Digital Commons Network^™

Do Public Accommodations Laws Compel “What Shall Be Orthodox”?: The Role Of Barnette In 303 Creative Llc V. Eleni, Linda C. Mcclain

Faculty Scholarship

This article addresses the U.S. Supreme Court’s embrace, in 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, of a First Amendment objection to state public accommodations laws that the Court avoided in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission: such laws compel governmental orthodoxy. These objections invoke West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette’s celebrated language: “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.” They also …

Reply Brief For Petitioner, Ferguson V. America, Brian Wolfman, Madeline H. Meth

Faculty Scholarship

The Government concedes that the circuits are divided over whether 28 U.S.C. § 2255 limits a district court’s discretion in reviewing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions. And because it cannot dispute that this issue is cleanly presented, unaffected by the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement, and exceptionally important, it instead rewrites the question presented. The Government’s effort to replace a question about the relationship (if any) between Section 3582(c)(1)(A) and Section 2255 with one about whether the district court abused its discretion should be rejected, and with it the Government’s attempt to gloss over the intractable circuit split, its misguided argument …

Reply Brief For Petitioner, Muldrow V. City Of St. Louis, Madeline H. Meth, Brian Wolfman

Faculty Scholarship

Section 703(a)(1) is straightforward: It prohibits all discrimination against an employee “with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1). The Department does not dispute that job transfers concern “terms and conditions” of employment. See Resp. Br. 1, 35. So, if the statute’s words are honored, and Jatonya Muldrow can show that the Department’s transfer decisions were imposed “because of” her sex, the Department is liable.

Yet the Department maintains that some discriminatory job transfers escape Title VII’s reach. It relies nearly exclusively …

Roberts's Revisions: A Narratological Reading Of The Affirmative Action Cases, Angela Onwuachi-Willig

Faculty Scholarship

In a seminal article published nearly twenty years ago in the Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities, Professor Peter Brooks posed a critical yet underexplored question: "Does the [flaw [n]eed a [n]arratology?"⁵ In essence, he asked whether law as a field should have a framework for deconstructing and understanding how and why a legal opinion, including the events that the opinion is centered on, has been crafted and presented in a particular way.⁶ After highlighting that "how a story is told can make a difference in legal outcomes," Brooks encouraged legal actors to "talk narrative talk" …

Brief For Petitioner, Muldrow V. City Of St. Louis, Missouri, Madeline H. Meth, Brian Wolfman

Faculty Scholarship

Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee because of her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Its core antidiscrimination provision, Section 703(a)(1), protects individuals not only from discriminatory hiring, firing, or compensation but also from discrimination with respect to their “terms, conditions, or privileges” of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1). Petitioner Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow maintains that her employer, the City of St. Louis Police Department, discriminated against her in the terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment when, because of her sex, it transferred her out of the Department’s Intelligence Division to an entirely different job, …

The Problem Is The Court, Not The Constitution, Jonathan Feingold

Faculty Scholarship

“But first, we must believe.” So concludes The Antiracist Constitution, where Brandon Hasbrouck confronts an uneasy question: In the quest for racial justice, is the Constitution friend or foe? Even the casual observer knows that constitutional law is no friend to racial justice. In the nineteenth century, Plessy v. Ferguson blessed Jim Crow. In the twentieth century, Washington v. Davis insulated practices that reproduce Jim Crow. Now in the twenty-first century, pending affirmative action litigation invites the Supreme Court to outlaw efforts to remedy Jim Crow.

Against The Chenery Ii "Doctrine", Gary S. Lawson, Joseph Postell

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court’s 1947 decision in SEC v. Chenery Corp. (“Chenery II”) is generally taken as blanket authorization for agencies to make law through either adjudication or rulemaking if their organic statutes permit both modes. We think this is an overreading of the doctrine. The decision in Chenery II need not be read so broadly, and there are good reasons to read it more narrowly. The most important reason is that agency lawmaking through adjudication presents serious constitutional concerns involving due process of law and subdelegation of legislative power, at least if the agency action deprives people of life, liberty, …

