Digital Commons Network^™

Deinstitutionalization Of Status Offenders: In Perspective , Robert W. Sweet Jr.

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Big Business Beware: Punitive Damages Do Not Violate Fourteenth Amendment According To Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. V. Haslip, Christopher V. Carlyle

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Victim Harm, Retributivism And Capital Punishment: A Philosophy Critique Of Payne V. Tennessee , R. P. Peerenboom

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Toward A Balanced Approach To "Frivolous" Litigation: A Critical Review Of Federal Rule 11 And State Sanctions Provisions , Byron C. Keeling

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Walking The Invisible Line Of Punitive Damages: Txo Production Corp. V. Alliance Resources Corp. , Nancy G. Dragutsky

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

An Economic View Of Innovation And Property Right Protection In The Expanded Regulatory State, J. Miles Hanisee

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Substance And Method In The Year 2000, Akhil Reed Amar

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Law Enforcement And Criminal Law Decisions, Erwin Chemerinsky

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Putting Buck V. Bell In Scientific And Historical Context: A Response To Victoria Nourse , Edward J. Larson

Pepperdine Law Review

In this article written for a law-review symposium in response to a presentation on the infamous 1927 U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Buck v. Bell, Edward J. Larson argues that, at the time that the case was decided, eugenics was on the incline, not the decline. In the 1920s, the American scientific and medical community broadly backed eugenic remedies for various forms of mental illness and retardation. Legislatures, lawyers, and jurists took their cue from this scientific and medical consensus. Absent any question that the statute at issue in Buck v. Bell was validly passed by the Virginia legislature or …

Presumed Guilty, Terrence Cain

Terrence Cain

It would probably surprise the average American that prosecutors need only prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt sometimes. Although the Due Process Clauses of the Constitution require that the government prove each element of an alleged criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt, the use of statutory presumptions has relieved the government of this responsibility, and in some cases, has even shifted the burden to the defendant to disprove the presumption. Likewise, the Sixth Amendment grants a criminal defendant the right to have the jury and the jury alone determine whether the government has met its burden and ultimately whether the …

Individual Autonomy Versus Community: Is It All Or Nothing? An Analysis Of City Of Chicago V. Morales , Keasa Hollister

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Absentee Post-Conviction Constitutional Safeguards – People V. Zowaski, Danielle M. Hansen

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Supreme Court Of New York, Bronx County - People V. Garcia-Cepero , Madeline Zuckerman

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Court Of Appeals Of New York - People V. Davis , Melissa B. Schlactus

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Supreme Court Of New York, Nassau County - Bursac V. Suozzi , Andrew Saraga

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Court Of Appeals Of New York - People V. Fuentes , Pamela Cullington

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Exile On Main Street: Competing Traditions And Due Process Dissent, Colin Starger

All Faculty Scholarship

Everybody loves great dissents. Professors teach them, students learn from them, and journalists quote them. Yet legal scholars have long puzzled over how dissents actually impact the development of doctrine. Recent work by notable empirical scholars proposes to measure the influence of dissents by reference to their subsequent citation in case law. This Article challenges the theoretical basis for this empirical approach and argues that it fails to account for the profound influence that uncited dissents have exerted in law. To overcome this gap in the empirical approach, this Article proposes an alternative method that permits analysis of contextual and …

Goodyear And Nicastro: Observations From A Transnational And Comparative Perspective, Linda J. Silberman

South Carolina Law Review

No abstract provided.

The (Theoretical) Future Of Personal Jurisdiction: Issues Left Open By Goodyear Dunlop Tires V. Brown And J. Mcintyre Machinery V. Nicastro, Roberta Brilmayer, Matthew Smith

South Carolina Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Last Common Law Justice: The Personal Jurisdiction Jurisprudence Of Justice John Paul Stevens, Rodger D. Citron

Rodger Citron

No abstract provided.

I Want My (Immigration) Lawyer! The Necessity Of Court-Appointed Immigration Counsel In Criminal Prosecutions After Padilla V. Kentucky, Scott R. Grubman

Nevada Law Journal

No abstract provided.

People V. Harnett, Michelle Minarcik

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

People V. Harnett, Joanna C. Peck

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, And Constitutional Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes Of Age, Laura K. Donohue

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Federal interest in using facial recognition technology (“FRT”) to collect, analyze, and use biometric information is rapidly growing. Despite the swift movement of agencies and contractors into this realm, however, Congress has been virtually silent on the current and potential uses of FRT. No laws directly address facial recognition—much less the pairing of facial recognition with video surveillance—in criminal law. Limits placed on the collection of personally identifiable information, moreover, do not apply. The absence of a statutory framework is a cause for concern. FRT represents the first of a series of next generation biometrics, such as hand geometry, iris, …

"Bad Juror" Lists And The Prosecutor's Duty To Disclose, Ira Robbins

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

Prosecutors sometimes use what are known as "bad juror" lists to exclude particular citizens from jury service. Not only does this practice interfere with an open and fair jury-selection process, thus implicating a defendant's right to be tried by a jury of his or her peers, but it also violates potential jurors' rights to serve in this important capacity. But who is on these lists? And is a prosecutor required to disclose the lists to defense counsel? These questions have largely gone unnoticed by legal analysts. This Article addresses the prosecutor's duty to disclose bad-juror lists. It reviews the federal …

Democracy And Criminal Discovery Reform After Connick And Garcetti, Janet Moore

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

A leading cause of wrongful conviction and wasteful litigation in criminal cases is the nondisclosure of information beneficial to the defense by prosecutors and law enforcement as required by Brady v. Maryland. In Connick v. Thompson and Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Supreme Court weakened Brady’s enforceability by limiting the deterrent force of 42 U.S.C § 1983 liability. Connick highlights Garcetti’s implications as a criminal discovery case, which scholars have not fully analyzed. While Connick restricted § 1983 liability when prosecutors confess to suppressing exculpatory evidence, Garcetti restricted liability when prosecutors are disciplined for bringing Brady evidence to light. …

"Bad Juror" Lists And The Prosecutor's Duty To Disclose, Ira P. Robbins

Ira P. Robbins