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Thailand And Its Shortcut Towards General Competition In Telecommunications Industry, Piyabutr Bunaramrueang
Thailand And Its Shortcut Towards General Competition In Telecommunications Industry, Piyabutr Bunaramrueang
piyabutr bunaramrueang
It is commonly known that telecommunications industry requires a specific set of regulations in dealing with its own critical issues, particularly of asymmetric regulation in its context of natural monopoly. Today in the digital age, telecommunications industry is transitioning towards general competition meaning that the specific conditions are fading out; specific rules are becoming unnecessary. The United States and the European Union have provided the most advanced examples in this area which have being developed for more than a century. Nonetheless, each country has its own conditions and specific requirements. For examples, the United States possesses very strong systems interplaying …
An Overview Of Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
An Overview Of Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction: An Opportunity To Protect Competition In A Consolidating Industry, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson
The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction: An Opportunity To Protect Competition In A Consolidating Industry, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson
Peter Cramton
This paper is provided in connection with the 2007 Telecommunications Symposium – Voice, Video and Broadband: The Changing Competitive Landscape and Its Impact on Consumers, sponsored by the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (“the Division”). Our focus is on the state of competition in the wireless sector. Maintaining a competitive wireless sector is particularly critical if, as the Division’s agenda indicates, wireless services are to function as a competitive alternative to wireline technologies. Strengthening competition is especially important now after recent mergers that consolidated the wireless industry into a few dominant firms (two to four depending on …
Testimony On Broadband To Senate Committee On Small Business And Entrepreneurship, Scott J. Wallsten
Testimony On Broadband To Senate Committee On Small Business And Entrepreneurship, Scott J. Wallsten
Scott J. Wallsten
No abstract provided.
Monopoly Rights In The Privatization Of Telephone Firms, Bruno E. Viani
Monopoly Rights In The Privatization Of Telephone Firms, Bruno E. Viani
Bruno E. Viani
Data from utility privatization sales in 74 countries is analyzed to investigate why governments award monopoly rights, and how monopoly affects government revenue from these sales. Financially constrained governments are more likely to award monopoly rights. Interest groups and institutions are important. Increased importance of taxed business users reduces the probability of a government granting monopoly rights, while an increase in the importance of subsidized residential users has the opposite effect. Durable democracies and market-oriented governments are less likely to award monopoly rights. Monopolies increase government revenue by 66 percent.
Telecommunications In Transitioning Towards General Competition: A Comparative Study On Interconnection In The U.S., The Eu And Thailand, Piyabutr Bunaramrueang
Telecommunications In Transitioning Towards General Competition: A Comparative Study On Interconnection In The U.S., The Eu And Thailand, Piyabutr Bunaramrueang
piyabutr bunaramrueang
Telecommunications industry is generally known for its specific set of regulations in dealing with its own critical issues, particularly of competition in the context of natural monopoly and asymmetric regulation. Interconnection is the major condition which is intensely regulated. Nonetheless, telecommunications regulations are transitioning towards general competition meaning that the specific conditions are fading out; specific rules are becoming unnecessary. The regulation of interconnection is now in question. The United States and the European Union have provided the most advanced examples which have been developing for more than a century. However, each country has its own conditions and specific requirements. …
Comments On The Fcc’S Proposed Competitive Bidding Procedures For Auction 73, Peter Cramton, Gregory Rosston, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson
Comments On The Fcc’S Proposed Competitive Bidding Procedures For Auction 73, Peter Cramton, Gregory Rosston, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
Neither Fish Nor Fowl: New Strategies For Selective Regulation Of Information Services, Robert M. Frieden
Neither Fish Nor Fowl: New Strategies For Selective Regulation Of Information Services, Robert M. Frieden
Rob Frieden
Neither Fish Nor Fowl: New Strategies for Selective Regulation of Information Services Rob Frieden Professor, Penn State University 102 Carnegie Building University Park, Pennsylvania 16802 (814) 863-7996; rmf5@psu.edu web site: http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/r/m/rmf5/ The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) has created a dichotomy between telecommunications and information services with an eye toward limiting traditional common carrier regulation to the former category. This regulatory dichotomy provides the basis for exempting most Internet-mediated services from traditional telephony regulation that requires carriers to provide nondiscriminatory network interconnection even with competitors. To support its deregulatory mission the FCC has found ways to subordinate the telecommunications components in …
The Public Network, Thomas B. Nachbar
The Public Network, Thomas B. Nachbar
Thomas B Nachbar
This article addresses the timely yet persistent question of how best to regulate access to telecommunications networks. Concerns that private firms may use their ownership of communications networks to their own economic advantage has led many to propose restrictions, variously referred to as “network neutrality” or “open access” proposals, on network operators. To date, the network neutrality debate has focused almost exclusively on economic arguments for or against such regulation. Taking a step back from current debates, this paper seeks to derive from established law the accepted bases for imposing nondiscrimination rules and then to work forward to ask whether …
Economist Letter To Ntia On 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Simon Wilkie, Robert Wilson
Economist Letter To Ntia On 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Simon Wilkie, Robert Wilson
Peter Cramton
As the 700 MHz auction approaches, we are writing to clear up a common misconception about the nature of spectrum auctions and the impact of various rules on auction revenues.
Essential Entry: Revenues In The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton
Essential Entry: Revenues In The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
A common misconception is that an open access provision on a sliver of the 700 MHz spectrum would reduce auction revenues. In fact, the open access, wholesale, and bidding credit provisions put forth by Frontline Wireless, will motivate new entry, enhance competition in the auction, and raise revenues.
Revenues In The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson
Revenues In The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson
Peter Cramton
There have been several comments that criticize auction rules that prevent the two major low-frequency incumbents from winning all of the newly available spectrum and incorporating it into their proprietary networks. Such rules include new-entrant set-asides, new-entrant bidding credits, and the open access plan. We disagree with these criticisms and argue that given the current market structure, such rules are likely to improve welfare and auction revenues. We are submitting this report to provide sound economic analysis of these claims.
Economic Comments On The Design Of The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson
Economic Comments On The Design Of The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Robert Wilson
Peter Cramton
We comment on the service and auction rules discussed in the Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making, FCC 07-72, 27 April 2007. We recommend that the FCC designate one license for a wholesale operation that provides open access nationwide on nondiscriminatory terms. This is necessary to enable entry of new businesses offering wireless services in retail markets. It also enables local operators to offer roaming at competitive prices. The new license accords with the Commission’s policy to encourage competition, and recognizes the benefits to consumers from low prices and expanded services.
Why Large Licenses Are Best For The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton
Why Large Licenses Are Best For The 700 Mhz Spectrum Auction, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
No abstract provided.
A Regulatory Play In Two Acts, Scott J. Wallsten
A Regulatory Play In Two Acts, Scott J. Wallsten
Scott J. Wallsten
No abstract provided.