Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
-
- Social and Behavioral Sciences (12)
- Economics (10)
- Industrial Organization (10)
- Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration (7)
- Business (6)
-
- Behavioral Economics (5)
- Communication (5)
- Communication Technology and New Media (5)
- E-Commerce (5)
- Economic Theory (5)
- Finance (5)
- Labor Economics (5)
- Public Policy (5)
- Science and Technology Studies (5)
- Antitrust and Trade Regulation (1)
- Business Administration, Management, and Operations (1)
- Human Resources Management (1)
- Labor Relations (1)
- Law (1)
- Performance Management (1)
- Institution
Articles 1 - 15 of 15
Full-Text Articles in Entire DC Network
The Dtv Coupon Program: A Boon To Retailers, Not Consumers, Scott J. Wallsten
The Dtv Coupon Program: A Boon To Retailers, Not Consumers, Scott J. Wallsten
Scott J. Wallsten
No abstract provided.
A Review Of The L-Band Auction, Peter Cramton
A Review Of The L-Band Auction, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
In May 2008, Ofcom’s L-band auction concluded. This was Ofcom’s second combinatorial clock auction. The auction used an innovative format intended to encourage an efficient assignment of the 17 lots. Eight bidders competed for the lots. In sharp contrast to the first combinatorial clock auction, the 10-40 GHz auction, in which each of the ten bidders won spectrum, in the L-band auction there was a single winner—Qualcomm won all the lots. This note briefly reviews the auction.
The Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rule For Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Robert Day
The Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rule For Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Robert Day
Peter Cramton
We report on the use of a quadratic programming technique in recent and upcoming spectrum auctions in Europe, and proposed for use in the FAA’s landing-slot auctions in the United States. Specifically, we compute a unique point “in the core” that minimizes the sum of squared deviations from the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payments. Analyzing the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we demonstrate that the resulting payments can be decomposed into a series of economically meaningful and equitable penalties, adding to the perceived “fairness” of this payment rule. Further, we discuss the many benefits of this combinatorial auction paradigm.
A Review Of The 10-40 Ghz Auction, Peter Cramton
A Review Of The 10-40 Ghz Auction, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
In February 2008, Ofcom’s 10-40 GHz auction concluded. This was Ofcom’s first combinatorial clock auction. The auction used an innovative format intended to encourage an efficient assignment of the 27 lots. Each of the ten bidders won one or more lots. All 27 lots were assigned. This note briefly reviews the auction.
Testimony For Fcc En Banc Hearing At Carnegie Mellon University On Broadband And The Digital Future, Scott J. Wallsten
Testimony For Fcc En Banc Hearing At Carnegie Mellon University On Broadband And The Digital Future, Scott J. Wallsten
Scott J. Wallsten
No abstract provided.
A Single European Regulator - Its 2008 Biennial Conference, Ewan Sutherland
A Single European Regulator - Its 2008 Biennial Conference, Ewan Sutherland
Ewan Sutherland
The story of the lack of progress towards a single European regulatory agency for telecommunications.
Understanding International Broadband Comparisons, Scott J. Wallsten
Understanding International Broadband Comparisons, Scott J. Wallsten
Scott J. Wallsten
No abstract provided.
Telecommunications In Africa: Small Island Developing States, Ewan Sutherland
Telecommunications In Africa: Small Island Developing States, Ewan Sutherland
Ewan Sutherland
Analysis of telecommunications policy and practice in Africa tends to focus on a few large markets (e.g., Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa), even though the lessons from these may not easily be scaled down for other countries. At the other extreme, the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) lie at the periphery, both geographically and in the sustainability and affordability of their services. They face disproportionate challenges in creating and maintaining properly functioning markets, not least as they are more susceptible to climatic and economic shocks. Like other African countries they too need to deliver services to businesses and citizens.
