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Regulating The Corporate Governance Of State-Owned Enterprises In Investment Arbitration, Mark Mclaughlin
Regulating The Corporate Governance Of State-Owned Enterprises In Investment Arbitration, Mark Mclaughlin
Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law
The renaissance of sovereign investment is one of the defining economic trends of the 21st century. While many states have benefitted, and continue to benefit, from an influx of state-backed foreign investment, this embrace is not without its hesitancies. Host states are particularly concerned that state-owned enterprises (SOE s) pursue non-commercial policy objectives, maintain lower levels of transparency than their private counterparts, and operate with inferior standards of responsible business conduct. In response, domestic regulators have enacted a series of countermeasures for SOE investment, including requirements that such enterprises must invest on a “commercial basis.” However, the regulation of foreign …
Do Government Linked Companies Hold More Cash?, Chenxi Liu, Kian Leong Nelson Yap, Sili Zhou
Do Government Linked Companies Hold More Cash?, Chenxi Liu, Kian Leong Nelson Yap, Sili Zhou
Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law
In this paper, we investigate the cash holings of government linked corporations (GLCs) in Singapore, with different levels of Temasek Holdings ownership. We find evidence that Temasek owned public firms hold on average substantially more cash than otherwise similar public firms listed on SGX. This result is robust to different measures of Temasek ownership. We also show that when GLCs have excess cash, they do not spend it on capital expenditure, acquisition, dividends or share repurchase. Instead, they hoard these excess cash leading to an accumulation of cash. In addition, we show that Temasek firms are on average more profitable, …
The Efficiency Of Friendliness: Japanese Corporate Governance Succeeds Again Without Hostile Takeovers, Dan W. Puchniak
The Efficiency Of Friendliness: Japanese Corporate Governance Succeeds Again Without Hostile Takeovers, Dan W. Puchniak
Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law
It is widely assumed that hostile takeovers are a prerequisite for an efficient system of corporate governance. This assumption is false. Since the new millennium, Japan has transformed itself from being on the brink of one of the largest economic meltdowns in modern economic history to currently being in the midst of its longest period of postwar economic expansion (2002-2007). This astounding recovery was achieved without a single successful hostile takeover of a major Japanese company. True to its postwar tradition, corporate Japan has successfully restructured through government intervention, bank-driven reallocation of capital, and orchestrated and friendly mergers — the …