Justices Citing Justices, Jay D. Wexler

Faculty Scholarship

Scholars have long paid attention to how often and for what reasons Supreme Court justices cite law review articles and academic books in their opinions. More recently, a new area of scholarship has begun to look at how Justices create their own lines of “personal precedent” through not only their prior opinions but also their academic writings. At the intersection of these two areas of inquiry lies questions of how often and for what reasons Supreme Court justices cite the journal articles and books of the various justices sitting on the Court, including their own. With the exception of one …

The Ghosts Of Chevron Present And Future, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

In the October 2021 term, the Supreme Court decided six cases involving federal agency interpretations of statutes, at least five of which seemingly implicated the Chevron doctrine and several of which explicitly turned on applications of Chevron in the lower courts. But while the Chevron doctrine has dominated federal administrative law for nearly four decades, not a single majority opinion during the term even cited Chevron. Three of those cases formalized the so-called “major questions” doctrine, which functions essentially as an anti-Chevron doctrine by requiring clear congressional statements of authority to justify agency action on matters of great legal and …

Ordered Liberty After Dobbs, Linda C. Mcclain, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

This Essay explores the implications of Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization for the future of substantive due process (SDP) liberties protecting personal autonomy, bodily integrity, familial relationships (including marriage), sexuality, and reproduction. We situate Dobbs in the context of prior battles on the Supreme Court over the proper interpretive approach to deciding what basic liberties the Due Process Clause (DPC) protects. As a framing device, we refer to two competing approaches as “the party of [Justice] Harlan or Casey” versus “the party of Glucksberg.” In Dobbs, the dissent co-authored by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan represents the party of …

Loper Bright And The Future Of Chevron Deference, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

The question presented in Loper Bright Industries v. Raimondo¹ is “[w]hether the Court should overrule Chevron or at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency.” The Court denied certiorari on another question focused on the merits of the case,² indicating that at least four of the Justices are anxious to revisit or at least clarify Chevron. It’s about time, although it’s far from certain that the Court will actually follow through with the promise the certiorari grant indicates.^{3 …}

Biden V. Nebraska: The New State Standing And The (Old) Purposive Major Questions Doctrine, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in Biden v. Nebraska does not sufficiently explain how Missouri has standing under established Article III doctrine, nor how the Court approaches the major questions doctrine as a method of statutory interpretation. Clarification can come from other opinions, even other cases entirely, in which Justice’s counterarguments are suggestive of the real arguments underlying the decisions.

MOHELA may have faced a concrete injury from the student debt waiver, but there was no evidence that Missouri would – and the majority had no answer for how Missouri had standing without an injury. A debate over special state …

The Anti-Innovation Supreme Court: Major Questions, Delegation, Chevron And More, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court of the United States has generally been a very aggressive enforcer of legal limitations on governmental power. In various periods in its history, the Court has gone far beyond enforcing clearly expressed and easily ascertainable constitutional and statutory provisions and has suppressed innovation by the other branches that do not necessarily transgress widely held social norms. Novel assertions of legislative power, novel interpretations of federal statutes, statutes that are in tension with well-established common law rules and state laws adopted by only a few states are suspect simply because they are novel or rub up against tradition. …

Rewriting Whren V. United States, Jonathan Feingold, Devon Carbado

Faculty Scholarship

In 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Whren v. United States—a unanimous opinion in which the Court effectively constitutionalized racial profiling. Despite its enduring consequences, Whren remains good law today. This Article rewrites the opinion. We do so, in part, to demonstrate how one might incorporate racial justice concerns into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, a body of law that has long elided and marginalized the racialized dimensions of policing. A separate aim is to reveal the “false necessity” of the Whren outcome. The fact that Whren was unanimous, and that even progressive Justices signed on, might lead one to conclude that …

The Right To Counsel In A Neoliberal Age, Zohra Ahmed

Faculty Scholarship

Legal scholarship tends to obscure how changes in criminal process relate to broader changes in the political and economic terrain. This Article offers a modest corrective to this tendency. By studying the U.S. Supreme Court’s right to counsel jurisprudence, as it has developed since the mid-70s, I show the pervasive impact of the concurrent rise of neoliberalism on relationships between defendants and their attorneys. Since 1975, the Court has emphasized two concerns in its rulings regarding the right to counsel: choice and autonomy. These, of course, are nominally good things for defendants to have. But by paying close attention to …

