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Sharing And Anti-Sharing In Teams, Robert D. Cooter, Roland Kirstein
Sharing And Anti-Sharing In Teams, Robert D. Cooter, Roland Kirstein
Robert Cooter
Compared to budget-balanced Sharing contracts, Anti-Sharing may improve the efficiency of teams. The Anti-Sharer collects a fixed payment from all team members; he receives the actual output and pays out its value to them. If a team members becomes Anti-Sharer, he will be unproductive in equilibrium. Hence, internal Anti-Sharing fails to yield the first-best outcome. Anti-Sharing is more likely to yield a higher team profit than Sharing, the larger the team, the curvature of the production function, or the marginal effort cost. Sharing is more likely to be better, the greater the marginal product, the cross-partials of the production function, …
Anti-Sharing As A Theory Of Partnerships And Firms, Robert D. Cooter, Roland Kirstein
Anti-Sharing As A Theory Of Partnerships And Firms, Robert D. Cooter, Roland Kirstein
Robert Cooter
Anti-Sharing may improve the efficiency of teams. The Anti-Sharer collects a fixed payment from all team members; he receives the actual output and pays out its value to them. However, if a team members assumes the role of an "internal" Anti-Sharer, he will be unproductive in equilibrium. Hence, internal Anti-Sharing fails to yield the first-best outcome. External Anti-Sharing may induce the team members to choose efficient effort. The paper presents possible applications of Anti-Sharing: while internal Anti-Sharing may provide an explanation for the existence of senior (or managing) partners, external Anti-Sharing leads to a new theory of the incorporated firm.