can substantially reduce the distortionary ex post effects of supracompetitive pricing without reducing the patentee's ex ante incentives to innovate. Indeed, this Article derives a legal regime that preserves the incentive to innovate by …