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Managing Persuasion Robustly: The Optimality Of Quota Rules, Dirk Bergemann, Tan Gan, Yingkai Li
Managing Persuasion Robustly: The Optimality Of Quota Rules, Dirk Bergemann, Tan Gan, Yingkai Li
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We study a sender-receiver model where the receiver can commit to a decision rule before the sender determines the information policy. The decision rule can depend on the signal structure and the signal realization that the sender adopts. This framework captures applications where a decision-maker (the receiver) solicit advice from an interested party (sender). In these applications, the receiver faces uncertainty regarding the sender’s preferences and the set of feasible signal structures. Consequently, we adopt a unified robust analysis framework that includes max-min utility, min-max regret, and min-max approximation ratio as special cases. We show that it is optimal for …
Bayesian Persuasion With Lie Detection, Florian Ederer, Weicheng Min
Bayesian Persuasion With Lie Detection, Florian Ederer, Weicheng Min
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion in which the Receiver can detect lies with positive probability. We show that the Sender lies more when the lie detection probability increases. As long as the lie detection probability is sufficiently small the Sender's and the Receiver's equilibrium payoffs are unaffected by the lie detection technology because the Sender simply compensates by lying more. When the lie detection probability is sufficiently high, the Sender's (Receiver's) equilibrium payoff decreases (increases) with the lie detection probability.
Communication And Learning, Luca Anderlini, Dino Gerardi, Roger Lagunoff
Communication And Learning, Luca Anderlini, Dino Gerardi, Roger Lagunoff
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We study the intergenerational accumulation of knowledge in an infinite-horizon model of communication. Each in a sequence of players receives an informative but imperfect signal of the once-and-for-all realization of an unobserved state. The state affects all players’ preferences over present and future decisions. Each player observes his own signal but does not directly observe the realized signals or actions of his predecessors. Instead, he must rely on cheap-talk messages from the previous players to fathom the past. Each player is therefore both a receiver of information with respect to his decision, and a sender with respect to all future …
Sequential Equilibria In Bayesian Games With Communication, Dino Gerardi, Roger B. Myerson
Sequential Equilibria In Bayesian Games With Communication, Dino Gerardi, Roger B. Myerson
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We study the effects of communication in Bayesian games when the players are sequentially rational but some combinations of types have zero probability. Not all communication equilibria can be implemented as sequential equilibria. We define the set of strong sequential equilibria (SSCE) and characterize it. SSCE differs from the concept of sequential communication equilibrium (SCE) defined by Myerson (1986) in that SCE allows the possibility of trembles by the mediator. We show that these two concepts coincide when there are three or more players, but the set of SSCE may be strictly smaller than the set of SCE for two-player …
Committee Design In The Presence Of Communication, Dino Gerardi, Leeat Yariv
Committee Design In The Presence Of Communication, Dino Gerardi, Leeat Yariv
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
The goal of this paper is to introduce communication in a collective choice environment with information acquisition. We concentrate on decision panels that are comprised of agents sharing a common goal and having a joint task. Members of the panel decide whether to acquire costly information or not, preceding the communication stage. We take a mechanism design approach and consider a designer who can choose the size of the decision panel, the procedure by which it selects the collective choice, and the communication protocol by which its members abide prior to casting their individual action choices. We characterize the solution …
Communication And Monetary Policy, Jeffrey Amato, Stephen Morris, Hyun Song Shin
Communication And Monetary Policy, Jeffrey Amato, Stephen Morris, Hyun Song Shin
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
One role of monetary policy is to coordinate expectations in the economy and greater transparency of monetary policy may lead to greater coordination. But if transparent monetary policy helps coordinate expectations, then it must also magnify mistakes.
Coordination, Communication And Common Knowledge: A Retrospective On The Electronic Mail Game, Stephen Morris
Coordination, Communication And Common Knowledge: A Retrospective On The Electronic Mail Game, Stephen Morris
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Common knowledge plays an important role in coordination problems and coordination problems are central to many areas of economic policy. In this paper, I review some common knowledge puzzles culminating in the electronic mail game. These puzzles may seem distant from practical concerns. However, I then argue why insights derived from this literature are useful in interpreting empirical evidence of how people coordinate under uncertainty and in understanding the role of communication in coordinating behaviour.
Unmediated Communication In Games With Complete And Incomplete Information, Dino Gerardi
Unmediated Communication In Games With Complete And Incomplete Information, Dino Gerardi
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
In this paper we study the effects of adding unmediated communication to static, finite games of complete and incomplete information. We characterize S U ( G ), the set of outcomes of a game G , that are induced by sequential equilibria of cheap talk extensions. A cheap talk extension of G is an extensive-form game in which players communicate before playing G . A reliable mediator is not available and players exchange private or public messages that do not affect directly their payoffs. We first show that if G is a game of complete information with five or more …