Digital Commons Network^™

Accounting For Federalism In State Courts - Exclusion Of Evidence Obtained Lawfully By Federal Agents, Robert M. Bloom, Hillary J. Massey

Robert Bloom

After the terrorist attacks on September 11th, Congress greatly enhanced federal law enforcement powers through enactment of the U.S.A. Patriot Act. The Supreme Court also has provided more leeway to federal officers in the past few decades, for example by limiting the scope of the exclusionary rule. At the same time, many states have interpreted their constitutions to provide greater individual protections to their citizens than provided by the federal constitution. This phenomenon has sometimes created a wide disparity between the investigatory techniques available to federal versus state law enforcement officers. As a result, state courts sometimes must decide whether …

Lawyers Judging Experts: Oversimplifying Science And Undervaluing Advocacy To Construct An Ethical Duty?, David S. Caudill

David S Caudill

My focus is on an apparent trend at the intersection of the fields of evidentiary standards for expert admissibility and professional responsibility, namely the eagerness to place more ethical responsibilities on lawyers to vet their proffered expertise to ensure its reliability. My reservations about this trend are not only based on its troubling implications for the lawyer’s duty as a zealous advocate, which already has obvious limitations (because of lawyers’ conflicting duties to the court), but are also based on the problematic aspects of many reliability determinations. To expect attorneys - and this is what the proponents of a duty …

Not For The Truth Of The Matter: Defendant's Hearsay And The Necessity Of Limiting Instructions In Psychological Defenses, Brian A. Ford

Brian A Ford

This paper presents a thorough discussion of the use of a defendant's hearsay statements to a psychological expert as the basis of the expert's opinion at trial, under California Law.

From Gridlock To Groundbreaking: Realizing Reliability In Forensic Science, Jessica D. Gabel

Jessica Gabel Cino

In 2009, The National Academy of Sciences published a scathing report announcing that forensic science is broken and needs to be overhauled. Weaknesses have plagued forensic evidence for decades, and the resulting legal challenges have been hard fought but met with few victories. What we do know is a harsh truth: that faulty forensic science has contributed to the conviction of innocent people—and will continue to do so if the status quo persists.

In recent years, the reality of wrongful convictions has become mainstream through the work of the Innocence Project and other organizations. Out of the 305 DNA-based exonerations …

The Piranha Is As Deadly As The Shark: A Case For The Limitation On Deceptive Practices In Dna Collection, Brett A. Bauman

Brett A Bauman

Police deception tactics are utilized throughout the United States as a way to catch unsuspecting criminals. Although criticized in many respects, most deceptive police techniques are not only legal, but are actually encouraged. DNA collection and analysis is no exception—techniques are frequently used by law enforcement officers in an attempt to collect a suspect’s genetic specimen in the interest of solving crimes. While law enforcement officers typically have the best interests of society in mind, the current practices employed by officers to collect suspects’ DNA violate the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment provides protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, and …

Full Disclosure: Cognitive Science, Informants, And Search Warrant Scrutiny, Mary Bowman

Mary N. Bowman

Full Disclosure: Cognitive Science, Informants, and Search Warrant Scrutiny

By Mary Nicol Bowman

This article posits that cognitive biases play a significant role in the gap between the rhetoric regarding Fourth Amendment protection and actual practices regarding search warrant scrutiny, particularly for search warrants based on informants’ tips. Specifically, this article examines the ways in which implicit bias, tunnel vision, priming, and hindsight bias can affect search warrants. These biases can affect each stage of the search warrant process, including targeting decisions, the drafting process, the magistrate’s decision whether to grant the warrant, and post-search review by trial and appellate …

Defying Dna: Rethinking The Role Of The Jury In An Age Of Scientific Proof Of Innocence, Andrea L. Roth

Andrea L Roth

In 1946, public outrage erupted after a jury ordered Charlie Chaplin to support a child who, according to apparently definitive blood tests, was not his. Half a century later, juries have again defied apparently definitive evidence of innocence, finding criminal defendants guilty based on a confession or eyewitness notwithstanding exculpatory DNA test results. One might expect judges in such cases to direct an acquittal, on grounds that the evidence is legally insufficient because no rational juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet few if any do. Instead, courts defer to juries when they form an actual belief in …

The System Of Modern Criminal Conspiracy, Steven R. Morrison

Steven R Morrison

Something has changed in the modern system of American criminal conspiracy law compared to its prior iterations. This article explores that change, arguing that the system of modern criminal conspiracy now gives to the government such great discretion to charge and prove a conspiracy that unpopular ideas and the speech that expresses them have become ready subjects of prosecution. At its center, this article defines the system of modern conspiracy law, which is one of uniformity rather than dynamism. Where dynamic systems of law contain distinct components that perform different tasks (proving actus reus and mens rea, for example), the …

Opposing Mr. Big In Principle, David Milward

Dr. David Milward

No abstract provided.

Evidence, Probability, And The Burden Of Proof, Ronald J. Allen, Alex Stein

Alex Stein

This Article analyzes the probabilistic and epistemological underpinnings of the burden-of-proof doctrine. We show that this doctrine is best understood as instructing factfinders to determine which of the parties’ conflicting stories makes most sense in terms of coherence, consilience, causality, and evidential coverage. By applying this method, factfinders should try—and will often succeed—to establish the truth, rather than a statistical surrogate of the truth, while securing the appropriate allocation of the risk of error. Descriptively, we argue that this understanding of the doctrine—the “relative plausibility theory”—corresponds to our courts’ practice. Prescriptively, we argue that the relative-plausibility method is operationally superior …