Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Digital Commons Network

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Innovation

SelectedWorks

Matthew C Jennejohn

Publication Year

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Entire DC Network

Contract Adjudication In A Collaborative Economy, Matthew C. Jennejohn Aug 2009

Contract Adjudication In A Collaborative Economy, Matthew C. Jennejohn

Matthew C Jennejohn

In order to explore the debate between contextualist versus formalist contract interpretation, this article examines dispute resolution procedures in a novel class of contracts: agreements governing inter-firm collaboration. Analysis of these contracts reveals two phenomena: first, agreements governing collaboration include arbitration clauses more frequently than other commercial contracts; and second, these agreements routinely situate arbitration at the summit of complex escalation procedures. These observations raise, in turn, the following inter-related questions: first, why do collaborators avoid litigation; and second, what makes escalated and private dispute resolution appropriate?

The article’s central claim is that litigation is shunned because contemporary contextualist contract …


Collaboration, Innovation, And Contract Design, Matthew C. Jennejohn Mar 2008

Collaboration, Innovation, And Contract Design, Matthew C. Jennejohn

Matthew C Jennejohn

The rise of the network as a form of economic organization renders problematic our standard understanding of how capitalism is governed. As the governance of production shifts from vertical integration to horizontal contract, a puzzle arises: how do contracts, presumed to be susceptible to hold-up problems due to incompleteness, control production arrangements that by their nature invite opportunism? Relying on publicly-available contracts taken from a number of industries, I argue that firms govern their collaborations through a number of new contract mechanisms, the summation of which is a novel governance system. Because traditional theories of contractual control struggle to fully …