There …
Reverse Auctions And Universal Telecommunications Service: Lessons From Global Experience, Scott J. Wallsten
Reverse Auctions And Universal Telecommunications Service: Lessons From Global Experience, Scott J. Wallsten
Scott J. Wallsten
The United States now spends around $7 billion on universal service programs—subsidies intended to ensure that the entire country has access to telecommunications services. Most of this money supports telecommunications service in “high cost” (primarily rural) areas, and the High Cost fund is growing quickly. In response to this growth, policymakers are considering using reverse auctions, or bids for the minimum subsidy, as a way to reduce expenditures. While the U.S. has not yet distributed funds for universal service programs using reverse auctions, the method has been used widely. First, reverse auctions are akin to standard government procurement procedures, which …
Telecommunications 2004: Strategy, Hr Practices & Performance - Cornell-Rutgers Telecommunications Project, Rosemary Batt, Alex Colvin, Harry Katz, Jeffrey Keefe
Telecommunications 2004: Strategy, Hr Practices & Performance - Cornell-Rutgers Telecommunications Project, Rosemary Batt, Alex Colvin, Harry Katz, Jeffrey Keefe
Rosemary Batt
This national benchmarking report of the U.S. telecommunications services industry traces the tumultuous changes in management and workforce practices and performance in the sector over the last 5 years. This is a follow-up report to our 1998 study. At that time, when the industry was booming, we conducted a national survey of establishments in the industry. In 2003, we returned to do a second national survey of the industry, this time in a sector that was recovering from one of the worst recessions in its history.
A Tale Of Two Competition Law Regimes--The Telecom-Sector Competition Regulation In Hong Kong And Singapore, Thomas K. Cheng
A Tale Of Two Competition Law Regimes--The Telecom-Sector Competition Regulation In Hong Kong And Singapore, Thomas K. Cheng
Thomas K. Cheng
Competition law has seen very active development in Asia in recent years. Ironically, Hong Kong and Singapore, as two of the freest and most competitive economies in the region, long held a skeptical attitude towards competition law. Singapore enacted its first cross-sector competition law in 2004, some say only due to American pressure. For years, the Hong Kong government defended its sectoral model and insisted that the city had no need for a cross-sector competition law. However, that obstinate attitude shifted in March 2007, when the government announced that Hong Kong would follow Singapore's footsteps. Until the new law is …
The Economics Of Pacific Bell V. Linkline Communications, Scott J. Wallsten
The Economics Of Pacific Bell V. Linkline Communications, Scott J. Wallsten
Scott J. Wallsten
No abstract provided.
Innovation And Market Design, Peter Cramton
Innovation And Market Design, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
Market design plays an essential role in promoting innovation. I examine emission allowance auctions, airport slot auctions, spectrum auctions, and electricity markets, and demonstrate how the market design can encourage innovation. Improved pricing information is one source of innovation. Enhancing competition is another driver of innovation seen in all of the applications. Market design fosters innovation in other ways as well by addressing other potential market failures.
The Effect Of Incumbent Bidding In Set-Aside Auctions: An Analysis Of Prices In The Closed And Open Segments Of Fcc Auction 35, Peter Cramton, Allan T. Ingraham, Hal J. Singer
The Effect Of Incumbent Bidding In Set-Aside Auctions: An Analysis Of Prices In The Closed And Open Segments Of Fcc Auction 35, Peter Cramton, Allan T. Ingraham, Hal J. Singer
Peter Cramton
This paper examines the impact of an incumbent carrier’s participation in two simultaneously conducted auctions: one set-aside for non-incumbents and one open to all carriers. This paper estimates the extent to which prices in the closed auction were inflated by the participation of incumbents. This paper also estimates what prices would have been in the open auction had incumbents been excluded from bidding in the closed. It is found that an incumbent’s participation in the closed auction through a front, Alaska Native, enabled it to win more licenses at lower prices in FCC Auction 35. In contrast, non-incumbents won fewer …
Telecommunications In South-East Europe: Operators, Reforms And Outcomes, Ewan Sutherland
Telecommunications In South-East Europe: Operators, Reforms And Outcomes, Ewan Sutherland
Ewan Sutherland
This paper sets out the policy frameworks adopted by governments in South East Europe to address the deficit of access networks and thus boost economic development. The responses by large European operators to the opportunities are then explained and analysed. The effects of the policies and the operator responses are then discussed. Finally, conclusions for policy makers and for researchers are drawn.