Interpretation, Remedy, And The Rule Of Law: Why Courts Should Have The Courage Of Their Convictions, Jack M. Beermann, Ronald A. Cass

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Arthrex opens a window on a set of issues debated in different contexts for decades. These issues—how to interpret statutes and constitutional provisions, what sources to look to, whether so far as possible to adopt interpretations that avoid declaring actions of coordinate branches unconstitutional, and where such actions are deemed to have been unconstitutional whether to provide remedies that cabin the most significant implications of such a declaration—go to the heart of the judicial role and the division of responsibilities among the branches of government.

Our principal focus, however, is on the …

Seila Law: Is There A There There?, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

In Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts, invalidated the provision of the Dodd-Frank Act restricting the president's removal of the director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to cases of "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." The Court's decision leaves the director subject to removal by the president for any reason or no reason at all.

This Essay on the Seila Law decision makes three points. First, because there is no legal or historical support for the Court's distinction between independent agencies headed …

Supreme Court Precedent And The Politics Of Repudiation, Robert L. Tsai

Faculty Scholarship

This is an invited essay that will appear in a book titled "Law's Infamy," edited by Austin Sarat as part of the Amherst Series on Law, Jurisprudence, and Social Thought. Every legal order that aspires to be called just is held together by not only principles of justice but also archetypes of morally reprehensible outcomes, and villains as well as heroes. Chief Justice Roger Taney, who believed himself to be a hero solving the great moral question of slavery in the Dred Scott case, is today detested for trying to impose a racist, slaveholding vision of the Constitution upon America. …

Deep Tracks: Album Cuts That Help Define The Essential Scalia, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

Jeff Sutton and Ed Whelan have collected some of Justice Scalia’s “greatest hits” in a volume entitled The Essential Scalia: On the Constitution, the Courts, and the Rule of Law. The book is an excellent introduction to the jurisprudential thought and literary style of one of the most influential legal thinkers—and legal writers—in modern times. As with any “greatest hits” compilation, however, there are inevitably going to be key “album cuts” for which there will not be space. This essay seeks to supplement Sutton and Whelan’s invaluable efforts by surveying three of those “deep tracks” that shed particular light on …

Mr. Gorsuch, Meet Mr. Marshall: A Private-Law Framework For The Public-Law Puzzle Of Subdelegation, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

In the wake of Gundy v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2116 (2019), there is reason to think that five Justices might be willing to consider reviving the constitutional non-subdelegation doctrine. But in what form? Judges and scholars have labored for more than two centuries to come up with a legally rigorous standard for evaluating the permissible scope and breadth of congressional grants of discretion to executive and judicial agents. Some, such as Justice Scalia, eventually gave up in despair. That is a grave mistake. Lawyers had faced subdelegation questions for centuries before the Constitution was ratified, in the context of …

Crisis? Whose Crisis?, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

Every moment in human history can be characterized by someone as “socially and politically charged.” For a large portion of the population of the United States, nearly the entire history of the country has been socially and politically charged, first because they were enslaved and then because they were subjected to discriminatory laws and unequal treatment under what became known as “Jim Crow.” The history of the United States has also been a period of social and political upheaval for American Indians, the people who occupied the territory that became the United States before European settlement. Although both African-Americans and …

Equality Is A Brokered Idea, Robert L. Tsai

Faculty Scholarship

This essay examines the Supreme Court's stunning decision in the census case, Department of Commerce v. New York. I characterize Chief Justice John Roberts' decision to side with the liberals as an example of pursuing the ends of equality by other means – this time, through the rule of reason. Although the appeal was limited in scope, the stakes for political and racial equality were sky high. In blocking the administration from adding a citizenship question to the 2020 Census, 5 members of the Court found the justification the administration gave to be a pretext. In this instance, that lie …

