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Innovation

Intellectual Property Law

Maurer School of Law: Indiana University

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Money That Costs Too Much: Regulating Financial Incentives, Kristen Underhill Jul 2019

Money That Costs Too Much: Regulating Financial Incentives, Kristen Underhill

Indiana Law Journal

Money may not corrupt. But should we worry if it corrodes? Legal scholars in a range of fields have expressed concern about “motivational crowding-out,” a process by which offering financial rewards for good behavior may undermine laudable social motivations, like professionalism or civic duty. Disquiet about the motivational impacts of incentives has now extended to health law, employment law, tax, torts, contracts, criminal law, property, and beyond. In some cases, the fear of crowding-out has inspired concrete opposition to innovative policies that marshal incentives to change individual behavior. But to date, our fears about crowding-out have been unfocused and amorphous; …


Patent Pool Outsiders, Michael Mattioli Jan 2018

Patent Pool Outsiders, Michael Mattioli

Articles by Maurer Faculty

Individuals who decline to join cooperative groups — outsiders — raise concerns in many areas of law and policy. From trade policy to climate agreements to class action procedures, the fundamental concern is the same: a single member of the group who drops out could weaken the remaining union. This Article analyzes the outsider problem as it affects patents.

The outsider question has important bearing on patent and antitrust policy. By centralizing and simplifying complex patent licensing deals, patent pools conserve tremendous transaction costs. This allows for the widespread production and competitive sale of many useful technologies, particularly in the …


Background Note: Standard Essential Patents, Innovation And Competition: Challenges In India, Arpan Banerjee Nov 2017

Background Note: Standard Essential Patents, Innovation And Competition: Challenges In India, Arpan Banerjee

IP Theory

In September 2014, a few months after a landslide election victory, the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced the launch of “Make in India,” an ambitious program designed to turn India into a global manufacturing hub. One of the factors widely thought to be responsible for Modi’s victory was support from India’s “neo-middle class”—a young, newly- urbanized section of the electorate seeking employment and improved living standards but struggling amidst an economic downturn. In a speech inaugurating Make in India, Modi linked the program with the aspirations of this section of society. Modi stated the need to elevate the status …


Measuring The Costs And Benefits Of Patent Pools, Michael Mattioli, Robert P. Merges Jan 2017

Measuring The Costs And Benefits Of Patent Pools, Michael Mattioli, Robert P. Merges

Articles by Maurer Faculty

This Article addresses a policy question that has challenged scholars and lawmakers since the 1850s: Do the transaction cost benefits of patent pools outweigh their potential for consumer harm? This question has special importance today. Patent pools are on the increase, due to large numbers of patents in critical industries such as software and mobile phones. In this Article, we present the first empirically-based estimate of the transaction costs savings engendered by patent pools. Drawing on interviews with administrators of prominent pools, we document the costs of assembling and administering a functioning pool. We then estimate the transaction costs that …


Power And Governance In Patent Pools, Michael Mattioli Jan 2014

Power And Governance In Patent Pools, Michael Mattioli

Articles by Maurer Faculty

The recent influx of patent pools, research consortia, and similar cooperative groups led by companies at the vanguard of American innovation has raised a pressing question: How does collective action influence the incentive to innovate? This question hinges on how patent pools are internally governed — a topic that has not been deeply examined by legal scholars. Through an original study of fifty-two private agreements, this Article pulls back the veil on patent licensing collectives to examine whether such organizations are designed to encourage long-term innovation.

This study draws on collective patent license agreements spanning the years 1856 to 2013 …