The Other Janus And The Future Of Labor’S Capital, David H. Webber

Faculty Scholarship

Two forms of labor’s capital—union funds and public pension funds—have profoundly reshaped the corporate world. They have successfully advocated for shareholder empowerment initiatives like proxy access, declassified boards, majority voting, say on pay, private fund registration, and the CEO-to-worker pay ratio. They have also served as lead plaintiffs in forty percent of federal securities fraud and Delaware deal class actions. Today, much-discussed reforms like revised shareholder proposal rules and mandatory arbitration threaten two of the main channels by which these shareholders have exercised power. But labor’s capital faces its greatest, even existential, threats from outside corporate law. This Essay addresses …

Elite Patent Law, Paul Gugliuzza

Faculty Scholarship

Over the last twenty years, one of the most significant developments in intellectual property law has been the dramatic increase in the number of patent cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. That same time period has also seen the emergence of a small, elite group of lawyers specializing not in any particular area of substantive law but in litigation before the Supreme Court. In recent empirical work, I linked the Court’s growing interest in patent law to the more frequent participation of elite Supreme Court lawyers in patent cases, particularly at the cert. stage. Among other things, I found …

The Supreme Court Bar At The Bar Of Patents, Paul Gugliuzza

Faculty Scholarship

Over the past two decades, a few dozen lawyers have come to dominate practice before the U.S. Supreme Court. By many accounts, these elite lawyers—whose clients are often among the largest corporations in the world—have spurred the Court to hear more cases that businesses care about and to decide those cases in favor of their clients. The Supreme Court’s recent case law on antitrust, arbitration, punitive damages, class actions, and more provides copious examples.

Though it is often overlooked in discussions of the emergent Supreme Court bar, patent law is another area in which the Court’s agenda has changed significantly …

"I'M Leavin' It (All) Up To You": Gundy And The (Sort-Of) Resurrection Of The Subdelegation Doctrine, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

In 2000, Cass Sunstein quipped that the conventional nondelegation doctrine, which holds that there are judicially enforceable constitutional limits on the extent to which Congress can confer discretion on other actors to determine the content of federal law, “has had one good year, and 211 bad ones (and counting).”1 The “one good year,” he said, was 1935, when the Court twice held unconstitutional certain provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act that gave the president power to approve or create codes of conduct for essentially all American businesses, subject only to very vague, and often contradictory, statutory exhortations to pursue …

Testimony Of Rebecca Ingber Before The United States Senate Committee On The Judiciary On The Nomination Of Brett Kavanaugh For Associate Justice Of The U.S. Supreme Court, Rebecca Ingber

Faculty Scholarship

Professor Rebecca Ingber testified before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee as it considered the nomination of Brett Kavanaugh for Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. Her testimony focused on Judge Kavanaugh's national security and international law jurisprudence, in particular, the court's role in considering international law constraints on the President's war powers, and the potential effects of this judicial approach on executive power.

Pov: Scotus Should Not Permit “Boycott Of Same-Sex Marriage”, Linda C. Mcclain

Faculty Scholarship

On December 5, 2017, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, in which baker (self-described cake artist) Jack Phillips, owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop, asked the court to decide “whether applying Colorado’s public accommodations law to compel artists to create expression that violates their sincerely held religious beliefs about marriage violates the Free Speech or Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.”

Equality, Sovereignty, And The Family In Morales-Santana, Kristin Collins

Faculty Scholarship

In Sessions v. Morales-Santana, ³ the Supreme Court encountered a body of citizenship law that has long relied on family membership in the construction of the nation’s borders and the composition of the polity.⁴ The particular statute at issue in the case regulates the transmission of citizenship from American parents to their foreign-born children at birth, a form of citizenship known today as derivative citizenship.⁵ When those children are born outside marriage, the derivative citizenship statute makes it more difficult for American fathers, as compared with American mothers, to transmit citizenship to their foreign-born children.⁶ Over …

Time, Institutions, And Adjudication, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

Some of my earliest and fondest memories regarding constitutional theory involve Mike McConnell. He was a participant at the very first Federalist Society conference in 1982, at a time when the entire universe of conservative constitutional theorists fit comfortably in the front of one classroom. More importantly, at another Federalist Society conference in 1987, he gave a speech on constitutional interpretation that, unbeknownst to him, profoundly shaped my entire intellectual approach to the field by emphasizing the obvious but oftoverlooked point that different kinds of documents call for different kinds of interpretative methods.1 In 2015, it is more than an …